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TO
THE KOREAN WAR
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History Honors Thesis
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,

Introduction

--------

Very little has been written on the peace movement during the
Korean war.

Historian Joseph Conlin assessed the period and con-

cluded that " when hostilities with North Korean troops commenced
in 1950, the American antiwar movement stood at its nadir."
rence Wittner's fine book Rebels Against
ican peace movement from 1941 to 1960 .

Wa~

Law-

is devoted to the Amer-

yet out of this
, book's 300-

odd pages, less than three concern the movement during the Korean
war--and most of this discussion is focussed on those elements in
the movement which supported the war.

This is typical of the major secondary sources on the ·American peace movement. 1
It is certainly true that the Korean war met with surprisingly

little public resistance , especially initially.

Republicans j oined

Democrats in applauding Truman's decision to intervene.

More sur-

prisingly , a number of traditionally pacifist individuals, organizations anq p.eri"o.d ioals endorsed the war , including some that had
'f;'

not supported world War Two.

Prominent in this category were Nor-

man Thomas, the Socialist Party, Dwight MacDonald and the Progressive.
Opposition to the war in the mainstream press was practically
nonexist 9.nt.

In July, 1950 Time

magaizine gave its position, which

would remain fundamentally unchanged throughout the war, in an article provocatively titled "In the Cause of Peace":
i nt ention to

de~troy What

"The communist

order existed in the rest of the world had

been plainly published and implacably pursued, " they began.

Time ' s

conclusion argued that "the road ahead of the U.S. was going t o
be harder than any it ever travelled ... if they could strike back
at communism ... if they could prove their power and purpose in Asia,

ii.
the U.S. and the free world might win through peace. "

Newsweek

echoed these sentiments in articles with titles such as "Angry
U.S. Girds for Rough War," and " Call to Arms Against Wo rld Aggres.
2

Slon. "

A final indication of the absence of opposition in the mainstream press was the number of antiwar advertisements taken out
in the

B~~

xork Times:

in the entire course of the Korean war,

only two such advertisements appeared, one from the American Friends
A

Service Committe,- and the other from an individual; in comparison,
in the single year after the inception of American bombing raids
on North Vietnam in February, 1965, twenty-seven antiwar advertisements appeared in the Times from tw·enty-fi ve different organizations,
collectively containing 9,476 signatures. 3
But, as opinion poll data collected by John Mueller shows,
American opinion was never a monolith of support for the war.
When q Gallup poll survey in August, 1950, asked the question,
"Do you think the U.S. made a mistake going into the Korean war
or not?'·, they found 66% of the respondents favored the war, 19%
were opposed, and 15% had no opinion.

This question

wa~

repeatedly

asked throughout the war, however, and neve!: again would support
of the war be over 50%--in 1952 , support dipped to 36%, with 46%
opposed to the war. 4
Opinion polls can yield deceptive results, and great discrepancies can be created by subtle shifts in wording.

For example ,

thi s result from early January, 1951:
" Question--Now that Communist China had entered the fighting

iii .

in Korea with forces far outnumbering the United Nations troops
there , which one of these courses would you, yourself, prefer?":
pullout of Korea as fast as possible.
66%
keep troops there to fight these larger forces.
25%
no opinion.
9%
Compare this result with the following, also asked in J anuary ,

1951 :
" Question--Do you think we should pull our troops out of Korea
now, or should we try to stay on as long as possible z":
,pull troops out.
20%
67%
try t? ~taY5on
no oplnlon.
13%
Overall, though, the data suggests a sizable minority of Americans did not support the war .

The following question was introduced

in October, 1952:
" Question--As th ings stand now , do you feel that t he war in
Korea has been worth fighting or not? "

In late October, 1952 ,

only 31% answered this question affirma'bively, with 56% answering
" no".

For the remainder of the war, the antiwar response to this

question remained above 50% , and the "pro " response never exceeded

39%.6
Even ques t ions with wording that tended to produce heavier
pro-war results revealed significant opposition :
"Questi6n--On the whole, do you approve or disapprove of President Truman's action in sending American troops to stop the Communist invasion of Korea?"

In August , 1950, 75% gave the pro-war

response , and 19% gave the antiwar response.

In September, 1953,

when the war had ended , support had dropped only to 64%, with 28%
opposing .

But in the middle of the war, in March 1952 , only

50%

iv .

answered "yes" to this somewhat leading ques tion, and 4 0% answered

7

"no" . .

There seems to have been a noticable section of th e American
population which was firmly opposed to the war.

Mueller concludes

that during the war, about 15-35% of t he American population actually favored withdrawal from Korea, and that starting in 1952 ,
this figure settled in to around 30%--approximately one third of
the American population.

Mueller even argues that the Korean war

and the Vietnam war were " supported to much the same degree, " and
also that
the same."

" th~

sentiment for withdrawal for the two wars was roughly

Mueller's implicit thesis is that opposition to the

Vietnam war was not as widespread as was popularly believed , i.e .
in this sense no greater than opposition to the Korean war.

But

this argument cuts bo th ways.S

In fact there was a peace movement during the Korean war.
Although Conscientious Objection will not be a focus of this paper, it is worth noting that the number of classified Conscientious
Objectors in the years 1951-1955 was a slightly higher percentage
of living registrants than in the years 1941-45.

"

classified C.O.s in the Korean war period ;

There were 15 , 000

Zelle Larsin argues

that if one includes noncombattants , th ose who refused to register ,
and th ose who went to prison, there were in this period "21,000
draft-age youn~ men with conscientious scruples against war.,,9
Moreover, although pacifist and peace organizations would
never have a profound impact on daily American life during this

v.

period, they- were often active and articulate critics of the war.
These groups were capable of insightful and intelligent critiques
of American foreign policy as well as moral opposition to war.
Pacifists were joined in their opposition by a number of prominent
black commentators.

And in a much more cautious way, " left" liberals

grew increasingly critical of the war as the war went on.
This paper will not argue that the Korean war provoked massive

,

resistance, huge demonstrations, or a popular renunciation of American motives .

But this paper will try to

docum~nt

and describe the

ideas, principles and actions of a heretofore ignored minority
viewpoint in American history:

the antiwar movement during the

Korean war .

Notes on Method:

the first two chapters of this thesis are

meant to provide background.

The first chapter is on t he history

of the American peace movement, with a slight emphasis on the movement during times of war.
war itself.

The second chapter is on the Korean

This chapter provides a chronological sketch of the

~.\!ar

for reference, but mainly focusses on the origins of the war--specifically, the period of the " liberation" of Korea, 1945-50.

It is

important to address these origins not only because they provide
a more complete picture of the war , but also because many of those
who opposed the war referred to these origins in formulating their
antiwar positions.
The bulk of the opposition to the Korean war came fro m pacifis t
and " near pacifist" groups , and h ence chapter thre e , wh ich discus-

vi.

ses this opposition , is the l ongest.

Chapt er four looks at the re-

sponse of the " left" liberals, and s h ows a very different kind of
criticism.

This chapter also serves to show the limits of debate

with in the mainstream, for the "left" liberals were the most radical fringe of the mainstream at this t ime.

Finally , a strong and

different kind of opposition is shown in the chapter on black opinion.
Twa types of thought will not be looked at in

d~pth:

criti-

cism from the radical left and criticism from the radical right.
These and other categories will be discussed near the end in a
section on why certain segments of the peace movement did not exis t.
It will be argued that opposition from the
cant, and that
" oppositiori"

le,ft was not signifi-

what has sometimes been referred to as right-wing

to the war was in fact not opposition.

Finally ; I.F. stone, a prominent critic of the war, will not
b e examined in depth.
j}orea!:! Yiar

p

stone ' s book,

1h~

Hidden Histor;y

~f

.!he

written in 1952 , challenged the official explanation

of how the war began , and raised a number of questions about the'
origins of the war which remain unanswered.
of the war to its end.

stone remained a critic

But stone also found himself completsly

isolated during the Korean war:,

his journal , the

collapsed in November, 1952 (his famous

!~ekly

Dai~

Compass ,

would not begin publi-

cation until after the war); he had enormous difficulty finding
a publisher for The

Hidd~!:!

History

~f

!he Korea!:!

Yi~,

finally hitting

on Leo Hub e rman and Paul Sweezy of the left-wing Nionthlx Review
by accident; and when the book came out, it was only reviewed in
Americ a by th e Nation and the New Republic-- two " left" liberal

vii.

journals.

Equally importantly , a thorough treatment of stone during

the Korean war already exists in Norman Kaner's essay, " I.F. Stone
and the Korean War", published in .,gold War Critics (Th omas Pater son, editor ).
Acknowledgements are due to:

Steven Fine , who gave me valu-

able advice, and whose thesis was very helpful to me in putting together my own; the Jerome Davis Committee, whose

gran~

h elped fund

my research at Swarthmore; members of the staff at the Swarthmore
Peace collection, especially J. Richard KYle, . who were helpful
beyond the call of duty; and to my friends, especially Amy Bachrach,
who probably heard more about this topic than they really wanted
to .
lVIy adviser , Clayton Koppes , deserves special mention.

Without

his encouragement, guidance and support , this paper would not have
been written.

He is responsible for most of what is good , and none

of what is bad in this thesis .
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"A

~Jeace

movement

'I:d thout

tb e pacifists \\Iould be an.

-- Ja~nes Sbot\'i el1 1
The history of pacifist and peace organizations in
America has been filled \'lith a wide variety of differing, and
frequently conflicting, viewpoints.

Sectarianism, ideological

debate and truly important differences in philosopby,
strategy and tactics bave marked this heterogeneous movement
since tbe 1776 Revolution.

T'nroughout, bowever, there bave

been a number of broad, distinct scbools of thought which
have influenced the various p e ace vTOrkers up to the Korean
\jar, and indeed tllrough to today.
ideologies have overlapped.

In a nUJilber of cases,

But vitally different ideas still

pushed and pulled in very different directions.

}~acb

of these

schools has its strengths and ,</eaknesses, '.'lhicb can be shown
in an oV3rview of tli e bistory of tb e peace Elovenent in America
UTI

to th 2 I(orean :'!ar.
Or'G;Ci,luzed peace activity at the time of the n.evolutionary

~

'. ~-'1

" "d.

was aluost exclusiVely a religious activity, pril'1arily

coming out of the Historic Peace Churches:

The Society of

Priends, the Brethr()n, and the rIennonites.

War was seen as

a rnore/r81igious issue:

il l'J ar, considered in itself, is the

p;CSEledi ta.tad and cl. Gternin:;d Q!=struc tic)i} of

hU:':!8.n

b e ings, of

- 2 -

'-~u aker

}\.ntlwny Bcmezet in 1778.

Tbese groups sbowed

c)posi tioD b ;' refusing to pay Vlar taxes, accept payment for
se ized goods, or take loyalty oaths.

The Mennonites offered

conElutati ol1 fees in lieu of service, but t he Utcpian Sh akers
and the :DretlJren vievJed tllis as passing one f s duty on to

an otber , an d did not allo\'l it.

Tbe enormous popularity of tb e

Revolution however, especially wben it was over, made all tbese
groups, an:l the idea of peace organizations in gen'2ral tempo rarily unpopular.
:i3ut

2

feVi decad.es later,

8..

'.'l~l en

the U. S . plunged back into

"Jar with Bl'i tain, oppo si tion beca."l1e quite widespr ead .
'3c-~ sily

be argued that the 1:!a1' of 1812 was tbe most unpopular

','far th e l ' • .3.

l)CJ.ssed by
" ~'l

It could

ever to cl~ part in:

th 2 declaration of viar only

19":'13 vot e in t he Senate, and 79-49 in tbe House;

3,

e Vial' J:"!partrllsn-c could never 1;lan the arr;:y to more than balf

its authorized strength; Oongres s provided for 50,000 re6ruits
[-}.nd got o!.!.ly 10 ,000;,~~.lled

io~'.:'

~)()I' t,

", '\j " f.:~:C

frO E'l

,vbicb

\,18

ar e descended!:; rJortheastern

e onsist s 11tly refus ed t o subscrib03 t o 'V/3.r loans;

"~2,:;;J . ,

" '~~'i ti S!l

gov"ernor C8ileb stron.g

a public fast of 8:tonement for l:u:!erica f s attack

!lupon tb e nation
:C' i ,1ancif~Y's

~·:ais88ic.11.D_8setts ,

8.tt ,:?mp-csd to fr ee a group of 3ri tish prisoners

gSlic:: r2.1 to tl7 t o discov8T \,ll12.t D:J:'itisb J: 2action would

~~ 1."1. '3 -trl t?] G S

01

Importantly, tbouglJ,

- 3 -

wb entba war had ended, a new mood took over:
took

ir:l~18nse

ta in3Q

satisfaction in tbe feeling that they bad mail1-

tlF~ir

national h onor, I.1 \'Iri tes historian Charl8s

:D ;!.Jcnedetti,

lIa n ore full-bodied spirit of nationalism

swept the country. "

The peace mOv8@ent was learning a lesson

J ohn Haynes Eolmes would point out a century later:

that

the irony of war was that "through its very effectiveness, it
propagates itself. n3
Soon after the war, a number of n ew, secular peace societies
b egan to crop up.

Ille most significant of tbese \'Jas the P..meri-

can Peace Society, founded in 1828 out of the New York Peace
So ciety allcI the

=·~;~)·3saC(mSGtts

Peace Soci,sty.

~he

APS became

;:tb'3 fi:cst secular peace so ciety wi tll national aspirations.

.

AP3 also included a large number of women; the
imnortance
.

~lS

of

II

':v'O:i:;2TI

in th c; b istory of the Arr:erican peace movement cannot

be over-emphasized.

Tlw

j~P3

debated tbe issues of "absolute !!

IJacifiso,ancl I!defensi ve if wars, and gradually enlarged its
t'.embel s11ip.
1

But tbe APS, and indeed the entIt:e U. S. peace

:JO V2UGntwould soon be shattered by another of the traditional
oDstacJ. (; S to pacifist ideals :

tll ~ belief in th 8

11

justness II

,

0 ': a

L!...

-"..'i2,.).-- • .

_
v
..
the greatest
dread of military
sunre-

n::;.c=n :":;-1,; J.

e:'-:::'.-r·ry out

~1G. VI3

(~oc:. '

becoInG so despera te wi tll bope-deferred , th at

s la':18 ••• I am cO.Y lvinced that tc1is is tbe great

~,

d'

.lly 19.

~,

. ., d..

~;n l.L

- 4 -

Child \vas not the only former nonresistant to give a +v
least SO L,8 endorS8t!lent to the Civil Har.

Forner · cdi tor of th e

anti-war, anti-go\rern!nent Liberator, Uilliam Lloyd Garrison wrote
a friend j!ZTow is no time for minute criticism of Lincoln
':--L<~public anism •••
J

for they are in.struments in the bands of God

co carry i'orlvard and help achieve the great object of eman-

cipation ••• the war is fearfully to scourge the nation but •••
grand results are to follow.! !

The . conversions continued:

nyou see bow warlike I bave become,!! wrote forner nonresistant
and feminist AngeIiYla Grimke,

slavery. l!.

~2b

lIO, yes--wa.r is better than

e AP3 backed tb e war:

"A stranger, unapprised

of the purpose of tbis meeting would have supposed it for the
vindic8.ticn of the 'dar, rather tban tbat of peace,!f remarked
Viol<3l1t feelillgs even ran high i"i.1 one man who h ad

one Eierao ,? r.

formerly accepted
ridli tia:

BTl:; ese

imprisonj'-~i3nt

rather than serve intbe

lUssourians are not men.

llhen I live with

men made in God's image I will never shoot tbem;but these
~/CO-Sl8.V

cry

~'Iissourians

- 8.nc. me.y ba sho t v!i to

\'ibo cluYlg to tbe

O.1"e demons from the bottomless pit

ii~1punity. I!

fi?~ i tb

Finally, even fl1e..ny of those

ad;'li tted feeling an iPlpotence remarkably

1ike th8': ,,/ :ic'n \'wuld , be expressed b7 pacifists during 'do rIel
;·?1'

II.

'. ·rot2 Gh8.rJ,eS K.rl1fpple:

J_ stilJ_ ho16 in reGard. til<':: unjustifiablenes,s of i;Jal' ••
J.esc;lutely d-':;-GerTnined not to fight myself, and continl).1Jl :;; firFl ill -[:;118 position of advising no OTIC;
c:ls -; ~~O fish t, I y l3 t rc cogi1i Z G -tIl:; fact that if
,
".
t -'1
SCI! ':'~: .. :)') y
do s::.: no J
G I l g'.1 iJ "'Co prev81!" G,]S SUCC!CSS OI
-""].~
,::'ia·'7r.>1101.i
·
,
·-"
",
+1,Yi
"
"Till
q-uc",a.p"!
"nd b-('iil'''' -:-1.1 ....,
i.J :,. .'
. _, _ _
v l 1 . . .. .
"J1'J'::' ~' , :; n ation UDder -ttl c: opi.:ratioli of tll e slav'e system.
~

~

'Ii

"-' ~

'..L

,

•

0 " ;"

••'

__

I_' ~

..1

~

I

, . _

__

r....;

L..

OJ

... ...

L~

<""'!.o_

___ "-_, ~

',J

1._ ', .

•

- 5 A serias of violsi1tdraft riots marked protest to the \"Jar,
blrt these Here, far removed from the traditional peace moverll~l1t,

wbidl Vlas agonizing over means, ends, and

\'iolcmco.

n justifiable !!

:Despite tll,? protests, and despite the existence of

1 ,500 consci::::ntious

After the

'Vial',

o-iJjector~

to tbe war, the Civil l.iar
movement . II 6

the APS began slowly to rebuild itself.

"'" 'lore radical group, tbe Universal Peace Union, was forr:1sd
in 1866.

Significantly, tbe UPUwas one-third female, and

featured S'ltch p:corninent members as Susan B. Anthony, Lucretia
~:'ctt,
J(~}

BelvL Loch:v!Qod and Lucy stone.

e UEt] would beco;:ne !:tl1 e

~j.?,cifist

1!10 st

action in tllO country,

Althougb by the 1890s

visi ole cente]:' of non-sectarian
11

even in this period Htb e

l·':,i::'·:loe:cship of tll e U:2U renained. snaIl and its influence minil~1s..1.

u

StiJ.l,

11 elred prOTJote a wider nDn-violent ideo-

1Jgy th an that of the APS.

It stressed Christian love, opposed

c;",!)i tal punislrment, opposed military drills in educational
i:'lStitutioi1S , atJd op};y:Jsed
- <'\1"1:1.

bomiC;.

.Al trJOugl1 it

",JaS

co~C'por81

skeptical of socialism, th eUPU ,,·ras

uf :p8rsonal a.nd natio118,1 aubition ,
~~l-!;:;

i8

punisbmej1t botb in tbe scbool

prefe:cr'1ent or pride, and

mutil;"tion , tOTture and death of men from the lower classes
less an object of consideration than the

ElO11;:;Y

~:;J:' their o::':'-nLi-pn2nt and. support. as soldiers .!l7

required

- 6 -

L)'~o

COUIUSlon dUl'ing the Civil \[8;r, tbis consciousness allovlsd

c1,:r'l to see tb e S·'Janisb-Ar!1eric3.l1 Viar and tb 3 :?ilipino-American

·J

:.!c:.r wi tb greater cla:('i ty.

Opposition to tb e forrwr . ."ras . fairly

U111Jopular; Tj?U leader Alfred Love was burned in effigy over
b is organization's d ,e nounciation of the war, and the UPU
never completely

recover~d

from the ensuing attacks upon it.

But protest of the :i!'ilipino Vlar was more successful, and soon
8
tllereemerged a broad-based ~nti-imperialist movement.
The movement emerged in the spring of 1898 in reaction to
reports tl]2.t Anerica was planning to annex the Philippines •
."
::::'tle coaliti on which opposed this included traditional peace

groups,

fe~n inists,

~:8.sb ington,

mugvrumps, black activists like Booker T.

Vlhi te supremacists like Be.TI

leaders IE: ,:: Samuel Gompers.

Tillrn~,

and labor

Needless to say different people

involved themselves for very different reasons.

Still, eruption

of the war nade the Anti-imperialist League a national movement of over 30 , 000 members, the largest anti-war organization
p':?r capita in U. S. history.

In 1899 -- previewing things

tbat woulO. CODe in later years, -- ?ostmaster General Emory
3Cli tb

orde:::'1c~:l

the r emoval of Edward Atkinson's anti-imperial-

iet ':lritLl::';s fron mail s8nt to
outcry was
dYlm.

S'J

tht~

Philippines.

Th e ensuing

great, however, tbat the government had to back

Unic,x--'cunately, the contradictory forces wi thin th e

.,.cv::-!vmt pulled it apart.

In the 1900 electiol1s most anti-

h:;:;,;eriali3ts supported W.J. Bryan but the. conservatives, in,::lw~~ing

(; :~.r;j ~gi8

c1ist:cL<.s t sd and opposed bi!:l..

Also, by this

- 7 -

t i ill2 thB U. 3 . Aruy had more or less crush e d th e i n surrection.
B~ t\'12en
~, 'i'
_ ,
\", 0:;'

250,000 and 600,000 Filipinos died because of th e

but th e U.S. lost only 7, 000 men , and I-I cKinley won an

eas:,/" re-el e ction. 9

In t'n e early years of th e T','lentieth Century , a new element
ent e red the movesent:

large, sometimes heavily funded, con-

servative and legalistic peace organizations.

The origins

of th ese groups VJ ere in th e Nineteenth Century Arbitration
In the decade before World l,r{ar I, 45 peace societies

Leagues .

ivs r e est a::.'l ished, including those wi th names like the !merican
3cci e ty o f I n t e rnatio!1 8,l Law,and the American Society for
oTuc5 i c2.al :)st tlenen t of International Disputes.
l1 a~ , ;e G. ,

but in t-il e SCl!'rJ. e i d eologic a l

ballpar~

Less obviously

were the American

:3CClOo'l P eace Lea.gue t he ',J ew York and Chicago Peace Societies,
and, rJC3,ny o t ll ers 0
cJ~/:; at ed

In 191 0 , the l{orld Peace Organization was

8.:}O_ lf han d so me ly :orovid e d for " by publisher Edwin

Ginn , and i 'J 1910 and 1914 respectively, Andrew Carnegie did
th2 s a']? :C.] :::, t b:::; Carn egie }:njownlen t for International Peace,

a n d the Cburcc} Peac e Ll1i'},[1 .
;:-m d

S9:':1

~hes e

groups were more cautious,

tlL3"l.3el v ,: s as bein g more !!practical!l than previously

~]X L3 :~ 2. '-1 ~

v/;: r:. : J::o:'ail

.~') ':,e C~

or gal1 i z::;.-t i ol1 s.

1~:>'; ~!-tL,-< s l1 t aJi -C:;T

':21; e~! d e si r ed to move p e ace

to rationality. 'f

One

~;12asure

of this

- 8 -

S

c>r>-u'r"'u-1
....... v
.
•
~....

f!

10

i\.epresenting another equally "practical il and elitist school
of thought were the rising nwnber of groups whicb favored
formal world organizations as the best plan to ensure peace .
This category can be broken down into two subdivisions:

the

truly federationist groups that favored international governing
bodies with police powers, and the legalists, who merely
called for a World Court and more formally codified international law .

Tensions and· differences existed vd thin and

between these groups, but they were often smoothed over in
favor of stressing similarities.

And similarities abounded .

1bese groups tended to sbare a Progressive (in its contemporary

m ,~aning)

political ideology, believed that .Alnerican insti-

tutions cou'ld and should be adopted for the world system, and
had· a vaguely naive faith in man's progress.

People in this

category also tended to come from a narrow social base .
Usually, they were Wlli te , urban, Anglo-3axon, protestant and
professional.

Elitist to the core, they avoided mass

CaL'l-

paigns, as well as contacts with socialists, immigrants or
labor groups.

,AI thougb World War I put a momentary damper

on t'Ij ei::::, r,lOVG!11?11 t, tll ey would soon reap-pear to back the IJeague
ofi\!s.tio ns, and they a,nel tbsir ideological descendents would
r'eLlai~l

maven

an

:;1:1 ~c .

!.: . 3 .
tbt::

P38.C(;

important part; of the evolution of the U.S. peacG
11
e11 ·tI~~.r

i n to 'dorld

mOVGI!12nt .

~·;ar

I in ll.pril , 19 17 , splin tared

In 191 Ci, antirdli tarists lJ8.d formed
AUAr·! v.,as a pro-

- 9 -

gressive, social reform group.

They declared toat their rigot

to protest wa.r ca.me from unemployment on tbe v!8.terfront, toe
misery of ci ties, . and financial depression.

t o their radicalism, ho\·vevsr.

There WBre limits

Toey announced that if the U.S.

lncame invo1ved in tbe war, thGY VJould cea.se protest of it.
Ideally, they wanted to the

n.s.

U.S~

to act as a neutral mediator.

entry into the 1.var split the AuAil into the Civil Liberties

Sureau(wl1icl1 beca.me tbe ACLU in 1920) and the Committee on
IT::;tbing at All, whi ch, in 1918 becam e th e J.Jeague of F:L'ee lIations
Association.

Other progressives joined the Fellowship of

Reconciliation

(Ame:cican chapter founded in 1914), a reli-

gious absolute pacifist organization.
~;';; :iJrican

Along those line s , the

l"i'riends 3ervice Com:ni t'~ee was formed in 1917.

Legalists

found a home in tll e newly-created \'lorld Oourt IJeague, and in
a :r1ore fea.e:cationist style was theI;eague to 3nforce Peace.
'. Hlsn th e dust bad settled, the groups opposing th e war were
the l"OR, tli8 CLJ3, tlle AFSC, anti-war socialists, some independent

Tadicals, and a faction ofth e ''lomen' s Peace Party (formed in

1915),

~hich

split on the issue.

Supporting the war, not

mJ. rprisiDgly, was ' tl:! e Carnegie Found2.tion,
".P2ac2 tl1rOlJ.gh VictcryH:
u; o ting

::1

\/OOS 8

slogan was

IITbe most effectual means of pro-

ch;.r.:lb1e international P"0ace,:I tl1S'y wrote, !lis to

"9:::0 s,:~cut ;:; tll e Vlar

a ~:ainst

tb 0 Imperial

.nne;.l v.ictory for d ·2Ctocracy. 1I

G(~r:rnan

gov'2rnm ~:m t

to a

Joining the Carnegie ]!'oundation

in supnor-'c \'lS're tb e CPU, ttl e APS, and the LE? .:~;ven within
this position t l1 ere were differences.

,!!'or exar:1ple, tb2A?S
of the latter in-
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cluded provisions for economic and military sanctions.

APS felt this was going too far.
~
, 12
go Iar snout;n.

Others felt the

L~P

Tbe
did not

If this splintering, in-fighting, and war support among
peace groups was not already bad enough, tbe peace movement
soon L;und itself under unprecedented repression.

On June

15, 1917, the ;:;spionage Act was passed, which made liable to
confiscation any literature which "Would cause "insubordination,
disloyal t~r, or rnutiny " in th e military, which opposed draft
or enlist 1;lcn t services, or which

m~

ght tlembarrass or hamper

the govcrnr:1c?l1t in conducting the war."

J~ven

before this act

had pass ed , mail had been censored and several people arrested
for lIpub1ic criticism of the ?resident" on the basis of a 1917
statute wbich applied to written or spoken threats of bodily
barm to tb8 Presicient.
set

Ul)

tC)

A

COl~lmi ttee

on Public Information Vias

control tbe press and public opinion.

of 3tate, \','ar, and Havy were on the Committee.

The Secretaries
The CPI had

.foreign and domestic brancbes, and div-isions covering news,
films, indu3trial r c lations, civic and educational groups,
and even state fairs.

The chair of the CPI, George Creel,

.:;x-plai !ii ilg t;'nat t1h'.) Pr8sident had said,
':",lC~'l

tld. ·I'~~ , tCl2.t it "!as insanity ."

"th ere could

tll

r.:

P rJ 8',,"

no

1'/i1son, sounding a l10tS

1.-;'h icl ! b::"8 2c':'oed in e V'3r~i decac.ls up to the present,
t;J

b,3-

referred

intri8u '::? , tll e intri gue for peace lt b e ing conducted

"tb:: ,c1-g':'::rts 8nd cJ.uIJes of tli s Imperial GermangiJV8:cmnc-;nt. ,,1 3

-

11 -

Anti;:Jar and antLlili tarist journals, neivspapers, and
f~om

ma,: ;azines were banned

the mails.

Cen sored DublicatioY:s

lTasses; the Vomen's International League for

included:

reac,::) 8.nd Freedom.' s Four Itights; th'2 Apneal to R::;asol1; the

the -r'ation (for criticizing Sam Gompers); the Freeman t s Journal
(for reprinting Thomas Jefferson's writings favoring Irish
independen6e); the Irish World (for writing that Palestine
would not beco ~rle a J3\'/is11 state) ; the iJorld Tomorrow (a religious pacifistE1agazine edited by Norman Tho rnas); and a C:LB

.
14
pamphl -2 t \'1[1io[; ori ticiz2d mo 1) vlolence.
Tll 2

j",.U.i1J'T "J8S

ilnestigated in 1917 over two pamphlets.

One

of these was by ]oger 3aldwin, and included a request to
consci entious objectors that tC]GY send letters to the Secreta.ry
~ar

of
' fie

stating t h eir position.

nt rulsd bot;] parrlphlets legal.

Ultimately t h e Justice DepartIn _October, ?ostmaster G-:meral

Albert }3urJ.son announc'd the criteria for censorship:

publi-

cations viouJ.d b <:; censored if they implied "tbat this governrlent
tlJ.?~

got int·;)

v/2r \'Jro~lg,

that it is in it for the wrong purposes,

or al1ytlJins tr.8.t will impugn tlle motives of the Government :for
'·1:::: -~.
ty '-"~ _

::mnt is
kind
;::l-!.1 i.1

8.

tool of

. ,,

( r-!...L- r·
'-'

~'/8.l1

'-' ~

•

tbis govern-

3treet or the muni tiOllS mal(ers.

That

'J --'"

I

.

b::co::: ·::ls

;.;~

".: · 8 . '-.:! _ .." 15

3:9iri t of o. isloyal-l:;y t11rougllOut tbe country."
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?Grmer Ambassador LTames Gerard '.vas quoted as sc,-ying
eve~y

hog-tie every disloyal German-American, feed

2hould

11 .,'(::

pacifist

y:aw If!Sat, and hang every traitor to a lamp post to ins0,Y.' '-::
success in tlJiswar. 'l

E'ugene D?os got a ten 'ysar se rJi:; -; ::v-:o

for an an tiwar speecb in Can ton, Ohio.
ci ties II wi t'c:in three mon th s of

ij.

I!l~' a

do zen

A~ :::':-ci

can

S. en try in to th e war, peace-

ful asserl1blies of citizens were 2ttHcked by mobs of soldiers
and sailors.

Some of the violence had ugly racist overtones.

Not only were German-Ar:lericans attacked, but -in

~;:ast

st.

Louis blacks were beaten, drowned, burned and lynched.

Over

60 people were banged or burned to death by mobs during ',;orld
'::ar I.

- "In travelling about your country it dces not seem to

me that you 'nave a surplus of democracy, " commented

8.n

.~nglish

l"iFF member, lIcertainly not enougb to warra,nt e xporting any of
it. 1I

It is little wonder that tbe CIJB was created "to main-

tain something over bere that will be 'Hort}} coming back to wb en
- 16
the weary war is over."
"The pacifist during the period of the war ••• was sick at
heart ••• " wrote ' Jane Addams, "No one knew better than we how
feeble and futile we

were against the impregnable weight of

public opinicll,tbe appalling imperviousness ••• t h e universal
confusion of a world at war."

In the same vein, HIr:e years

of 1917' and 1918," wrote Jobn Chambers, "represented mth
the peak _of c13dicatiol1 by a relative h8.ndful of pacifists
and tbe nadir of the scope and impact of tbe

~eace

movefJent

as it wi tb 8red under ttJ e forces of alienation and repression.

H

- 13 -

peace mo vement, which had always experienced internal

~oe

rifts and weaknesses , had now been sub j ected to a mil itarized
public and a repressive government.

It would not be the last

ti r 'l8. 17
Heanvll1ile, at Oberlin College in 191 7, a studen-'c named
D-:;vere Allen had founded and edi ted an antiwar journal called
the Rational Patriot.

Allen would go on to become an editor

of t1Je ';iorld,help edit the Nation far a year and in 1933 ,

start tIle Vo rldover Press, an antiwar news service that could
cJai~

t o reach millions.
~'var,

through tbe Korean
important

figul~es

The

~orldover

Press remained active

and Allen became one of the most

in the movement, adding a socialist per-

sp8ctiv2 to his pacifist analysisc 18
Altllougb not everyone ha.d such long-lasting success,
t~e

a

majority of tb e interwar ;yaars were, at least superficially,

tr~mendously

successful period for the peace movement.

Of

gr8at i mpo rtance was the massive disillusionment wi tb 'dorld
' : 8.-;:

I, VJhich set in soon after, the "'far

end (~ d.

Increasingly,

it c:<3.me to be seen as having been an utterly senseless slaughter .
i\ variety of antiwar 1i terature came out during and just after

t

p~~
_ '(j
_
' _

" ~nor·!'!;)lJ.s

::]1 :?

1001'1"

.:Phn Dcs ",lassos ; and
;~')~ci

r3,nci

1;}
'.• t=>
_ S

c>rn

,LL..,~.

'1?'YOO"t1
..I_...t..,L. t"

'ov
J
~:;ric'n

Remarque ;

by e. '3 . cUEmlings; ' Three So1diers
li12 i:l Y

oth e rs.

T1uni tions mak9rs tODk a

al lJc ating i n Iron, Blood and Profits; 'Pl1 e Profi t

;': erc1"J~1:tts

:: "D '::S"t s 'oll;::.~

of
for

D,~ath:
tl ~s

by

f3

of "Jar;

.Qrl§. Hell of a Business, whicb became

?>ook of the lIont'n:!}ub.

'li'in31ly t'nere
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\'. 31.'e

boo ~\:s

~ere

sudd en ly

01 picture s, sncb

2.S

The Horror of It.

Pacifists

being joined by a large section of society
..

.

in bemoan ing the awful, futile ln Justlce

,..

OI

",ar..

10
J

I:e mn.;h ile , Devere Allen and others continue d t o add a
soc ialistic analysis to their pacifism.

Kirby Pa.ge, the

f!?acifist historian," along witb Horman Thomas -- the original
executive secretary of tbeFOR, and later Socialist Party
PresidentiaJ candidate -- argued that the social structure
crsatedby unrestrain ed economic competition made internationalism
practically :impossible.

Th e socialist and pacifist president

of the HD": Republic argued that " capi taliS1f1 lies bebind the
nat i onalis ~ ,

dUC8

that the intereSts of the capitalist are what pro-

t he insistent, insidious, persuasive, automatic propa-

ganda all th s th:s that our cOlJ.ntry is bett er than others and
the.t we bav: to enforce our superiori ty in some wayan tbem wi tb
ai li tary strengtl1.
1)2

avoided

\,/ i ttl

(ther pacifists argued that war could only

H

li th e reorganization of our whole system on

ttl S basis of production for use and not for profit, with the
'!}" <:?cl s of

·;~1·l S

world and not of particular nations in view."

_ ';ven tbe ?CR. was sufficiently influenced b;y all tbis to question
". ,<!y tll":.ir

~}ta nd

Dn

indu:3trial struggls Has so equi va cal:
w",;

"p er-

s n el l of eli vid ends, fl sugg,? s tecl one member . 20

?olitic:.=J,l:_Y-l'! indcd pacL,:'ists a'Yld intern'::l.tionalists in 1927
_>:C: :i~ci

2.n

:" fI ti-i:n.p 'co rialist

coalition on tb e issues of

- 15 of Congress sbocked the CoolidgE administrati on inte

sof~0nl~g

i ts position en rf ic:a.ragua, and sasing its dSFlanos

: ' r:~x i(; c.

PS':W8

00

workers 'had for on ce successfully applied pre'l C"Ji ti ve

..

me d lClne.

21

Anotter outgrowth of this increasin g politicizGtibu was
a questioning of the religious basis

0:

a religious view of

Devere

life,

1I

argued

pacifism.

~I

hold

t~

Allen, I'But I

have Ii ttle Gent toward official Cljristiani ty ••• and it seems
to

me that this continuous Jesus emphasis is justly offensive

to

equally fine people of other faiths, and, moreover, leads

to a perilously
sense."

close :reliance on Jesus in B,n autrwri tarian

Allen led an ongOing battle to have th e subtitle of

the i:forld Tommorrow -- ,·!hich always meationed

or

~;esus

Christiani ty -- dropped, and eventually su cceeded.
surprisingly, this debate even spilled over into

;~gain,

~e

lOR.

Their youth section, the Fellowship of Yeuth for Peace, split
from the parent group because
less religious bent.

0

f the younger organizatio n' s

Ultimately, in 1929, the

FC~

exe cutive

committee proclaimed "that the limitation implied by the use
of the word Jesus in the Statement of Purpose tends to make
the Fellowship exclusive and sectarian. "
recruiting J evis,

,::)oon the .7CR began

Ca.tbolics and generall:, i!broadening tb e

basis on which the Fellowship rests. ,,22
~ithin

this wing of the pacifist mo vement debates

not only about

continu~d,

ii1e theological bases of pacifism, but on

national iSSUGs, such

8 .S

th e increasingly violent 1200r strtJggJ_"?

at b orne, and international issues, such as the Civil W8r in

- 16 -

striking coal

u iners in rarlan CountJ ,

thBse other groups sal·v t"L<:;rnselves as

mo re radical counterparts.
vative groups came

ot t ~r,

di f f ? r p~ t

tl; ':: .i r i r>?::-

r::-for ;'~ C'rs,

Increasin gly, these

no r ~

ccn~ ?r-

to oversh ad ow , at I'cast publi c ly, other

pacifists.
In this category were many of tbe

sa~e

s orts o f

org2~izati o n8

that bad existed before th<:; war.

~he

J 2IP, th e A?S, and t t s

American Society of International

T,2\'j

all s upport ed int 0:::':lati o':1&l

legalistic and/or judicial forms.

Absolut e J_y not r s i'ori; ist

goups feared internati on al

or "idealistic, " these

class-

based ideologies and actions, and wor%e d to u pbold ttjS status

!l.£2. of state systems and property rela.tionsbi ps ~
formist" groups concentrated on mo ral

sv t~ority,

r' ore !'rea~ ~

, r o gr e ss

along U.S. lines, with U.S.-styled institutions, infus e d with
U .S.leadersbip.

about tbe future:

:[1h ese groups were tradi tionally outiHlistic
"Women won suffrage , wooe:'] wo n prohibition.

Now women are putting through the outlawry of war,

the :",romen' s P eace Union.

boasted

'I

Eo derates vii t'b in tb e FOR and >TL?P

were also attracted to this moral , bptimistic, utopian,
alistically cl'l 8uvinist platform.

Finally,

arose to back the League of Nations,

2.

number of groups

includi~g

th e

iea g ae ~c f

liations Non-?artisan Association, the ?or e ign Policy
an d th e "!orJ_ d r-s 8.c e Foundation .
aliz8 , or, as th ey put

l

•

.J..

G,

natio~-

~ssoc i at i Gn ,

TheS e groups ,vanted t c

"defini tize I, vlOrld order.

r8-ti~~·.n-

- 17 social cbange \rlould bave to com,'j, but t;-,is cbang2, 2.nd tb·:;
resul ting world order, was to 0e run by 2/:pcrts. '!:2": S s \!Crd
'V'Jon't do the job any more,!1 wrote:; histori2.Tl CrJ<".:rles """'2rd ,

sovereignty, riglits of man, dictatorstJi p of t'he !)rr)lct8riat,
triumphant demccracy

~d

the like is pure bunk.

It will not

run trains or weave cloth or hold society toge:;tbsr. "

.·\g2.i.n,

was seen as playing a major leaderShip role.

Arr:erica

;.rthur

Sweetser, a prominent official in the League Secretari8.t, wr,Jte
that America I",as "the grestest co.heoive TJolitic.s.l unity i.n
existence, the ricbest nation, tLe J:'lost highly organized,
and that America's Hideals and

principles;~

II

flourisbr::d best by

I

1

"showing them fu the whole world and urging other nations to
follow.

II

::l:b ese groups, the legalists, and. tll e reformists a1J_

rejected what they called the !1sentimentB.l internatione.lism"
of

the pre-war era, as well as th e more r2.dical stal1 ce of

other p8,cifists of

'beir own period.

These groups were 2.ble

to weather the defeat of the League of Nations, and remain a
strong force both vJi thin and outside th e pacifist

COTilFlUni

ty. 23

The apparent strength of the pacifist uovement in t'ne

19308 was overwhelming.
was still able to tell
pacifist.

I

As late as 1940, Franklin Roosevelt
the American people tba.t <'I am a

You my fsllow citizens ••• are pacifists too.

1937 poll, when America.Ds were asked "If another
~'Jorld:'!ar dev(~lops

I

I
I

vl8T

'I

In a

like t he

I
~

in:<urope, should America take part again? "

lJinet::r-,five p8rc·:'mt answered "no. "

::very ns\vspaper should

1It

- 18 'tncourage its readers

t

CJ

refuse

~-iG'rv i

Vi 8 T

en,"

saici

":;:~ )

?'?deral Coun cil of Cburcb es resolved in 1929 that
rturcbE~s

should condemn resort to th e

s'noulcl bencefortb refuse ••• to s2mction
agencies in its support."

war-sY8ti.'3 ~n

i~ ,

.i .: 1:'~ rt

as

":

El f!

and

or to b0 u::j<?d as

A 1931 poll of Protestant cdnister s

found 12,076 out of 19,372 agreeing that tbe Cl'lUrcri sr: ould
never again sanction any war, and

8.,

later found even more ministerial

~acifisIIl.

of

poll ta!: en thre e

J '3 8,rS

In 1935,

8.

canv 2SS

•

tbe Central Conference of Arllerican Rabbi fJ on the question

of whetber it should arecommend to its lTIsHlbel's tbat they
refuse to support any war in which

tbis

a:untry

Elay :::m gage in"

received in repJy 91 !lyes fI·.ivotes, 31 ilyes" wi tb reservations
votes, and only 32 "no It votes.

S:h e (' en tral Gc; nf e rerl ce, th e

lTatio'n al Council of Jewish Women, and t11e IJati::nal
of ?emple SisterhooQ.s belonged

to a mili tant peace

?r~de :r:' ation

o:C'ganizati ~) n

until the late 1930s. 24
Th e feeling spread toa wide

v~riety

of the population.

In 1933, a poll of 21,275 stUdents in 65 colleges found 8,415
pledged to absolute pacifism, and another 7922 1 wbo W'O'uld only '
bear arms in event of an invasion of the U.S.

Cn April 12,

1935, 60, noo students across the nation participa ted in a
" strike:! aga.inst war, and a Hovember demonstration in ' Yew York
alone drew 20,000.

In 1936, approximately half a

~illion

col1 0 g~

and high sch o ol students were reported to hav e left th e ir
classes and IJarticipated in pro-peace demonstration s.

In 193,"·,
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96,000 farFlers within tbree weeks.
t h e Socialist

At its 1934 C01Jv i? [!tion,

adopted a resolution dccl&ring i ts o p poci-

~arty

tioD to "mili taTisr:! ,

imp8ri. alisr~,

a n d war. "

pr0:paredness for \f-lar'! could !Iue tolerat e d. by s 0c i a li s ts" ', ino

the form of lI a general strike."
dramatically:

Pacifist groups gained strerlgtb

the ;i.rII,PF, for exanple,

SciW

i

tS

increase to 1 3,000 members in 120 bran che s .

"jcrpb'·:rsbi~)

The Historic

Peace Cburcbes were also very strong: in 1936 tr;8

u.s.

h ad

114,337 Mennonites, 93,697 Friends, and 188 ,290 Bre tt ren.
J~ven

tb e Communi sts go t on tb e p2ace banc.i'.\'agon, "mel. e n jOYf?d

brief coalition

SUCC2SS

. t ~()
\12

th.2 I'.rnsrlcan
'
.
-_',sagup.

j~ gainst

and Fascism, until their partners tired of their tactics and
left.

Overall, pacifists were able to reach out in t h e 1930s

to beb·,reen 45 and 60 million Americans. 25
But things were not as good as th ey seemed.
of Manchuria shook the movement deeply.

~rl1

e invasion

The National Peace

Conference was created as a coordinating body, out it was
soon taken over by the :2;mergency Peace C8.mpaign, \AJ'n i ch was primarily run by tIl e FOR and the AFS8.

Th eSe groups ca':, 8 to lo ok

more and more to the political c enter, as the l e ft f e ll incr e asingly into disarray.

The Communists had

succes~fully

aliena.ted nea:r-ly everyone else in the AIJA\JF, and tb A Socialist
Party \'las rid.dled vii tb factions.

IIest Ylotably, fro:'n tbe pacifists

peint of view, was the S2's attempts at interv e ntion in t h e
Spanish Civil War.

Th e 3 PC called for n eutrality, economic

- 20 -

cO:Jp:::r2.tion, and. strGYlgth 2ning del'1ocracy at b Olile.

3ut tir'12

waB moving against tbem.
'''''CT'a~Sl'na''T
.J..u
_ ,~c:t·
.-b..J.." ,

t'c)P_ antiwar forces found

political bedfellows.
for

t~ L:'

tr1':~msGlves

National Council

?:cevention of idar, a liberal group, and

worked with t h e reactionary isolationist bloc'
in passing tbe Neutrality Act.
hitting tbe country.

v/it'b

tb i~

l'1I.LPF

in tbG Senate

A more conservative mood was

Since the 1920s, pacifists bad been red-

bai ted by sucb groups as tb e :tCey men of America (dealing wi tb
radical and subversive movements), the Military Order of
florId.

'.:81"

I, tte 1\:'18rican

i -i:; got vlorse:

::..J ,~gion

and otl18rs.

In the 1930s

ilimyol1s vlilling to pursue the ••• lists of

Conmu:1i :3 t orga.nizations and leaders named side by .side· wi th
!'Peac8 H organizations and leaders, as cooperating and official
supporters of such communist-organized and controlled affairs
as tb '; v a rious Congl'8sses against war •• ~ cannot doubt tbat
tl.1:; lXlCifist and Revolutionary l'l:Jvements are linked together
\'ii tb b o o ps of stssJ ~~ vlJ:'ote :::;li~abetb :Dilling in ' .!he Red

~(;atrictdc

In fC'..ct,

J:'11i8 was ironic, as

L h :J ~H?

t(18

Spanish r;1vil \'lar, increas<:)d

tlJc::,t l'2:.El.i"(}:::d in antiw8,T groulJs soon fo u nd
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wh ich would bavu r8quired a n ational
order to dec:la.rc \'l£:.r.

Al thougb

8CT~!e

li1)(.;r81 p8.cii'ist:c;
Cu~;

socialists united iTl the anti-',var "Keep Imeric8.

the war":

~,~ 'r d

~;C ' : "

c. :~' W<;T

tb2.t honor i'J'ent to a group called Amsrica

America First was a rif::l}t-\ving org2.n izaticn
fascist and racist

t~ndencies

neo-

1tli t~)

thc'..t called for lfa.n i .';;pJ:'cgn a ble

defense fur l:..merica fl as opposed to fighting in

~urope.

KAC),';C;

ultimately bowed to tbe greater popularity of this theMe witb
tl1e public, \:'lhic'h soon caused the li'CR and AI'S::; to l:;;.cw e Ie/,C;; ' ;,
and

..L.'

IJrJe

~RL

left soon after.

In creasingly, th2se groups

sbifted resourc e s away from poll tical lines hl order to provide for relief work and C.O. support.

The VIIPF stayed in

KJ-;.C'JC, rJut noted that it was !Ideeply concerned by a spirit of

isolationism ••• narrow and bard TIc.tionalimn
ism ."

KAOWC soon went bankrupt, and upon

0

•

r8.cis!'! ••• ~ ~!ili tar-

TJ.3.

entry into

the war, America First disb2,nd ed !lin favor of victory!!:
only t'ning to do now, :: said isolationist
l!is to kick the hell out ·of them.!'

./~gain

,~enator

Burton 1!lJ eel cr,

pa.cifists l e arnod

tbat desires for certain social goals may conflict with the
desire to avoid war, and that the desire to avoid war is not
enougb to hold together groups that have very differ an t 80ci&1
goals. 28 .
In creasHlgly, as during tll e Civil ';:ar,
question th8iT doctrine.
as

i1

;.., Cl' .L
''''l' Qro · vb
L.~,
U c:1

.L.

Degan to

Reinhold Hiebubr renounced -o2.cii'is::l

s i;"lply n. vcr3ion of Christian perfectionism ,!l andoppOS8d

mandatory neutrality l egi slation in 1937:
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:C'2Iusa1 to take rif31:s only if we

b,~lieve

tbat peetc:: is

al~vays

prcferabL0 to the exploitation of the weak by th.::: strong. n
Albert

=~instein

admj_ tted that !!':2h eexisteDce of t-dO great

pmvers with definitely aggressive tendencies (.:;'el\·'~any and
';?l)an) GCJ.;<: 8S an imrnediate realization of mOV'eIt1sut tovlards disarmament i8practical.

The friends of peace must concentrate

thair efforts rather on achieving an alliance of tbe military
forces of the countries which have remained democratic. "
S~erwood

~ ddy,

eluded that
fo rce.!:

8.

leading religious pacifist regretfully

!i ~T othing •••

n.abbi Judah

could stop them except tbe use of

~~c"gnes,

a former pacifist, declared sorrow-

fully tbe.t al t'nougb '!Iar Vlas im:noral Hv/e do not
+0
OJ

0'_0."

r;H},":>
. _l.v

C.'
U

OCl·~"'ll·"'
· 'a_ ~
,,:)u

iJa-("-J--,i

-. ~ --t.,v"

.I

C011-

l"'::>.'il ·"inea'
_ \. ~~ . (""~_

kIlO\'!

OI"-fl"Cl"aJ1"iT
_
_..J.. ...

what else

uro-ncu·.L.ral1"+y
i ........ l.,
__
v,
.....

b-llt the p a rty was Seriously split over the \\'ar, "lith Horman
\'Javering bet\"Jsen

::;:110 ;-:18.S

!I

extrer:1e suspicion " of th e Allies f

E:otives, and llbigbly criticEl support of the war.';
mUDists

\'Jc~re

The Com-

pic1{eting tbe 'Jhite House with their front group

°A.ll i3rica.n ?eace rIobilization" cmd V!ere busy making plans for

a

~~ 8:tionaJ.

invaded

1' (;'."'2 ):-

R~s3ia;

be"0 rn'In}

011

June 21, 1941, the ver:I day Germany

of c ourse the C? promptly re-reversed its posi -

rabicUy
__pro-war.

Generally, the real pacifists

feeling t1}f; ir i:1potenc8:

:' It is not wi thin ."LY personal

-'_.j
i-, __ r
J-1
l,'

'!j::~'e

Peace~J8ek

to l! u.J.t -Cbs fl']od of p:: 3rsecl1.tion that rushes on its

cl';vasto:i:,ing

C01.JTSe

t"Grm.1.gh Ge:C !:lallY, Austria and Cz ·- .;choslovakia,!1
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~he

dile~ j a

worsened for

p~cifists

as

at one time or B.Dot·ber in tb sir lives hS.d vO'Vled n8V8:(' tQ
fight again a:nd then wi tbtbe first

as to why this war Vias different,

I:

trur~rpets

wrote

t i'jO

fcund 1:''08.80ns
I.l2.cifists.

In

Poli tical and. reforT;}ist pacifist groups increasingly saw tl1r;i:c

zations g;rew apace.

:f'11e li'OR inCI'2aSed its

:.Crom.

;:lembe1..~shiI)

4,271 in 1935 to 12,476 in 1941, with 4,000 of the new membErs

prollortionate success.

On the otl")er band, tbe lTCI":! a:ld the

WILPF declined I:Jrecipi t0l1s1y, tll clatter lO$inE t'do-t1 1irc1s of

its gre-war TilCiGOersl1ip by 1946.
gained I:lemb8rS during -'cbe Vlar.

r~l'n

e :;?OR

~Lere

mlQ

':::,:11 8.ctu8Jly

vTere9,OOO

actj_v~

?OR

members in 1941, 2.:nd Just undsr 15,000 at the war's G,old.
1"lRL grew frorl! gOO Inembers in 1939 to 2,300 i11

1945.

The

:~'(: C~

strength of tlJGse groups was in tt e ir ability to "turn inwardly~!

'and accept thei:r status as a ,non-poli tical isolatsd minor-

ity.

"Trusting in God, we meet tbis hour without disDay.

De8pi te th3

l"ll~>ic:m

bave sundered

i:'.S

fo~~· li~"'llmess

and sin 1.1bicb IIl2,rk us all and

into 'J2.rring TIe.tions,

V18

c,reall cl"JiJd::cen of

thG one )'8.tbe:.c, ';/ho is eternal God 8.nd 1;/008e narne

love B.nd joy.';

I-1:sse

~:7ou'ps

neittf5I' offici8.1J..y

j_ S

"I.eve.

sup'~ort'2d

nor
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to YJ.:'otect and ' provicle cOI'lpa nionsbip f oI' tlv;FJselv8s :::::'1(1. ott, c,:,~:

too e omLlon fe81ing of isolation -- in

..l
-,-, '
gro Ul)S may ,l1ave ClonG'
lIl) S' "Des -'-(,

L'

v(]

ey

tl1~,;

co:wnmi ty p.;nJ. in

':!n

l'

COlLel.

~\..i

non-interventionist, es did a numb8r of individual pacifists,
and, significantly, a sizable chunk of American blacks.

Stil l ,

the popularity of tbe war made serious inroads on tbs pacifist
cOi!!fimni ty..

c.o.

status.

J:lu'ee cuarters of all Q-uakers drafted refLl.88d
In fact, only .3 of 1;i of t1Je

3L~

registered in '.!orld \!8,r II chose C.O. ste.tuS.
pa.cifist grouIJs

'.'J 2-8

mild

compEu~ed

to

~·:,:~.r ld ',.'?'J:'

~:jl10

millic "(i

'::1epre ssion of
I, 8.1 trJougb

tbere'\'las a crackdmm on iJ8. cifist -teachers, end tba

I~.li11ois

:Bar denied entry to a pacifist lawyer.

V1G.S

C'Tsrs.ll, it

not

repression, or even the usual internal differences and weaknesses of the peace mov ement that plagued and hauntp,d pacifists
during durld'·;'clI' II;

_v
1" -'-

the old dile:m:l8. of a

n:rhe proble!".l is nDt ho\'l to get rid ef toe

2!lOJny , "

iiiccclo J:ucco ill 1945, ffbut rather ho\·., to g e t rid of
victor.

For '\\:llo.t is a vj. ctor but one

viol ence: '.Yorks?

'.n:JC

v iII tsacb hiD a

\'100

+

if J"ll 'C!
II
-IV

.,,

\.',.-,
'"('
~<o,_.

VTcote

tl:H~

last

b8.s 1e2.rnsd tba t

;>

~

I
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at

~Tew

York ' [; Gi ty College, pl' Gviously

2.

[JO tbed of 2ntiwa!::'

'appeasement" rapidly becarnc syn c n cmous 1:1i tr1 "paci f ifJr;r. Ii

!l i:> e

Vincent Peal e remarked in 1944 t hat
against war we a llowed ours elves to get i n to
t 02. t we vJere

totall~T

~u c~

unprepared, thus giving thE:

~

pcsiticn

Gf~ r,n ans

an

opportuni ty to make tlJis war. ~i33
Significantly, .the

well.

U.S~

bad come ou t of t'b s

Of the SO million casualties in

million of th ese '.'J ere Ame rican .

\~ rld

'::fEU'

co mparatively

War II, only onc,

American battle de a ths were

roughly three times tb e number of auto fe,tali ties during the
same period.
'
01n . Lvoe

194. II·"

".L

The war helped the U.S. finally pu11 itself

D e preS ;:llon:
.
--,..,
U.0.

l. v

"'- -p.l.TI.
LT1J

"940
J

had r e ached 2200 billioD.

" ~!l

viaS;~;;Iv

./lIn n ~ i

' • ., l .
Ol._L_l ()~'J,

O'Ll"t

"
emu, l't1

C elil

8.1'o2i t o:ci efl y -- unprecedentscJ

econQ]!li:~

o pportv_'-·;iti e s .

Slzty-ninE; perccn t of ,,\:.sric8:(l s polled i.n /tu gust 1 ?;[~3 said t 1Je,t
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anxious , nors cormd tted to tbs usc of pbysic&l

Slowly, pacifists tried to regain soms
tabili ty and acti vi ty •

violf?j'lc~

~easure

At first th ere \Jere sOi<1.e

for

of rsspec-

8:0 ccu:caging

signs:
of -Cbs

~JIL?}!',

and in 1947 it went to tbe

;";.)',3; .

JJSCJil1c::S

in

tbs Llsmbership of tbs FCR and 1;/:"lL from tbeir \>!Srtime Ligbs
can probably be best interpreted as a resl1.:. t of re12xinE
t,sl1sions botb in the world and tte peace eOLu:mni ty.

;:(C:,dic:alisr:r;

':Jas reintroduced into tbs })8.cifist LIO'Jement, in goed l)&rt due
to tbe return of tbose vJ"bo b ad stayed -- and oecoue pcli ticiz(~cL
in tbe CPS camps.

Advocates of direct actiOl! suel

~.J.

as

38,Y2.rd Rustin h,=:lped push the WP.L into adopting a p:ccJgran
favoring ltpolitical, economic and social revolutier; by
'liolel1t :meo.Yls .!l

Dellinger and oth ers pronlOted direct Gction

mediate result was tbe forwaticn cf the Conmittee for

;,:2.1·:ers took

c),

YJOTI-

~on-

Gandbian approcwh , calling for nOrl-ccopero,t ion,
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RicJ.:) H C::' Gainst segregation in interstate

Another kind of pacifisill was catching on

2S

w~ll .

~b8

in 19 L:-7
was 17,000, in 1948 it was 45,000, and in 1949 it WRS 45, 080 .

an internatio112.1 police forc o,

8Xld

by 1949 17

st2, t·;:. S' Gislatl..D~': -' s

had passed resolutions favoring world government .

~ypifying,

in t11 e words of Jon YoG.er, !ftb2 tl'c.di -'donal ,'rays in ':i(Jict1 Ame ::cican

~dGals

'ree,lism,

as suspended 'for tb e duratio n' of periods demanding

1,1

tn e i.T-rg

I'JaS

plague d by all t':J,'; 11 a'lls prss·2D.t in

its ideological ancestors.

An d despite its temrJO l'o,r:T popu-

lari ty, even its Hrespe ctable 11 conservati V8 ste.ncc v!ould no t
~r

)0
save it from what was to come. -

In 1947 , the peace movement r e ached tte peak of its powe r
;;!hen it b elpeci d:30i'e8.t the LJniversal Eilitary rrrainil:c; bill.

A.tT _ >:uste described tbe campaign as "tbe only case vJbere c;.

II
I
\

rec,lly effective coordination of pacifist forc e s and Y),"')ar
pacifist

\'laS

and a Cold

8.cbieved. t!

~ar

But tl'J e spirit of th e a Ge

beginning in s arncst .

In 19 43, the

\'!8,8

cbangiD ::.:;,

-~12 rgency

C;or.L;i ttes of A'l:oli1ic Scientists (vill ich -incJ.uded Sinstcin, Earo l r:.
t': :ce~r,

Fans

Let~,.:;,

.:?hilip I' io rse, Linus Pau ling, Leo Szilard 2.nu
the policy o f

I

1;ar!'l 2 d

peace

.~
1

I
I
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to

8.8

t 'o :J Soviet

1• '_"
u

19 -/17,

+'(1
, 0)
v _0

LD1 o n •...,37

~-.

T• ~,' . ~.
~

TI"
8..l1YlounC Gd t'-(Je '-~_'rU!n8.n .uOC"GTlue,

backed right-\'ling fOl'CGS in Gr;?c,:::e, 'J:url:<" o.n(l
Soviet , Union tigbtcned its grip on casterr)
c.r8Jnatically in its

engin88l~ing

8X iCL,

C~d_·r' ;:.::.. :

:~~urop2.'

of tbe coup of

, •
c.cccrQ1nG-<1

-s (:: eYl

~-;lOst

C'z (;cboslov8..ki8.~-

and attempted to blockade 3erlin; in 1949 tbe GJSR exploded

l~S

first atomic
finally took power in China; and nine months after that the
ror
b eg-a11. 38
A
e an. "'ar
\1
Pacifists did not fare well from this.

In 1942, the New

-:tcrk Sun cbarged the 3ulletin of the J'...tc yn ic Scientists ':!itl]
['1avingcommunist connections, and bad to 0 8 to.kerl. ·:to court
to be forced into retracting the charge.
tion

V18.S

opposed unsuccessfully in 1948

0

Poacetihl 2 conscrip:~lso,

tLJe 1948 elcctic n

-

s-p1i
- t the 'Osace moveJJ1snt between Eenry' '.1o.l12.ce 8.ild I:o:cTTIan
,

Thomas, 'With tbe majority supporting the latter,
both recording disappointing totals.

IYLlt -iii

tb

Interestin gly, some

pacif:i_sts, i Dc:luding such :T1ovement stalwarts as Dwl.2:';bt
: =acDcl1ald
t o be tbe

found
strC:;i;.J that broke their pacifist will:

;':8, cDon2.1c.

1I1ost faith:! in pacifisu oecause ni t -could n o t solve tllC proble:.:
of tile

I'll e

~2TIergen

cJ Co In!'.'li ttst:;

L toruic Scientists :(:)11 in to inacti yi ty in 1949; and in

r"-.

-P'

\J..!..

:::; a'l!:C s ~; (; ?
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:.'i ttnsr 18

,

\,ft ~ rO.S

}1oy l(eple:c, Pea. CC~nl a}:SrS

pa. cifisfJ . u

Ol~88,n. iZ e r,

J_[l.rn~~·(} ~.~;::d.

tl1a't

"tbere are practi (;8.l1y no ?es.c0!.1akcrs I gr':nll)S i'u.-n cti Oil i ng
"de on
I
outs l

..L't1~
u c;

('lJl'~
j
U

~r"r-,
\
d.
<;:;0, • • • ("11-:;
, a . _.I~)

-'..h
c>-",.•.";:.,
ULJ \...1

are relativ31J f sw

activities being carried out by individuals which are

~l umrnc:tted.

memberships of tb c JOlt and tb e \lrU,

to fee1 at tl-Jis :point, simply to get
\'lord pacifism exists is no me2.n
J~ven

VlRIJ coordinator in 1950.

spared:

pe c ~[Jle

!II' '12 b e gun

to kno\", t 1.1 2.t tb c

accoI'lplis11ment~

I!

lanentocl a

the conser'vativ8 mrB' \'las not

it split with its equally conservative Studcl1 t vling,

tb en sav! all its previous i'JOrk undone as state aftc:J:" state:
repealed the ir endorsements of ','ferld goverYJ.JDents -- 1 6 bad don e
so by 1951

!:It a:ppeared

~

~'!orld

Jovernment l,'lould entail tbe

surrender of n8.tio:nal sovereignty,
General Assembly.
approved a

bil~l_

II

rei:1.:l::."'keu. tlJe Vi1'ginia

In 1952, the Senate Appropriations

~ommitte e

denying funds to any organization w11 icb !!directly

or indirectly promoted one world government or citizensbip. "
Th e UWF hung on through the Korean Har, but in a much weaker
posi tion.

Former m'lF leader Cord r.:eyer Jr. left th 2 lLJF in

1951 to join the CIA.

All im all, the mood of tbe peac8

ment as it entered the 1950s was best summed up b i Roy
who spoke of

:le~

illOV8 -

~epler

kind of despair among pacifists VIlJicL leads

to inaction in ot1-: ~~c t112,;.1 little fellowship gr01..11)s of ;·mtu8.1
('o·'-")'"~(ll·
sar~..Ll·
.l
O. v u
...,

J..'... .

\. ....

<'. "

lJ

"nr'!
''''~''r
. ~:..
J..

u. s.

'JC'

~o

•

n)::;I

It was in this general condition that th e peace mov esen t
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:::'c,r ourplJ.rposss , it is us eful

to eli vide paci:f5..:~~, ': n :>T

sb8.re of too history of t'n e peace fnovern. on t, 8.nd

_y
.;~v
+
go ......
r

and

;s ~
'.':" os:-:;"o.
'1_Lc>
-L
._

~

__

~""" (-~-"e
G~~~v.

v· d l'1 cl
r

1).leI

'"
-L
".,'
ana' 1
~18~lncv
SUOU1VlSlons,

,

organizo.tions and indi'Tidua1fs _ ..

. d.• J •

Euste, for exa:nple -- cut across thes e clc!.fJ sific ctti cn s.

?ut

0

ccasionoJ_ly,

tJO'

.L

tbb:i~ '.re

SO :Fi8

~

the four basic schools of tbougl1t tbat had infJ..ucTl(;r:-;cL 8!"Jd
v!ould con tinned to influen ce tb e

'p·~ ac Gl

rnov .=;Llent fro L tll 2

Revolution to tbe Kor ean War were these :
1

(1)

Heligious and absolute ~ifism:

People 1.'ii "t'nin

tbis grouJ.: simply found W2:r: to be inco mpatible vIi tll t>ei:c
deeplJ'-hel~

religious or ethical beliefs.

bound up with ends:

n:rhere is no

FOit, :Tpeace is tbe way.!!

~'eace \12)3

way to peace,

U

see ll

2.8

saL: t·be

These pacifists tended to bang

auto their beliefs more tenaciously tban any other grou.p, a.nd
frequently found themselves to be practically t11 '3 only ones
opposing a 'dar after the shooting had actually sta:ctecl.

.'-'..s

th eir doctrine was based on morality, th ey tended t o try to
be 1iberal, Dutin general tbey W9:ce politically

V8.gU2,

c.nd

usually prei\?rred individual vvi t n ess, small group support 2.nd
p:c'otection of their o':m to political strategy or geals.

In
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involved with the sD8cifics of aGJ particu2ar war,
opposed wars in general.

~~'xamplS's

rather

h~t

of this sort of g:coup

include the \'fRL, the :;:'0.2., and the AFSC.

(2)

World Fedorationist/1egalist pacifism:

mefmingful diffl?rences can be feunel 1.,Ji tbin -'-eLis

Lg~l~,

bV.t

g:CCUj),

.

.~"

group .

', ." ilS

includes all organizations that wor}:ed prir:1ELrily for
of international go ve::Cr1fCion tal or legal institutions

fo:~'

forll

BOEj,;?

a

28

method of settling international conflicts sbort of war.
These groups attempted to be more ilrealisti8 i1 tban otber
pacifists, and in fs,ct did enjo:/ sorne

SlJ.CCE~SS

in in:tluS'ncil1g

large sections of public opinion, an dperl1s'ps even go v (=;rTI:::len t
policy -- after all, there is today a Uni ted I:i a,tioTIs,
Court, etc.

0,

"Jorld

Unfortunately, tbese groups he,d a number of

serious internal flaV!s:
measures they advocated codified existing

see tba. t

.L'

~t1

e

relationsl)i~)s,

tl1us

upholding the status quo ineQualities that frequently figured
heavily in causing wars; along these lines, people of this
school were unprepared to deal VIi th the idea of internal revolution, the most notable example in tbis Deriod of course
being tbe U.JT.' s refusal to seat Red Cbina; they were uns.ol2
to see that the rest of the VJorld did not necessarily want
A~ieTical1

values and institutions forced upon it; and they

Vlere unable to see how a '\!orld Federation, like th c l7. ~T. could
b e manipu18,ted by ttl e interests of one bloc of countries
8;ga5_nst a:not11er -- v;hicli v1Ou1d raise auestions 8.bout the
!i

justness!! of

VieTS

or i"ailitary sanctions conducted by sucb an
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type were shocked by how easily

-'T

,..,

U. :,;.

public opinion

turned against tbeir ideas.
Of tll s groups in tbis catogor:r,

nificant in tbe
'~)
~.?

ea~cly

t1v~

U';::?

1:18.S

t;b (: .:;0 ut

Sl(;-

1950s.

Social Activist uacifism:

Ti'rom tll e aboli tinnL:.-ts te:

overlap of rS.dice.l 2.ncl lJacifist causes.
a fling wi tb ='rotskyism.

..,

.,ven l.i . '-T•

People
vii tbin this
_

.. tClicled to

°TOUD

(;)

oppose war from tbe basis of a political, social and economic
analysis,

2.S

well as for ethicaI reasons.

and individuals by and

lcn~ge

Altbough t'nese groups

had the mOBt accurate and coherent

political analyses of the causes and n8:ture of

th~::

t'[JUS ina certain sense i:lere tbe most i'realistic,

'I

weTs, and
tb eLe very

c01')cern wi tb oth9r for;ns of oppression cansed tbem ireqLl.::mtly
to end up advocC';.ting violence as being Ilnecessaryl'. in certain
given circumstances.

If war was the price to be paid to end

slavery or defeat Hitler, then war it must be.

Increasingly,

however, with the Cold 'Jar dividing the . world into ~ftV!O armed
carnpsl1' the lines of what a 'ljust vlar" was bacmae more and
more blurred.

r'lcmy sinceroly anti-totali tarian social-activist

l)acifists found tbemselves swept a'way into supporting

th !~

rath er dubious iljustn ess Ii of Ameri can in terv'entioll in fa:::-off
places such as

~orea.

Tbese groups
are quite distinct frou the rest.

Isolationists tended to h ave
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of G.S. involvementovarseas.

Although tbey were believers

in a strong defense, these people tended to question more
over·tly inperialistic wars, such as.the debacle in the
2.' hilip}Jines, and thus were frequently involved in the antiiDp eriRlist groups formed·in the period we have looked at.
Occ3.sionally these groups l1ad racis t or neo-fascist overtones,
such as t bers were in ALlerica First.

Isolationists and other

right wingers were also distinct from other tendencies within
th2 peace

~oveillent

in that they almost inevitably backed the

u.s. to t1Je bilt when it actually entered a war.
Tbe most articulat e spokesman for tbis point of view during

tbe Korean :oJar Vle.s Senator
+'
Line

~~3.ft.

But isolationism \'las never

sahe afts2:' Wo rl d ;'! ar II, and Taft ' s posi tioD

"JaS

highly

a::-:1biguous.
7inally, the continuing acti vi ty of
orgal1izcd~ions of

"JOI.'lcn

and women's

va:cying ideological persuasions should be

noted, as tbe se groups toot on a special . prominence during

2e.(;ifists have tradition3.1ly bG ,?n faced \vi tt) numerous
o,ivisiV G and probler'la tical issuss:

"just wars"; "defensive

wars"; external repression of tbeir movement; a militarist
,;,ubli c; qU'3 stions of 1:ihetb ·3 r th ey should coni;ern th emsel ves
.,,
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tions i n

;:len]]

pacifists '. minds, including lITany of the social

a ctivists in th e p eace mov em ent.
::iili taris 11 ~, mjd tll en
a ·,l

Gxa:JP1 :~

~·IcC8.rtllyism

~h e

rise of post-war

made tb 8 Kor'3 an

of t he next two problems as ',\.' 811.

~lar

period

Groups that had

[joel. to ::turn iw"rardlyH during iflorld \!ar II barely bad a chance
to turn outvoJardly b e for e to e y were forcGo. to turn inHard1y
.3gain .
1.1 1tinat s

'::Cle l'l e ssoDs'? of 'do rld vIar I I sgeflled to provide the
sxa;:-~p1e

of tl1s "eff e ctiveness of ':iar,

II

its occasional

n ecessi t~r , andtll ' :; in s ff (3 ctiv en ess, if not downright danger,
o f pacifis:'i.

:?i~l a ll J ,

pacifis·t 2 [Ho.d

S ;:; 8Tl

tilS F·]i t ·Set L:ations c
to

decl ~r e

t he \1or1d Federationists and other

th sir dr e 8.lTI come tru9 in tbe creation of
.And t b 2 l.llli t e d ] ations

wsr i n Kc raa c

\iaS

just about
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Chapter :2
This chapter is not intended to provide an

in~pth

discussion of the

Korean War in terms of its military history, its status as a UN war,'or of its
"limited" nature.
war.

It is not intended to be a general discussion of the
(1) a history of the origins

It is meant to provide three things:

.

.

of the Korean war; (2) a basic chronological framework or . the war; and

en a brief attempt at setting the war in its historical context.

The

bulk ot the chapter will be concem-ed with the first of these, because the
facts involved are much less weH known than those concerning the war itself,
and because a number of anti-war groups and individuals referred to this
history of Korea from 1945-·tCl 1950 to wpport. their opposition.
When the Korean war broke out on June 25, 1950, the act was nearly
universally hailed in the U.S. as a detestable act of Soviet-inspired communist aggression against a tlfree" and democratic sovereign stateo

"That

this may mean lifar on a global scale is trueo .. (but) when all legal and
moral right is on our side J why should we hesitate?1I asked John
director of the Dirlsion of Northeast Asian Af.f'airs.
extrezr.a version
out the waro

01'

Allison~

A slightly less'

this analysis dominated most of American thoug..ltt through-

Surprisingly, many of these assumptions still remain funda-

mentally unquestioned by many Modern historian&o.f' the Korean waro

Admittedly,

rome important questions--.sueh as wre ther the invasion was directed by
Moscow--cannot yet be definitiVely answeredo

However, to state unequivi-

cally that the attack was certainly SOviet-inspired is to be operating
under some fairly rigid prior assumptionso

What is most disturbing about

certain accounts is what questions they choose to frame.

The type of answers
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one gets, as always, depends in great part on what questions one asks, and
on what asswnptions are behind those questions.

Historians of the Korean

war frequently begin their story with the attack.

'!he story is then told

with the additional assumption-.o.either implicit or explicit-that no matter
what was happening in South Korea, it was still "free", whereas North Korea
was definiticmally aggressive and totalitarian.

What is left is a his-

tory that is itself a product of the cold war assumptions of the period
~

it studies.

Another major f1aw in many sources is the tendency to -judge

American actions solely by the efrect these actions have on America, as
opposed, say, to third parties like the Koreans.
at some

'!his chapter will look

of the aspects of the U.S. playing cold war politics in Korea,

and what the re sul ts were.

Specifioally, it is cruoial . to analyze the

first few years of the .American occupation, looking both at American policy
and at the internal poli tieal, economic, and social forces in Koreao

'lhesa

are the origins oftha Korean war. l
One of ths important problems wi. th the standard thesis is whether one
could really consider North Korea and fuuth Korea to be two separate
nations at this point.

Korean nationalism was constantly being given great

importance by all contemporary observers of thesi tuation.

"The tact

seems to be that all Koreans want their country to themselves in their
life time and will not have any form of foreign tutelage (in order) to
attain an alien standard or nation", said William Kangdon, a State
Departlrent advisor, and the literature on this period is filled with such
observations.

The

35

years under ,Japanese occupation had obviously greatlj

whetted the Korean appetite for its previous independence-as a united
na tiono

Koreans were extremely wary ot the prospect of foreign rule or
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interrerence.
2
to descend.

Geopolitical cQftCerns of' other nations, however, were about

Korea was divided in the classic
that nation which could occupy it.

post~'12

manner of belonging to

The f'act that the Soviets wou1d be in

Korea Ct.l\lsed the U.S. to hastily devise a dividing line for occupation
forces.

'!be 38 th parallel was chosen, in the words ot two ot the choosers,

Bonesteel and !ask, "even though it was :fUrther north than could be realistically reaChed by the UoS. forces in event ot Soviet disagreement" because
"we felt it was important to haw the capital in the .American zone.'!
the Soviets agreed, Ru.sk was "somewhat surprised."
ing" troops arrived on September 7, 1945.

Vhen

'Ihe American "liberat-

A crowd of' Koreans gathered to

stage "an enthusiastic welcome" at Inchon tor the troops.
:f'ired on the crowds, killing two and wounding

Japanese troops

ten. American General Hodge,

in command ot the forces, commended the Japanese.

It was not an auspi-

cious beginning. 3
T1)e Americans hardly entered a political vacuum, - although they
may have wished or thought they had.

In tact, the infrastructure ot the

resistance movement had given rise to an organization ot local coMmittees,
called People's Committees.

By August

31, 1945, these committees maintained

law and order and distributed Japanese property in 145 cities and villages.
The resul ting government was called the Korean · People' s Republic (KPR).
1he Russian aI7T1" allowed these groups to retain control in the lbrth.
ever the Americans refused to acknowledge an authority-in
their own.

~he

How-

South but

"The assumption by the Koreans themselves of the responsibili-

ties and functions ot a free and independent nation ••• will of' necessity
require time and patience" said Trttman.

Thus began the American occupation

- 38 a period marked by raciSM, oppression, and specifically' suppression ot the
political Left. h
"The background to and touchstone ot American policT making in Korea
in the fall of

1945

was 'a .st~ong Le-ft that; as the weeks progressed. appeared

to thrive rather than weaken under the occupation" argu.es historian Bruce
Cummings ~

"Fla tly' stated, one of our mission s was to break Clown this

Communist government (the KPR)".

An American orficer in Korea explained

tha t "when we came here we found the Korean People I s Republic in control.
'!his was in violation of orders to let the Jap officials staY' in their jobs.
,

So we broke it up."

Moderate historian Charles Dobbs argues that the

Americans "had never decided whether they were liberating a captive people
or occupying part of Japan's inner empire'J; increasingly the U.8. behaved
like the latter. 5
Hodge announced in

1945 that Koreans who committed acts "hostUe

to

the Allied forces" would "surf"er death or other such punishment as the
"Take no chances, be

court maY' determine".

warr or

Oriental favors, and

on the alert for the doublecross," Hodge s.y.mpathetically' warned his troops.
Major General Hilldring at the State Departmmt actually classified Korea .
as "occupied" category rather than "liberated."
- comment was that

t~

Soon a popular Korean

"only real difference between the former

and the present one was in skin pignentation."

For his part, Hodge opined

that "The Koreans are the same breed of cat as the
racism was typical:

I.

overload

Japanese~"

'Ibis sort of"

gook" was the standard .American name for Koreans.

Also, there was racism in the implication that the Koreans--who as a peoPle
had:a longer hiStory of self-government than allY' North American or ~pean

nation..-..rould have to remain under Uncle Sam's paternal wing until theY'
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could handle independence.

6

This sort ot thinking can easily infect

historian.'orexample,Dobbs makes the following argument:

t~e

in repriMand-

ing Hodge at a certain point, Washington ncommitted a crucial error ••• in
appearing responsive to Korean ptlblic opinion.

Korea was held toga ther

by the glue of authoritarian rule, and the attend~n~ use of force, vio-

lence, and repressive measures.

:atpecting a continuaticn of such rule,

Koreans found Hodge weak and undeserving of the ldnd of respect they had
accorded Japanese commanders". Considering the strong resistance movemnt during the war, and the continuing attempts by Koreans after the
war to

crd~te~ a

unified democratic

gove~nt--e.ttempts

that would be frus-

trated by the U.Sc and U.S.S.R.--this is a particularly poor rationalizationo 7
Meanwhile, according to historian Gabriel Kolko, liThe entire strategy of mill tary occupation and trusteeship was based on the assumption
that the Left had power and that the United States forces were to prevent
it from organizing in the Southlto MacArthur's aides claimed that the primary missi'on of the occupation was " •• 0 to form a bulwark against commu-

nism" 0

It was just a short step for Americans to see indigenous radi-

calimn as SoV1et-inspiredo

"Communistic activities are reaching point where

they may gain control unless positive is taken.

Am sure most radical

elenents are Russian instigated but cannot get positive proof" reported
Hodge to

Mac~lU-thur in

November, 1946.

Hodge advocated a denll."1ciation of

the KPR--not even allowing it status as a, 'partyo

"This will constitute

in effect a declaration of war upon Communistic elements in Korea, and

may result in te~ra:w disorders," he warned.

Leaders of Peoples! Com-

mi ttees were arrested on trumped-up charges and replaced with right- wingers.

Still, the popularity of the Left proved .difficult to repress, and the Left
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remained by far the strongest force amongst the peopleo

Modera te Historian

lfilliam Stueck, refers to future South Korean leader Syngman Rhee in

1947 as "the head of the strongest group in South Korea wi t.1. the possible
e~c~ption ot the _c.2f!!MUD.is,ts..!," (emphasis mine).

The latter appeared

fI

to

have the support of at least a third of the popula tion lt until this support "dwindled substantiallylf due to "police efforts and a counter-propaganda campaign.IIB

,

The Left was syste!l1'l tically excluded by the Alooricans from any degree
of power.

The

Advisor,r Council had a 9-1 ratio of Rightists to Leftists,

which "virtually reversed the actual distribution of poll tical
and popular support .. 0 in the South.,"
Democratic Council was

45-1.

~nfluence

The ratio on the Representative

And Cununings "could not find a single

in-

stance in which the Americans appointed a Leftist Korean to any responsible positionoll 9
One of the major programs through which the U.S. exercised its power
was the Korean National Police (KNP).

Established by the Japanese, these

police, according to official historians of the occupation, "possessed
a breadth of function and an extent of power equalled by few countries in
the modern world .. "

According to Cummings, the KNP structure was retained

because "there were no other forces that were at once cohesive and determinedly opposed to the Left .. "

Hodge believed only the police were capable

of disbanding the KPR and the People's Committeese
,from william Maglin,

~J\m9rican

director of the KNP:

A revealing quote comes
"We felt that if (the

KNP) did a good job for the Japanese, they would do a good job for

USa"

American accounts list the KNP as having been responsible for "all political activities, news, magazines, public morality, strikes, foreign affairs
and religious activities."

Parades, demonstrations, publications, plays

and movies all came under KNP jurisdiction.

As early as October,

1945,
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the pro-KPR Maeil Sinbo newspaper was ordered to cease printing.
"the police force

had

~espised

from a few

grO'..nt

Rapic:D.y,

men in hiding at the t:iJne

of Japan's defeat to a belligerent
force
of 25,000 enthusiastic
to aid
.
.. .
.
the United states occupation and the political ambitions of' the Right."
Meanwhile, the Occupation
freedom on South Korea, with

.~ove.~nt wa~

disast~D"'$

10

imposing its ideas of economic

results 0

Within a month of its

arrival, the .American Military Governnent (AMG) removed all controls on
production, collection a.'ld . distribution. of rice
and imposed a free market
....
on prices and distribution.

"The MG is restoring the prinCiple of a free

market, giving every man, woman, and child. his just and fair share of the
.

great wealth with wMch this beautiful nation has been endcrtred," read
-the directive.

This led to a massive profiteering, hoarding and hunger,

despite · a 6riI> increase ~ crop yield over the previous year.

Rationing was

reintrodUced--a.t one half the wartime levels the Japanese had set.

Inna-

tion was rampant, with prices outstripping wages in their increases by a

4-1 ratio by November, and after a law freezing wages but not prices, almost
a 6-1 ratio by March.

The price of a bushel of riC. rose from 9.4 yen

in September, 1945 to 2,800 yen in September, 1946. Whi~e speculation
made fortunes for the already weal thy', the AMG declared the KPR's redistribution ot Japanese
on these lands.
by the KNP.

It'Op~rtgr Ule~l

and

di~s.s~~sed

the peasants and worle rs

Quotas of rice and other grains were violently expropriated

After the first three months of occupation, Hodge concluded

in a report that he reco:rJ:\m3nded Itserious consideration" for the agreenent

with the U.S.S.R. for si.trlllltaneous troop withclrawq(: this would "leave
Korea to its own devices and an inevitable internal upheaval tor its seltpurifica tiono"

11

Repression co.'ltinued.

On May 14, 1946, Ordinance

972 made the following
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punishable:

"any conduct in support of .". an organization or movement

dissolved or declared illegal by or contrary to the :interests of the occupying forces"; printed ll"aterial "disrespectful" to the occupying forces; and
12
refusal to give information to a -pe!"sonwith the authority of the MGo
After a year of American rule, the State Department concluded "It
seems to us that all evidence of the past year clearly indicates that
Koreans are not psychologically or technically prepared to undertake self\

government •••we feel thp,t no encouragement should be given to the Koreans
to think that abandonment of trusteeship is or may be feasible. n13

The autumn of 1946 saw peasant uprisings throughout the Kyongsong
and Cholla provinces, and other regions of People's Committee strength.
"Nothing in the three years of the Occupation so shook Americans at all
levels as the autumn upriSings of 1 946" ..

There was a general strike

on September 23 involving 8,<XX> railroad workers and 16,000 students.
This soon became a general strike involving 295 enterprises in Seoul alone,
30,000 workers and 16,000 students.
Korea took part in the strike..
ensued.

251,000 workers throughout South

Mass arrests and battles with

strike~breakers

In Seoul, 1400 strikers were arrested on SepteMber 30.

On Octo-

ber 1, the strike turned into a general insurrection, with crowds attacking policemen.

38 policemen were killed in Tagean on October 6.

lan<D..ords and police were victims of attacks in many villages and cities.
Entire police departments were destroyed in Yongch'on, Kwni, Waegwan,
Songju and elsewhere"

The Americans declared martial law and set about

violently crushLl1.g the

rebe~lion,

which had slogans such as "Return the

Korean Government to the People's Committee".

Police, troops, and right-

WLl1.g organizations were not able to put down the rebellion until midNovember.

Over 200 policemen were killed, and over 1,000 rioters.

Around
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30,000 were arrested.

The Left turned out to be "the biggest losersll, as

the KNP has consolidated its power in smashing the Left's worker and
peasant base.

14

The official American reports wrote these events orf

as communist-

directed and Ifin no sense spontaneous,n but this simply does not fit the
facts.

Rather than a structured revolt that the Americans "kept looking

for and not finding", there were unS'Jstematic, spontaneous uprisings.

,

,

"Taken one at a time
tions.

t~ey

--

were the products of a thousand local fru's tra-

Taken as a whole they amounted to a lusty shriek of dissent over

the arrangerrents of liberated Korea," concludes Cummings..

"By the end

of 1946... the United States had fostered in its zone in Korea the development of a regime as ruthless and oppressive as any 'be:> emerge in the post1
w,s.r .world" ~ Kolko argues. S :
''."
, . ".: " . .' ~.:; . ,.'.. .
~·.',j,:Whri1ugh a series of disagreements over the structur ?and
fom of future Korea's govero..ment, the U.S. and Russia were becoming increasingly estranged.

The U.S. proposals would have w::ighted the unified govern-

ment heavily to the Right, the Russian proposals heavily to the Left.

.

The

breaking point was the election of 1948, in which the Soviets refused to
participa.te--not unreasonably, from their point of view.

Reports from

UN 'o bse·rvers"7 in the &>uth spoke of "considerable clifficul ty

w:maldng

contact with the left-wing organizations, certain of whose representatives
were found to be either in prison, under order of arrest or some form of
police surveillance 0"

Rhee celebrated with a large rally in honor of the

UN commission, at which several leftists were mutilated by Rhee's thugs.
The elections were held on Yay 10, and, with both the Left and significantly,
the nationalist Right (who saw elections solely in the South as dividing
Korea iEsO facto) boycotting the electio~s, Rhee's candidates were practically
the

o~

ones

r~J1ing~

In the ten days preceding the election, 323 persons

were killed in riots or police raids, and more than 10,000 arrested.

'lhe

State Deparw.ent history concluded the election was "characterized by 5"
public approval and enthusaism."

As Kolko concludes, "against the express

wishes of all political groups save an extreme contingent of the rightwing, an independent government was established in the southern half of
Korea." 16
Many questions remain about the outbreak of the war.

'Vllien 10 F. Stone

..

wrote "The Hidden History
of the Korean War, fI in 1952 he could do no
.
.

lID

re

than pose questions to be p!rsued, and point out interesting inconsistencies.
Many of these questions remain unanBW'ered today.

Was the attack a surprise?

500

Is it likely that it could have been considering the

and 700 civilian technicians in South Korea?, asks Stone.

American officers
Even Stueck

quotes an official ~ho claimed that by "late 1949, talk of a Nor.t h Korean
invasion was aIm:) st routine in intelligence circles."
or even known in advance--by the Russians?
gate to the UN boycotting the

assew~ly,

Was the attack ordered--

If so, why was the Russian dele-

and was thus unable to veto the
,

sanctions passed against North Korea.

If the attack had been carefully

planned in advance, why was it that only about half of North Korea's forces
were l1X>bilized?

Also, which side provoked the war?

going on for some time in Korea.

An arms race had been

When U.S. occupation forces left Korea,

they left $110 million in arms and h82 U.3. officials to train Koreans in
how to use this equipment.

Official American accounts show that North Korea

be gan expanding its arm:r atter January t 19500

"AI though the North Korean

mili tary build-up prior to June had always been interpreted as prodr of
aggressive intent, 1..11 fact it was more a response to the military imbalance
of power that Rhee and the United States had created during 1949 and 1950,
the aggressive declarations of Seoul, and the possibility of further mili1
tary growth in the South," argues Kolko. ?
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The most radica.l and coherent challenge to the standard view of the
outbreak and early days of the war is Kolko t s.

He argues that a vastly

inferiOr North Korean force, bent perp..aps only on the capture of SeoUl,
was allowed to lltake" large chunks of South Korea in order to provoke a
reaction

0

This reaction would allow the opportunity for personal glory

for Gmera1 MacArthur, provide a cause that the "Asia-first" senators and
Congressmen had wanted since the "loss" of China, and would create a
"necessary emergency" ~-necessary to get "numerous global projects 'and appropriations out of an unfriendly Congress. rt

nNo one can say what would have

come of these projects if the North Koreans had not marched south ••• If ,
said a senior official in 19510

BotJ;l MacArthur and Rhee deliberately

and repeatedly exaggerated the scale of North Korean attacks, and the
amount of ground lost.

Seoul even announced Russian troops were involve do

Even the conservative London
tion it was receiving.
apparent madnesso

Time~

became openly suspicious of the informa-

But, Ko1ko argues, there was a method in this

Continued retreat, MacArthur and Rhee knew, faced the

tr.S o with the alternative of defeat or massive cormnittment.

•

Rhee was

claiming that tbree-quarters of his army had been lost" which was blatantly
untrue.

Towns were abandoned without resistance, U.S. planes "repeatedly

struck defending ROK unitso"

By the beginning of August, the North Koreans

were substantia1lJ" outnumbered and out-equipped, and still advancing.

When

-the Americans sent in 65,000 troops in early August, this was almost as
many as all the North Koreans, who kept advancing until September.

Mean-

w'hile MacArthur "\-las busily exaggerating the North Korean troop strength
bya factor of broo

By September 1, l-'.acArthur had 180,,000 men in Korea,

as opposed to 98,000 for the North Koreans, about a third of whom were
fresh recruits"

By October 1 MacArthur ordered a halt to strategic
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bombing in North Korea because there was nothing of importance left to bomb.
30,000 North Koreans escaped behind the 38th parallel, followed by 230,000
UN troops, supported by 100,000 U.S. navy and air force men.

"Whether

consciously or not t MacArthur had transformed a civil war, intensified by
what was likely a pre-emptive attack into a greatly expanded American involveEent in the Far East," concludes KOlko.

18

The history of the remainder of the war is better known, less controversial, and will

<.

be flushed out in the following chapters.

Therefore

only a brief sketch of' the military history of the war is necessary here.

On September 15, 1950 MacArthur's landing at:;Iri.~'h'on turned.. the tide
of the war, and by the end of the month UN forces were approaching the 38
parallel.

th

In early Chtober, South Korean troops crossed into the North,

with American troops follOwing a week iater.

MacArthur received orders

on September 27 whioh included the following:
will your forces orOBS the

~mnohurian

"under no circumstances .....

or U.S.S.R. borders of Korea, and

as a matter of policy, no non ...Korean ground forces will be used in the northeast provinces bordering the Soviet Union or in the area along the Manchurian
border .. tt19
Between Chtober 8 and October 14, Cllina repeated its warnings in its
domestio press and intelligence reports suggested Chinese troops were mass.'

ing near the Yalu River.
Indian ambassador.

.

China also··.comnmniCated warnings through' the

On October

25 at Onjong--Iess than forty miles South

of the lI.anchurian border--SOuth Korean .Arnv units made contact with Chinese
"volunteers. 1l

Soon, hundreds of thousands of Chinese troops entered the conth

flict, pushing the UN troops back past the 38
parallel .. and well into the
.
.
th
Sou th by mid-December. By January 25 , however, the U.S. Eighth Army-,
tmder Matthew Ridgway, began ptlshing back in the offensive dubbed "operation killer .. "

On Parch

15

the UN forces retook Seoul, and by April 1951,
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the two sides were again fighting roughly around the 38th parallel.

20

The firing of General 1-1acArthur in April, 1951 has been the subject
of much discussion and writing.

'lb what extent the General was exceeding

the purely military authority he was given is still difficult to say.

On

the other hand MacArthur was clearly trying to fornula te the overall strategy and policy of the war--if not Asian policy in general-independent
Q({U~.h. .the

1m
,

and,~~:h~
, :iTr' ,s,.,
.
.. .
-"

',Y,"i

~r

,

This ranged from MacArthur's meet-

ings with Chiang Kai -5hek to his obviously more nili taristic view of the
Korean war, which fairly clearly included attacks on China.
The offensive which prompted MacArthur's firing was his Itpeace plan lt
of March

24. This plan included the warning, "the

enemy ~, ;

must by now be painfully aware that a , decision of the United Nations to
depart from its tolerant effort to continue the war to the area of Korea,
through an ' ex:pa.n~ion of our military operations to his coastal areas and
interior bases, would doom Red China to the risk of imminent military collapse...'! ' Even Matthew Ridg..ray writing in 1967 had to argue that this ,'''so ,
obViously suggested a radical shift in V.S. policy that it is hard to imagine anyone's pretending it was merely, as some said, an expression of a
willingness to accept a military surrender."
implied a sudden harden:i.ng of .the VoN. line. 1t

And "even a call for surrender
'lb make matters worse, this
' 21

plan undercut a different plan that the UN was about to bring out.
Truman viewed this as outright insubordination, and fired ¥..a.cArthur,
and Ridgway took over as UN commander.

More broadlY$ the firing of MacArthur

can be seen as an assertim of civilian control over policy deciSions" and a
victory for those who believed in

l~ting

the Korean conflict, as opposed

to those who favored attacking China.
The war then settled into two years of long, drawn-out stalemate.
Negotiations proceeded remarkably slowly, and the majority of the concessions
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were ultimately made by the Communists.

A settlement was finally reached

when the Communists compromised on the issue of forced repatriation of
prisoners of Wq1?.... -a point that they had previously strongly insisted on.
Korea would remain divided:

an acceptable compromise for Russia and the

u.s.
To understand U.S. policy at this time, one must look at the period.
The U.S. in 1950 was domina ted by an extreme cold war mentality.

'Ihe

"betrayals" 0,£ the Yalta. agreements, the Berlin crisis, the Czech 'coup,
,

and perhaps especially the "fall" of China were heavy on the minds of
U.S. officialso

'!he tendency was to bla.roo everything on the communists,

and to see conspiracy of a vast monolithic communist block everywhere.

-'

Another outgrowth of wt-12 was the new-found role of the U.S. as the world
policeman and defender of liberty e",:",erywhere.
containment and collective security_
a major issue.
O'UX

aUT

U.S.

11

Thus was 'spawnedNSC 68,

credibility" suddenly became

credibility was on the line in lCorea, and, it seemed,

credibility--or lack thereof--b.ad awesome implications.

Director of

the office of far eastern affairs John Vincent worried that if the Americans
left Korea, J?-pan would "question America's strength of purpose and seek
an accomodation with the Soviets.

.

was already extensively committedo
in a" "Communist victory below the 38
American reliabilitYolI

Stueck agrees that "American prestige :;
For the United States to acquiesce
th

parallel 't-lOuld call into question

America's new role had a domestic side too:

"We

must be better armed and equipped than we are today if we are to be prot.ected
from the dangers that still face us .. 0" , said Truman, "we must continue to
increase our production for military purposes •• and less to civilian consumption."
1952:

Perhaps most telling of all was General Van Fleet's speech in

"Korea has been a blessing.

some place in the world. 1I

There had to be a Korea here or in

One may well wonder to what extent this sort of
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thinking was a self-fulfilling prophecy.22
Many

of the same assumptions that have colored .American foreign policy

have also colored the writing of its history.

A history of ' the Korean war

which does not emphasize that war's indigenous Korean roots, and prefers
instead to view the confiict only as a super power confrontation is inherently
ethnocentric.

Also, mu.ch of the history that has been written of the Korean

war is far too uncritical:

for example, Stueck is content. to cite a

MacArtl'mr quote about "Well-trained and

well-indoctriIiate.d " ~sats,tance·iiltil:~

trating from North Korea" in 1947 as fact.

Dobbs at one point argues

that during an entire set of negotiations, "it is clear that of all the
groups involved, only the U.S. sincerely sought compromise."
on the Korean war

t~

quite famon:$" .

David

Ree~'5book

Yet, it is sonewhat limiting to frame

questions such as, "Speculation as to communist motives for launching the
invasion must still remain largely conjectural.

Why was the invasion

chosen so unsportingly in Korea ••• ?" (emphasis mine). 23
Over 1,000,000 South Koreans died in the war.
put at 1,500,000.

2.5 million South Koreans were homeless or refugees at

the end of the war, and 5 ;inillion'were· on 'relief.
levelled.

Communist losses were

North Korea was literally'

Rhee at one point forcibly rounded up 400,000 men for potential

- use in his army, and sent them to camps where 50,000 died of d1-sease" or
. starvation, and the majority
of the remainder became physical wrecks.
..
24
while, 9h,ooo UN troops, 34,000 of them Americans, were killed.
.

.

Mean-

Korea was a small country undergoing what could well be called a civil
war, caught up in U.S.-U.S.S.R. cold war superpower politics. And it should
be stressed here that the fact that this chapter has focussed on U.S. policies
is not meant to suggest that the Russians or Chinese were acting with any
greater moral scruples.

It was the Koreans that paid the highest price for
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country, and the continuing division of Korea.
It would be foolish to expect that points of history about the Korean
war that have only been brought to light recently by radical historians
such as Cummings and Kolko should have had any great influence in shaping
the opinions of .Americans during the war.

On the other hand, the extent

to which Americans did not lmow and more importan-6;r did not care about the
origins of the Korean war

fur~her

significant sign of· the timeso

back than the :invas len . itself was a

No issue was seen in the war other than

the superpower confiict, and no further look was needed to determine which
side was right and which side was wrong.

It is interesting to note that

generally
speaking'-. the only
people who were
investigating
the histor,r of
. ,
.
-.
..,

,-

Korea 1945-1950 during the war 'were pacifists and other opponents of the
war.

And often those who looked found a surprising amount.
'lli.is division is represented in the historiography of the Korean war

as well.

The more conservative historians usually begin their account of

the war with the attack from the Borth, and the more r~;eal historians
tend to give 'more attention to the "liberation" periodo

Ultimately, one

does not have to agree with all the conclusicns of a Kolko ora Cummings
- to argue that it is frequently they,no;t! ithe more traditional historians,
who are asking the right questions.

A number of these questions would be

raised by those who, at the time it was being fought, opposed the Korean

War.
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Chapter 3
"This is not a time for pacifists to withdraw from public work and
witness, or for the pacifist movement locally or nationally to contract
its activities."
-Peacemakers
"Our pr.q;r.am tor the Korean War is STOP THE WAR.1f
-A. J. Muste

Although the Korean war period was in many ways exceptional for the
American Peace movement, the distinctions made in the previous chapter still
provide the best framework for analyzing the movement at, this time.

There

were religious groups, social activists, world federalists, and women's
peace groups all activethmughout the war.

The war even provoked cri-

ticism from the right, but as will be shown, this ambivalent and ambiguous position was completely divorced from the peace movement, and thus needs

to be dealt with senara telyo

~-li thin

the

IOOve ment

itself, and wi-thin the

different major ideological categories, there were, as always, significant
differences between groups bOth in position--from conservative approval of
the 'war, to moderate criticism of it, to radical opposition to it--a.nd in
the tactics espoused--from individual witness to letter-writing to public
rallies. Although the movement in this period was relatively isolated from
the mainstream, it remained a rich and vi tal source of ideas and information.

And especially considering their small nmribers, pacifists at this

time could be surprisingly active.

Beyond merely enduring, however, the

American peace moveIl2nt during the Korean war was able to offer pragrna. tic,
insightful critiques of American policies.

Their opposition had a factual

as well as moral base and, in a number of cases was arguably as "realistic"
as the positions of those who, priding themselves on their sophisticated
and practical- worldview, supported the war.
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Of the Religious groups, the WRL, perhaps because of its traditional
role of' being at least somewhat political in outlook, was the most divided.
lhe divisions were not over the war as such, as the WRL was pledged to
oppose all wars, but their internal splits were indicative of the political
climate of all the'tilnes.

The WRL reported that Abe Kaufman, long-time

WRL Secretary, had resigned over the WRL' s decision to send an observer to
the Sleff'ield-W'arsaw Peace Conference, which, in Kaufman' swords, had "destroyed l the Leagueb usefu:t.i'less as a genuine antiwar group, olearly" opposed
to all totalitarianisms."

In a 1975 book, David Dellinger noted that this

resignation was due to the WRL's adoption of' a "more anti-impeii.al.ist" position

an~o re~

than Kaufman had wanted.

issue and also over the
WRL should be.

part~

'!he WRL lost members over this

political question of' haw "absolutist" the

If this were not enough,

'evan.Thomas reSigned,

beoause of "profound disillusionment" with the paoifist
The l-1RL was in fact clearly opposed to oomrmmism:

reportedly
1

movement~

"We are under no

illusions concerning the grossly anti-paoifist practioes of' Soviet and world
COIllJlDlnism ••• "

they wrote, and they even printed a whole sheet on "Relations

wi th Stalinists and Stalinist Groups," in,whioh they annomlcad that:.'membership in the WRL was not opeq to those "willing to f'ight for the Soviet
_Union," and that organizationally, theWRL would not support or oooperate
wi th stalist groups 2
0

As a religious pacifist organization, the WRL spent JIIllch of' its time

working on behalf of conscientious objeotors, opPoSing the Universal Military Training bUls, and opposing war and militarism in general, without

reference to ourrent confliot.
to the Korean war.

But they also kept up a strong opposition

'!hey printed Gallup Poll statistics showing public oppo-

sit ion to the war, and, at their most politioal, argued that Asia was undergoing "a series of revolts with a determination to throw off' the white man's
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exploitation and humilitation. 1I3
Mo at of their opposition to the war, howe'Y-er, was on a IIX>ral and ethical
basis..

They reprinted this part of' a report from the Manchester Guardian:

' IIA napalm raid hit the village ••• and nowhere have they buried the

dead because there is nobody left to do so ..... the inhabitants were caught and
killed and kept in the exact

postu~

they held when the napalm struck--a

man about to get on his bicycle, fifty boys and girls playing in an orphanage,
a housewife strangely Ut"ltliarked, holding in..her hand a page torn from a
catalog-,,4
The WRt argu.ed tha. t uOpen Warfare has all but destroyed Korea."

An

advertisement they took out in the Natiol1 read, lithe original rights and
wrongs ·in Korea are already' submerged in a maze of bestiality and horror
unmatched in all the human Bt0r.1o h5

In fact

the~

WRL ·even 'accepted the prevailing view, and argued that the

Korean war had begun with rrunrorgivable .... North Korean aggression," but they
equally opposed

u.s.

policies.

They called for an

L~diate

armistice, and

mediation for the war, and individual non-violent resistance at home.

The

\-TRL was also deeply concerned with the rise of domestic repression, and
warned that, "The rapid militarization of America, accompanied by a growing hysteria towards minority positions may well lead to repressive measures
directed against expressions of pacifist viewpoints ,now needed more than
ever before..

At the same tiroo it becomes increasingly necessary that paci-

fists support each other and act together .. "

7

The -rlRL was both a victim of this external repression, and
nal splits.

Both were symptomatic of the tim3so

or

inter-

'!he WRL claimed to have

a growing roombership during this period, but also complained that declining
contributions were causing a financial crisis for the organization.

..-,.

- 54 Although their hearts and..spirits
remained conimitted
to an active religlous
-.
.
.

pacifism, they remaitled fairly ineffective and isolated throughout the
Korean war, trapped by the tims.
Generally less disturbed by political debate was the religious pacifist American Friends Service Committee.

It too involved itself in the

traditional protection of C.O.s, and opposition · to UMT.

In its own tradi-

tion, the AFSC worked to provide "Quaker Relief" to Korea.
the AFSC's opposition to the war was

verr

And JIDlch of

general, and religirusly basedo

Btlt the AFSC had a political side as lrell.
'Ihe most political tract the AFSC wrote during this period was their

1 951 publicat.i.on "A QUaker view of U.S. Foreign- Policy. t1
.

.

In the section

on

lisa, the AFSC claimed UoS. policy there bad .fidled because it had not
given "surficient weight to the economic, social and political realities of
Asia."

The U.S. had failed to understand the Jlleaning of revolution and

civil war in Asia--here the AFSC draw parallels to the American Revolution
and Civil war.

1he AFSC noted that

As'~

had suff'ered "a century of' humi-

lia tion and exploitation of proud people by' wbi te imperialists; they clainied
that the Korean war had alienated Asia from the U.S.; and they argued that
China f S actions were understandable--" Any .American should be able to understand by' imagining lJ, i'.:>; own reactions if an international army under Ibssian
command and largely composed of Russians were rapidly advancing northward
through Mexico ••• "

But, they concluded, "American mistakes in Asia are

dUe largely to a miS'tUlderstanc1irtg and are not irreparable. nB
While the AFSC was capable of such insightful. political analysis, they
did not indulge in it often, nor did they encourage political action.
opposed the Korean

war,

They

occasionally criticized domestic racism, but, asidd

from. their Ralief program, and a number of small "Seminars for Peace,1f the

- 55 -

AFSC remained very nruch Itturned inwarcD.y" during the Korean war.

But it

was not the same for the AFSC as it had been for the WRL, who had in a
number of ways been unhappily forced into that position.
content as it was:

The AFSC was

holding its small IDgetings, defending conscientious

objectors, and quietly continuing the Quaker tradition of indivldual witness.,
Of the religious pacifist groups, the Fellowship of Reconciliation
Alfred Hassl~r and
•
A.J. Muste were undoubtedly more concerned with the political issues and
produced the most prolific and spirited opposition.

historical background of the Korean war than the rest of the membership,
but the whole of the usually staid FOR could and did express a clever, perceptive positiono

For example, when the

P.ro~ssive

editorialized in favor

of the Korean war and against pacifists who were incapable of seeing "hOI''''
meeting force with force can result in anything but war," the FOR responded
wi th a ditty worth reprinting in its entirety, to 00 .S'..mg to the tune of

the "H.M.So Pinafore":
"Thing are Seldom What They Seeln"
"Things
Battles
Bullets
Men are

are seldom what they seem
are an icD.a dream
fly imaginal'7
killed, but not so very

Very true.

So they do.

Tanks go rumbling on at peace
Filled with men who are police
If they chance to roll in gore
Still it can't be called a war
Yes we know.

That is so.

When a pilot drops a bomb
He lets it go with great aplomb
If it kills a poor Korean
Still there's no war on the scene
Certainly. • That could beo
Rines blaze and cannons roar
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Pity the pOor pacifist
He sees but the casualty list
Oh how sadl

Oh too bad!

If this seems a'. trine queer
Facts are tac ts and very clear
Peace is war and war' is peace
And the Army's but Police,
Never fear!

It is clear!9

The FOR publica tio~ .';t;hEt FellowshiP. remained
SPri~ly

ties.

debate" and suggested a

~rie~Y'

throu~hout

the ~ an arena tor
,ot anti-warpositions and activi-:-

The FOR called for economic aid" rather than military intervention,
.

'

tor both North Korea and China; deplored the popularity of the war, and
.

'

c

_,.

pervasiveness at U.S. militarism in general; worked long
C.O.~;

an~hard

tor

detended tax res~sters ,(al~ough :t;h~ FOR itself did not necessarily

endorse ~ resistanc~); wrote on the history o~ the Korean war; l>!Otested
the U.S. arms buildllpj and printed a number ot politically sharp

c~ticisms.

...

ot U.S. policy.
The most acute political critiques were written bY' A.J. Muste and Alfred
Hassler.

In September, 1950, Hassler wrote "Cops in Korea."

noting the popularity ot the war:

He began by

n~~ .usual apo~ts tor power politics

have been joined by all sorts at anti-war stalwarts.'!

'lhesa included .the

Federal Council of Churches ,-.the Church Peace Union, the }Jnerican Council

ot the tobrld Alliance for

~tern.ational

the Progressive, and others.

Friendship, the S:>cialist Party,

"Communists, pacifists, a.nd a handful ot last-

:dj..tch isolationists have constituted virtually the only" vocal opposition,"
he commented.

Ra.ssler vigorously disputed the "police action" analogy,

and argued tha.t the war had to be seen as part ot the cold war power strug-,
glee

He denounced the U.N.' s refusal to seat China, and argued that without

Russian or Chinese consent, "what the 'police action" really means is that
a truncated UN has been conscripted as an ally- ot the thited States in its

C.Q;"''lrQ;~·t')

- 57 against the Soviet Union .... " Also, he charged, the U.S. "throws her
strength behind every anti-colll1llUnist government in the world, regardless
of how reactionary it may be".If"

Hassler sharply criticized Syngman Rhee,

and concluded with a call for the U.3. to give up war, and to promo te del11Ocracy abroad.

10

In M:trch,

'51,

Hassler wrote "Call off the Cops," which argu.ed even

more strmgly against the police action analogy, again stressed the Fast-'West
conflict, noted that the countries which had voted to condemn the' "aggression"
of North Korea and China. represented only

5q(

again advocated admitting China to the U.N.

of the world's population,
and
.

Hassler argued that a

force" that worked to protect the status quo was undesirable.
once again "take the leadership of the revolution," he

It

securi ty

America nmst

con~IUded.11

A.J 0 Musts was a figure of such significa.nce that he will be dealt
with separately later.

For now, it

should '~be

noted that his contributions

to the FellowshiE made many of the sane points made by

Hassler~

Also worth

noting here is Mus te • s critique of Taft, since J as Muste himself put it,
"At the outset it may be well to dispose of the idea that Taft may be a sort
of leader of a peace movement in this century."

Taft was an old isolationist,

at a time when isolationists were a vanishing breed, and he represented the
rightnwingschool of opposition to war, with all its traditional flaws,
including the a tti tude that once America was in a war, America should try
to l'Tin it.

Muste began by pointing to the Senator's extreme anti-co:mmunism,

and quoted his willingness ..to intervene militarily in
of
. a wide variety
.
places including Japan, India, Africa, Australia, and many others.
also pointed to 'fuft's quote:

Muste

"Communism has introduced a new spirit of

aggr-ession into the world, Hi t has adopted a combination of deceit, propa-

ganda, and strongarm
methods ••• Now we are forced
to adopt
the same .methods •••
.
.
,

or be swept away."

Finally, Muste pointed to Taft's declaration that if the

I
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u.s.

were going to fight the Chinese, "We might as well have a declared war.

It would untie the hands of our military conrnanders. tr
referred to this as Th.ft's program
12
into China. lI )

It

(Alfred Hassler

to end the Korean war by moving it

The rest of Muste's thought will be discussed later.

d.e monstrates, however, is the extent to

w~ich

What the above

the peace movement had rejected

even the most minimal feelings of common purpose with isolationist right.
For the rest, the FOR concerned itself with the traditional concerns
of religious pacifist groups, as noted before.

They did, however, print

other articles which gave the history of the war, and specific oritiques
of U.. S. policies before and after the rTar's
outbreak.
.
-.

They espeoially

stressed the repressiveness of Rhee, and were harshly critical of l.fa.cArthur,
whose policies, they claimed provoked China's entry
into the
.
.

war~

.

Also,

stories of. experiences ·in Korea were re gularly .printed to show the horror
of the l-Tar..
ing~

The FOR called for mediation and an immediate end to the fight-

Additionally, t.l)ey argued tha t "rle shoUld help Asia free herself of ...

all imperialism."
'.[he FOR was also ooncerned with domestic censorship.

They reported the

banning of !,lternatives-a. radical pacifist magazine .for which David Dellinger
wrote--for an advertisement it ran that the government claimed encouraged
"draft dodging"; also the F'ellowship ()Dt~ that a number of prestigi0tls new~
papers, including the New york Times t had refused to run an ad from the Central
Committee for Conscientious Objectors--a moderate group that solely worked
with C.O.s·...-an ad that simply announced the existence of the

ceco

and the

C.Oo option; lastly, they protested the fact that Cecil Hinshaw, member of
both the FOR and Peacemakers, was denied permission to speak on the campus
of Ohio State Universi tyc 13
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'!he

F~lowshiE

also served as a forum

r~r

varie~y

a wide

a rather humorous debate took place in its pages between

of vie-ws, and

lert~st

groups.

The

debate began with a letter from a pacifist in the Socialist Party, writing
to defend the pacifist credentials of the SP, in spite of its support of
the Korean war.

The letter claimed that the SP had "more pacifists in

proportion to its membership than any other party J II had a pacifist national
--

-

chairman (Darlington Hoopes), and was I1very democratic" and thus open to
change.

:r.Ia.turally, the Left being what it was (and is), this PromPted

responses from other parties, ~nd soon read~~s_,'>.~,theFellCMshiR were informed
that the &>cialist Labor Party, the World Sooialist,':Party, and the Liberta-

-

-

14

nan Socialist League were all "more pacifist" than the SP.
Finally, although the FOR opposed the war articulately and intelligently, both because of their religious bent and because of the times it
was hard for them to c?me up with a strategy, or even any plan of action.
And this bothered them.

In May,

t

53, they conclu~d an article with an

especially revealing and painful admission, which must have summed up the
feelings of many

pacifists ~

of the period:

uWha tcan a few thousand paci-

fists accomplish to reconcile the Pentagon and -the Presidium?

Beyond writing

a letter to a Congressman to oppose UMT or holding back fifty dollars from
a $50 billion budget until the government finds tire to come around and
take it, what can one do but wait around, shifting from one foot to the

ot.lJer, for Armageddon?1I15

------_ ._--_.__ ._-- .- --- --._-.._.... -._----- ---_._---------_._.__-----_._ --------..

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . . . . . . . . . . . . . ._
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. . . . . . ._

.... _ _ ....: . . _ _ _ . . . . . _ _ M'UI'. . . . _ _ . . _ ....
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Complementing the work of these religious pacifists were groups that
worked practically exclusive1y with conscientious objectors, such as the
CCCO and the National' Service Board for Religipu_s OBjectors __ While the wor.k
o£ these groups lies primarily outside the topic o£ this paper, a few points
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The best source for statistics on C.O.s. was the
News Notes.

ccco

publication

By the end of the Korean war, they reported, over 200 C;.:O.s

had been convicted under the 19h8 Selective Service Act, and this figure
.

.

did not include Jehovah's Witnesses or Muslims.
mind here is that in 1952"

A statistic to

be~

in

43 of these prosecuted, received sentences of

between five and ten years. 1§
Certain C.O. cases could raise political points.

A letter from the

p;:uoents of JL-rn George, "a- 19 year old C 0.who was sentenced to two 'con~

7

currently-running three year sentences, argued against the police action
analogy, and noted that the Canadian courts had ruled that drafting men for
the UN army v.Tas unconstitutional, since the Korean war was

!:2i a

police

action0 17
The most famous C.O. case of the Korean war was that of Robert l1i.chnero
An 19 year old Quaker, Michner was given a ten-year sentence-..the heaviest
given anyone lL.'"lder the Selective Service Act up to this time, iroluding
draft dodgerso

'Ihis was a year after Michner had finished serving a year

and a half for not registering, and the fourth time in all that he had been
tried and convicted for similar offenses.
of the Scripps-Howard Washington
tence:

N~~

This even bothered the conscience

which edi. torialized against the sen-

"We'. think this nation is strong enough to survive with

11i.clme~

jail ..... and booked to serve as aCaDo, which he is .. .." they concluded.
sentence was eventually reduced.

18

out of
The

But "second prosecutions" and stiff

sentences continued throUghotlt the war.
Concern with C.O.s inevitably meant a strong opposition to Universal
military training..

The National Council Against Conscription defended C.O.s,

spent even more ef'f"ort opposing UMT,
the

~lSBRO,

an~

also, unlike ..~:ups such as CCCO and

made serious political criticisms of UoS. ':involvement in Korea.
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Russia was "completely guilty or completely blameless. 1t

They believed

Russia had known about and endorsed the North's attack beforehand, but
they also pointed to the belligerence of the

~uth.

T'ney quoted South

Korea...Yl Defense Minister Sihn Sung Mo I s November, 1949 boast about the
readiness of his troops to attack North Korea:

nIt we had

o~

own way,

we would have started up already, but we had to wait un~il they (the American govefn.nent leaders) "V!ere ready.
wait.

You ,are not ready. tit

They kept telling us,

'No,

nb, no,

NCAC's publication, Conscription llew-s, criti-

cized the UIIS. for concentrating on military aid to Korea as opposed to
economic aid.
"the

They referred to "crumbling morale in the South Korean army,1t

unpopulari~y

of the Syngman Rhee government," and the "questionable

reliability of the (South Korean) Arm:r and police force."

liThe American

policy of armed intervention :m KOrea is dangerous for both peace and deroocracy, II they concluded.

'!he NCAC was also concerned v'ery early on with

the possihlity of Soviet or Chinese involvement in the war.

Opposing lthem-

selves firmly to communism, the NCAC worried that possible U.S. bombings
of Korean cities ""'ould "aid Russian propaganda about American militarism,
iMper.ialism, warmongering, etc."

A bit more nobly, they also were con-

cerned with the reconstruction of Korea, and the spectre of vcrld War
Three..

The NCAC called for the formation of a UN truce commission; a UN

appointed mediator or commission of nediation, for "the permanent settlement of differences,"; the admission of China into the UN; a "fresh approach II
to disarmament; and a global economic recovery programo 19
Interestingly, the NCAC was one of the most anti-co.mmunist groups in the
Peace move:rrent during this period; certainly

the~

nist of the groups that actually opposed the war.

were the most .anti-commuThey were constantly
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lists of groups which theY' saw as representing "efforts to get communists
to work with non-communists."

or

the groups they so charged, the only'

one that will be discussed here is Committee on Peacef'ul Alternatives, and
as will be shown later the NCAC's charges were blatantly unfair.

The NCAC,

however, continued blithely on, devoting pages of Conscription NeW's to
.

.

quoting the Daily Worker, which they noted, on April 27, 1951,. called on
communists to work in broad peace organiza tions
ing the war in Korea, admitting China to the l!N,

aI"C!~d

the demands of end-

b~g

the A-bomb, and

negotiating a "Pact of Peace" among the Five great powers.

Surprisingly,

the NCAC never accused American Women for Peace, whose poli tics-as will
be shown later--were closer to the "communist line" than any other major
group of the ti.ne.

NCAC did note that the Chicago Peace Conference,

which was being spcmsored by the J\JIIerican Peace Crusade, with which AWP
was affiliated was given a large advertisement in the Daily librker, but
the NCAC never accused either AWP or the APC.

"While we must decline to

be fooled ••• in connection with peace fronts," they concluded, rather

too virtuously, "vTe l!Ust do oUr utmost to avoid contribution to anticommunist hysteriao •• n20
The NCAC also oppoSed the increasing domestic American militarism.
They wrote angrily

a~inst

mobilization and the M<?ney i t

co~t

in

art~cles

with titles like ' "More Money for Munitions Makers."

'!hey printed a number

of outrageously militaristic quotes, for example the

follo~ng rrOl1l~ Marine

Brigadeer General Lewis:

"We are the most fortunate of men.

'!here was

a time when a professional soldier had to wid t twenty-five years or

so,: '. ;~\

before he ever got into war. We only had to wait five years for this one ••• "
'!he NCAC was also concerned with the psychological etfects of war, and
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nlness"-~fAlread.y

out of Korea nearly a thousand mental cases have been hospitalized."
t,he

ot.~er

On

hand, they lept at the news that only a m:inority of combat troops

actually fired their weapons, ' in a article titled "Combat Soldiers are
Not Always Killers ... 21
Most of the NCAC's time,howevar, was devoted to opposing UMr.

Alt.'1ough

most of their arguments on this issue were very broacD..Y ,cmti-mili tarist"
and did not deal with the war spe?ifically, they did argue

~t

war proved, that UMT training did.:~6t prepare nen for ~attle",
mandatory program could

ever'prep'~re

tl;J.e Korean

No gener~,

lOOn for real war, the NCAC argued.
-

-

The NOAC also charged that the A.r'rrw had been giving its regular
troops
:in
-,
,. '

Korea training w:h:i.ch "had been weakened by the Arm;r's atteplpt to conVtince
the nation that the Army and its proposed UMT program would be, an extension
,

.

of a boy's public education. 1f
had prompted

But, the NCAC continued, losses in Korea

a. reappraisal, with one

high~ranking

officer commenting that

"We've got to get over this damned coddling and babying of troops.1f

On

the other hand, t.i.e NCAC pointed to battles in the Korean
war
in
which
,
. ".
. units with more and better training suffered more casualties -than less
wellnotrained troops.

They even argued that the Korean war showed that with-

out UMl', limen could be trained faster than weapons could be produced and
transported,1I thus demonstrating that there was no need for UMT. 22
UltL-nately, the NCAC put the blame for U.S. failures in Korea on
bad planning, intelligence, judgment, and even bad equjpment.

The latter

issue covered everything
from -lack of winter uniforms to lack of tanks:
.
"At the beginning

~f

the Korean war, the U.S. ArlT\Y'

~ent

fight against ta."lks, with high casualties resulting.
did this .1123

foot

The

sol~ers

~

to

deliberately
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The NCAC represented a combinatiOll of influences:pri.marily, they
were a single issue group working against 011'1', but they also could speak
out against specific U..8 6' policies in Korea unlike other single issue
groups like the NSBRO and the CCCO.

Also unlike these groups, the NCAC

suffered from a certain am:mnt. of anti-communist paranoia.
their war opposition was

on~ general

In general,

anti-militarist grounds.

They con-

tinued in the same style after Ul.fi' had been defeated and the Korean war
ended..

"The Korean truce has brought no public clamor for ternrl..n1ition of

the draft or a headlong cut in defense spending,tI they wrote in October,

1953; perhaps, they hypothesized, this .,-ras

~e

to a "feeling of fatalism

about military control over the natio:a.

Whatever the reason,u they con-

cluded, with renewed committment, "it is

impor~t

time conscription to begin to express

for opponents of peace-

t.~emselves."24

The fucial Activists in the peace movement were split over ::theJ{"orean
war to a surprising

extent~

As will be discussed later, a wide variety

of traditionally antiwar progressive thinkers, ranging from a spectrum
of liberals (who will be examined in the next chapter), to the formerly
pacifist and still socialist
as to

'tfl\v

No~P

Thomas, supported the war.

certain parts of the peace movement did

~

Speculation

exist will be given

Mfice to say for now, that increasing na tional conse 1"vatiBm, ari"j:.i-communism" and the "lessons" of l'iti II had influenced the thinking of progr:-essives to a tremendous.

degr~e.

But social activist pacifist

ppposition did exist during the Korean war, and it covered a range of ideology f'rom·,the fairly moderate to the quite radical.
Devere Allen and the

v.~

Interpreter for which he wrote and edited
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remained surprisingly conservative during the Korean war years, and Allen,
who had usually found ,himse~~. ,~~g the

~re

radical pacifists in

pz:e-

vious years, became ~eot the most moderate critics of the Korean war
in the Peace movement.

Interestingly, Allen

war as it went on; this was a pattern of most

gr~

more critical of the

left-libera~s,

.including

those who originally endorsed the war, but not of' other pacitist gt"oups,
who tended to have. either an unchanging
opposition to the war, or an unchang.
ing support of it.

Nonetheless, Allen and the Interpreter became increas-

ingly critical of the war over time, targeting

e~cially

UoS.

fore~gn

policy, increased militarism at home, and syngman Rhee.
Deapi te his socialist background (or perhaps because of' it), Allen
subscribed heavily to cold war ideology • .Butbeyond that, .. he was capable
of writing, in a reIl'.lS.1-kable .'cdi.spl~y of cult~al chauv;aism, "Democracy cannot suddenly be handed to the Koreans; it must ripen from within. 1t

Bnt

beginning with China's entry into the war, the World Interpreterbecane
increasingly critical of the war.

Ea.rlie~, th~ Interpreter had warned of

,t he danger of provoldng the Chinese by .fighting close to a hydro-electr1c
plant on the Korean side of the Yalu river.
clatmed, supplied :1 ,.500~OOO

The plant, the. !!!,.terpreter
2
ktlowatts of power to Manchuria. .5

The InterPreter blamed MacArthur, his "get tough 'philosophy," and
his lIusual lack o.f political judgementn f;or provoking the Chinese into
entering the war.

But still, the InterPreter maintained a comparative

consetvttliism. When Alternatives was banned In the fall of 1 ~o, the Interpreter
.

.

"

commented that the banning "could harcD.y have been avoided," and harshly
criticized Alternatives for encouraging draft dodgingo

The Interpreter

concluded with the hope that pacifists would avoid "such harmful extremism
in the future."

They also did not back down .from their ,cold war position.

- 66 In December they stressed that Mao was

subs~rvient

Mussolini in 1940 was a p~isoner o~ ~tler ••• "

to Russia, "just as

liThe Sov:iet. people undoubtedly

want peace;" they added. on the next page, "but their conditioning in
hatred must be faced.,,26
The World Interpreter did oppose the

wa~,and

called for a t!ease fire,

withdrawal of troops, mediation, Korean disarmament, general elections, and
a five year period in which a unified Korea would be a "ward of the U.N."
On the other hand, they ..were capable of

~rguing

at the same time that China

should not be admitted into the UN-"In practical politics, let alone morals, Communist China can
recent behavior. eo"

~rdly

be atimi tted

to

the IDl soon, in view of its

'lhis stand was unique among anti-war groups in the

peace movement. 27
However, the Interpreter was shifting.

In April, 1951, they noted

Thurgood Marshall's report on discrimination in the army (this will be
discussed in detail latero)
trou?les before the war
ment.

In July they admitted that some of Korea's

w~re

the fault of Syngman Rhea and his govern-

In December J they wrote angrily of mass torture and executions in

South Korea before the war.

Victims of both sexes were executed witl'xJut

fair trial, often after their

bac~s

had been broken with rifle butts,

they reported, and charged that 1,200 had been killed at one time outside Seoul in this manner.

In the same issue, they also wrote, "It may

disturb you, bUt if .you go back over the negotiations
step by step, you
.
will come, I'm afraid, to an inescapable conclusion:

that in recent

weeks the eneIlW' has made more concessions than the UN side ••• .,28
Still, they were capable of bizzare and unique arguments.

In June, -52,

they suggested that the communist prisoners might not have to be repatriatedo

The Geneva Convention required the repatriation of prisoners of

war, they admitted; but, they continued, "is the conflict a ' war or a
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They also

~oted

that neither the North Koreans or the

Chinese had ever declared war. 29
But on the same page, their growing anger with Rhee was evident:

"Pre-

siden t Rhee, in typical style, has been arresting members
.
. . of. the Assembly
he could not silence otherwise, and defying the UN's request for more mature
democratic behavioro" Later the InterpJ:"eter was to write of Rhee that near
the end of the war he was "formulating Bome ot the truce teams most impossible offers," and that "how to handle him is likely to become the UN's

n~~er one problem.,,30
~

its anticommunism, its rejection of China as

S~l~'s

puppet not

fit to sit in the UN, its bizzare stand on repatriation, and its generally
,

"

...

conservative (for social activist qpacifist~) outlook, ,the ~T()rld Interpreter
ironically subscribed to a variety of the very cold war
ideology .that
.
.

,

was contributing to the rising American militarism they so deplored.
final sentence of a paragraph

~heX

wrote on American militarism

question that the Interpreter itself might have

profitte<i" fro~

The

ra~sed

a

answering:

"The European ••• tends to see American
belligerence
as bordering on madness ooo
.
,.is it this that accounts for Washington's almost pathological fear of'
peace, theetern'a l toughness that goes on losing, friends ••• Or have we
simply plowed a furrow of fear so deep that we can no longer climb out?1I31
'!here were, of course, more radical social activist pacifist groups
during this period.

The National Council for Prevention ot War

and the

Committee for Peacef'ul Alternatives were two active and vocal examples
of this type.
The NCPW' too}: a radical tack at the very begirming of the war.

In

July, 1950, the headline of their publication Peace Action proclaimed

"We Get Bogged Ihwn in Korea."

The article referred to our military
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to us."

They warned that

ther~ wo~d

be "no glory for ;the .. U.S. in a mili-

tary victory over the North Koreans J It <:'-S bombing as Asian people would
inevi tab1y associated with European imperialism.
the conflict was a civil waro
South Korea

•

•

•

Moreover, they argued,

And, they charged, "the . people of'

-- . are unwilling to die

fo~

ime .Syngman Rhee

regime,

whereas the North Koreans shOW' enthusiasm and devotion to their -cause
however mistaken theY'~y be as to it.s rut~e. frui:tS.1I32
In terms of tactics, the NCPW sent a statement to every member of the
o~

House and Senate and a number

other government offic:t.al.s

negotiated tmce!and seating China in the UN.

for a

The letter argued that Korea's

postwar misery would promote communism, that the U.S. was
ialistic to As ia,

cal~ing

appearin~

imper-

and that negotiations-Itwithout appeasement"-with the

Russians were urgently necessar.y.33
The NOPW' kept up their opposition in the . pages
of Peace Action in a
.
.

"'

stream of articles with
Heaines

ShOll

We

A~e

t~tles li~

Losing

Asian~,1t

"New-est Bungle in Korean War," "Daily
"Our 'Liberation' of Korea .Not An

Inviting Spectacle," "How Long Must '!hey Die NeecD..essly,"
and etc.
- .
.

.

lbey

were consistant1y anti-co1onia1ist, and quoted Justice William O. Douglas's
-argument that ItWhat is happening in Asia is a series of
oppre~sion

~volutions

against

and povertyooe their origin is not communisteoothey call tor a

201i tical appro~ch

ueo

more t.mn a military plan of actiono n

(emphasis

in the origi.na1o). '!he NJPH drew parallels between the Asian situation
and America's own revo1utiono

"The revolt is against tyranny and intoler-

able living conditions," they wrote, and they argued that the UoS. govemment--"bom in revolution" --shauld "align itself with the people" in a
peaceful

~lay J

as opposed to "undergirding with arms an unjust and unheal-

thy status quo. If 34
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disputed the "police action" analogy:

TheY' hotJ..y

police applied law to individuals,

not nations; were not su,\)jectto I'tempora17 shifts in power politics";
did not '''blast and bum whole sale It ; and took orders from a single recognized sovereigntY', which did not exist on a world scale.
they

a~gued

agency."

Mlre fundamentally,

that "the UN is ,a peacemaking :agency, and not a warmaldng

It "must hot be

lis~d:bY' .any

Great Power tC?rits own p1,!rpose."

Showing insight remarkably rare to the times, theY' concluded that "bombs
bearing the UN tag will alienate and divide rather than unite the nations
of the world."

Fin~llY',

theY' noted tha. t . although UN endorsement was sup-

posed to make America's cause morallY' right, Uto the surprise ot m.any,
both sides are tighting with
equal conviction that theY'
are 'in
the right
.
.
.

and defending a principle 0 o. the Chinese and North Koreans have gi van their
lives as freely to expel the 'imperialist

inva~rs'

as our side .J:1asfought

and died to repel the 'communist aggressors' o.oeas a consequenc9eooall ot
Korea, North and ..South, has been devastatedo,,35
.
By- March, .1953, the NCFt'l, "after many JDOI!-ths of pondering over the •••

probable 0 0 othat the

Penta.~n

known facts," concluded that it was

It

beratelY' provoked the Korean war."

The NCP'W accused the U.So government

deli-

of having
"bunt fear -of communism in order to rearm;
noted the ·previous
...
'

animsitY' between North and South Korea; the withdrawal of UoS. troops in

1949; the public mistrust of the U.S. towards South Korea's military' intentions; and Acheson's om ission of Korea is his "line of defense" speecho
The NCP'W charged that "This whole affair was deliberately planned as a
calculated risk.oo,,36
The NCPW opposed

mrI', the war econoII\Y, and the mre brutal excesses

of American troops in Korea, such as napalm raids on villages, and
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"Operation Killer."

(The latter, according to New York Times statistics

the NCN reprinted, "put out of action 134,616 Chinese soldiers of which
only 616 ••• have been made prisoner.")

The NCPW was perhaps weakest in

proposing specific strategies and tactics.

They did print four "Peace

Plans" by four different authors in successive issues .of Peace Action. but
these plans were extrerooly Vague, and did not call for much concrete action.
However, the NCPW frequently argued against the war and domestic mili tao

rism clearly and

~rtic~ately,

cold war ideology.

,

0

refusing to be swept away by the dominant

"If we are wise as well as . brave,"theywr?te, "the

same eagerness with which we got the UN to bless us into the Korean war
can be llsed to get out of it.

If UN sponsorship can make the U.S. inva-

sion of a foreign country a moral act, then UN sponsorship can make negotiation and withdrawal acts of moral heroism.
"We shall have to discipline some of our passions and suppress many
small and foolish prides, it is trueo

But if we

donft~

we may forget that

the big thing is the effort for peace and not a temporary victory on an
obscure and regrettable battlefield.,,3?
The National Corranittee for Peaceful Alternatives was another articulate and fairly radical social activist pacifist group_

The accusation

by the NCAC that the NCPA was influenced by communists,
however, was quite
...
,

.

,

unfounded--the NCPA, in their own words "impartially and sharply criticized
both the Soviet Union and the United States."

Their positions were not

even as radical as other groups at thetiloo.

But their opposition to the

war was consi stent and intelligent. 38
lilt is uilworthy of our traditional generosity and national creativeness that we give Asia no alternatives save communism or the Bo Dais, Rhees,
and Chiangs ••• " they argued, and added that "Asia's anti-colonial ideas

- 71 stem directly from our American heritage."

'!he NCPA called for recognition

of China, a halt to the war, and Korea's future to be uregulated by international agreement in concert with the Korean people. 1l39
The NCPA argued that containment was provocative, self-defeating and
inconsistent.

They held that Russia was not

despi te her "internally dictatorial system. n

illi~erently

expanSionistic,

They addressed economic

issues, using the standard pacifist technique of writing up an alternative
budget.

Politically, they called for

self-determinatio~

in ASia!\ More

globally, they argued that "The American people have been offered two
choices,.

One is the so-called 'preventive war' oeo:the second is 'armed

cold wart.eothe first means global

war-~ow,

the second threatens global

war--latero" 40
The NCPA l-TaS also a fairly active group:

"proj ects are better than

meetings," they wrote, and they took on a number of projects including
post-card campaigns, rallies, and even attempts to put "Peace Planks" in
the plat~orms of the ~TO major parties in the 1952 election.

41 .

The NCN was a practical, articulate critic of the war.

They were

not divorced from the moral aspect of war opposition; for example they
quoted a Korean living in Seoul as saying to an American, "Thank you, I
am liberated.
liberatedo"

IV wife is dead,

rrIif children are ma.:L-ned.

'!hank you, I am

More indicative of their philosophy, however,

l~as

their con-

clusion that "In future cases where aggression is charged, we urge that
the UN first explore all peaceful means, including mediation and negotiation, before :involci.ng military sanctions. 1f

At the time this was a radical

.dea. .. 42

1.

'I'w'o individuals without group affiliation that made sigmificant contributions to the more radical social activist cause during the Korean war
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were David B. eho and Stuart Meacham.

eho was a Korean studying in America

at the time of the war, and M3acham had served for ten months in 1947 as
labor advisor to Lt. General John Hodge, who was then in charge ot t.l-].e UoSo
occupation torce in Koreao

Both men wrote strongly and intelligently about

the war" and their writings were reprinted in a vast number of Peace movement publications.
In hts 'mo~~ quoted piece" Meacham began" "Americans 'will be required

to make an enorxoous contribution indeed to Korea IS well.;.l)eing it .she ever
is to wipe out the

dest~ction

which she has felt to to .be her duty to

visit upon Korea in 1950 • . He then gave andmmerisely detailed history of
nediatio~

of the

Russo-Japanese war eventually put Korea under Japanese control.

"Thus

Korea" dating back to 1904" when Theodore Roosevelt's

in this tirst Korean crisis, A..TJlerica's contribution was to deliver Korea
into the hands or the imperialists,," Meachaln charged.

M3acham continued,

giving a thorough account of the U.S. policies in Korea that supported
landlords, Japanese collaborators, the unretormed ,and "ruthless" police"
and the repressive Falee governmento
M3achamwrote j

"Newspap~rs

or the nature of that scrrernment

have been suppressed, students

ha~

been spied

upon and jailed,tracle unionists have been beaten, terrorized" and .imprisoned, and even JOOmbers of the National Assembly who became un,?omf'ortably
vocal in their criticism of Rheehave been arrested and jailed."

Mea-

cham charged Rhee with failing to implement any of his promised retoms,
and noted that in the May, '50 elections, Rhee's party could only keep
40 seats out of over 200 contestso

"The biggest question ot all,"

Meacham concluded, tlis whether in this third great Korean crisis in which
America has played a role our part will be that ot the true defender ,ot
the Korean people, or will we again be deaf . to their needs because of
the larger considerations of power politics. n43

- 73 The other outstanding individual, David Cho, made a strong case for
Korean self-determination,
and was. harshly critical of Syngman Rhee.
.

Cho

wrote that he was "sympathetic" with American intentions in Korea, but
he argued that "American goodwill toward Korea is being distorted •••
because of the unpopular, corrupt, and

~pressive

~

ruling gr'oup

Korea."

"'lheRllee . re~ has been regarded as ••• rascistic and terroristic" by the
JlBjorityo£ .the Korean people, he

. ~ontinu~d..

Cho stressed theimpc>rtance

to Koreans of a unified goveJ:'Illl18nt, and ·po in~t:!- to

th~

agreenentsCJ(if

Northerl'l.:1and :Southern leaders (leading the Southern dele{;ation was . the
moderate Kim Kiu

Si~)

at a,.,North-SOuth Gonf'erenoe held May 1, 1948.

terms of the agreements reaohed at this oonference included:

The

(1) a uni-

fied government; (2) opposition to the establishment of a dictatorship,
including a dictatorship of' the proletariat; (3) opposition to monopolis-

(4)

tio oapitalism, but a reoognitio~ of the right of' p~ivate property;

the

unified government to, be fO!'m9d through eleotions in"all Korea; (5) provisions for the withdrawal of foreign troops and bases.
blocked this

agree~nt,

Cho argued, was lheels

"ultra:ri~tistsoIt49

The IOrean conflict, Cho continued, was a civil waro
Koreans should have the right of self-determinationo
_Cho wrote, "If we Koreans are . to

~fer,

i'he, 'gr?!lPthat

~damentally,

Quoting Kim Kiu Sic,

. l .e t, it bE:l by our hands; if

are to prosper, let it be by our own ef'forts. lI

"'19

In conclusion, Cho wrote,

"It. is evident that military intervention of the foreign powers does
settle the problem of Korea, but rather does lead the Korean people from
frustration to frustration, and to a misttust in their liberators. n4,
For the most part, truly .radical leftist influence on the social
activists in the Peace movement during this period was nd.nimal.

ntis was

due in large part to internal and external problems of the Lert which will
be discussed later.

One exanple of' such opposition, however, is the
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writings of Leo Huberman and Paul Sweezy of the Monthly Review o
Korean itTar shows our rulers are leading us

a~ong

"T'ne

the road to national

defeat and disaster,," they began, in a special pa."!I.phlet they wrote on
Korea.

ContL'"luing, they argued that, "The U.S. govemm3nt in efrect

invited the North Koreans to attack, then made no plans to !reet the attack
when it ca..'l'fe."

Rejecting as "nonsense" the idea that

the~e

was a "hideous

't-Iall Street plattt to blame for the war, they did argue that "al1oost the
entire Amerioan · ruling class has seriously misjudged the forces at work
in the world today-ou n Although Huberman and Sweezy were sickeningly
sycophantic to the Soviet Union ('.I;Fhstern European countries are governed

h"t.r eastern Europeans; it was Czech
communists with the support..,of many
~

..'

.

"

Czech social democrats who took over in Czechslovakia in 1948 ••• " they
claimed), their .progra.'1l

1-TaS

comparatively moderate:

stop the Korean war,

admit China to the UN, cease support of Formosa, and allow Asian nations
selr-determinatio n, with the U.S. adopting a policy of friendship with the
new natio'ns, whether they had ch~s~.I}- _?.~~italism, communism 'or socialism.
Still no ot.1ter group in the

peace~n.:t ';would

rna tch Huberrran and Sweezy's

radica.l rhetoric, although as we will see, American Women for Peace caJOO
close.

46

To, continue looking at the Peace !>bverent during the Korean war, it
now becomes useful to separate groups into 17NO further sub-categories":sub-aategories which had their origins in trends described in the previous c,hapter.

These sub-categories are:

(1)

Those whose ideology was

a roughly equal lU of religious pacifist and so cial . activist pacifist
ideologies, and (2) Large, radical women t s peace groups.
The first

~ategory

was

.compo~ed

primarily of religious pacifists

who had come to take an increasingly poli tical view of the world without

-

ever compromising

'( )

-

their absolute pacifism..

The positive side of this

combination was that it led to well-infornJ?d and morally powerful 1var
opposition..

The less positive side was a certain con...f'usion over tactics;

the tradition of individual witness and that of political activism were
SOIrel'1hat contradictory.

Still" some of the JOOst

~ginative,intelligent,

and imaginative opposition to the Korea war came from pacifists in this
group.

The two outstanding exa."lIples of this type were A. J. Muste, and

,

the organization Pea.cema,kers ..
Tne Peacemakers were a radical pacifist group
such notables as Muste and David Dellinger.

vl~O~

membership included

Peacemakers -SUcce.ssful-ly" ~

blended a moral, absolute pacifism with speclfic critiques

o~

ialism, white supremacy, and of U.S.-UoS.S.R. power politics.

U.S. imperThey called

for the seating of China in the UN and an immediate cease-fire in Korea •.
Strategically, they worked on everything from fasts to rallies, and

~

good number of things in bett·men"
The rhetoric of the Peacemakers could get quite strong:

they

ref~rred

to U.S" imperialism; U.S. "warmongersll aicliilg "fascist" countries; etc.
Peacemaker Ammon Hennacy wrote "T'nere is a class s ·liruggle and •••we live
under a capitalist dictatorship.1t

However, the Peacemakers had no illu-

sions about Russia, taking care to condemn flboth Thlssian and American
imperialism. 1I

One of their members in -a letter even accused the Peace-

makers of becoming at times "too anti-Russian .. o"

Finally and most embarrass-

ingly, "subversive-exposing"
Scripps-Howard columnist Frederick vloltnlan
.
.
..
,

dismissed Peacemakers as a Quaker pacifist

organizatio~,

the FOR, which was "even

than Peacemakers." -This brought

mo~ c~servative

an angry denial of Itconservatism~

·a£filiated with

from the Peacemakers, who responded

that their program was quite radicalo

"We are ashamed that our presentation
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has been so weak that it is conceived

a.~

conservative," they wrote.

47

The Peacemakers endorsed a wide range of activities, renecting the
differing influences on their ideology.

They fasted, worked on political

carnpaigns, held rallies, encouraged tax resistance, attempted to send a
delegation to Eastern'1llrope, worked against racial segregation, tried to
promote "spiritual develOPment," .a nd called for the creation of .a worldr~llies

wide "Satygraha peace force."

Their

tively SllBll, but that was in

keepin~

and meetings were compara-

with the style

~fa

based paCifism, primarily intent on keeping the faith.

religiously

Still, over 200

people attended an anti-Korea~ wa~ rally Jul~H, 1950, at w:hich !'luste,
Dellinger and Igal

Rooden~

spoke.

At the sane

t~,

others,.u ndertook a two week fast in protest of the

I?ellinger .a.nd four

continued both sorts of activities throughout the war.

48

Tax resistance was also pra,c ticed by .Peacemakers:
refused to pay par'!; or all of their taxes.

A. J.

The Peacemakers

wa~.

~ste,

59 of their members
with his usual

panache, sent the IRS a copy of the Gospels and .'lhore~u' s .II El3say ,on
Civil Disobedience" along with a note explaining why he could not pay his
taxes. 49

en

the political

_ paign durin~ the
leafiettingo

'52

, si~,

Peaoe,makers sponsored a "vote for peaoe" cam-

election, which·. featured a "peace oaravan" and massive

Sone 31,000 "vote for peace-how?"

leafiets were distri-

buted around the campaign headquarters of the major candidates.

The leaf'-

let advised which candidates running in ,the elction "pacifists may support
with a clear conscience."

'lhese candidates were:

Darlington
Hoopes, SP
.

nominee .and also FOR and WRL member; Eric Haas of' the Socialist Labor Party';
H.C. Ibldridge of the American Rally, Ua mixture of vegetarians, money
reformers and ex-Trotskyists If; and Fred Proehl of the Greenback Party.
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It was not a good election year for the Peace movement.
also picket around campaign headquarters of

t~ ~jor

Peacemakers would

candidates with

signs proclaiming such zoottoes as "Wars will cease when men refuse to fight,,"
and "Vote tor peace with Thoreau and Ghandi.,,50
Peacemakers, however, always seemed a little unsure of themselves when
it care to tactics.

At the end of an article on their campaign work

they asked, "ls this the type . of project Peacemakers should.spend 'more
time on?

Is this one

effective.wa~

C?f

gett~g

our Dessage across:

JOOst important, what should Peacemakers be doing now as a grouP?"

And,
'!heir

;

actions ranged from an approving article -on Senator
Ralph
.
.
.

.

...

speech ~hi.ch favored "broader J?f3ace terms," to
Peacemakar: Fyke Farmer to

subpeo~Pres~dent

~

'Flan.q..~,rs'
;

'

..

Senate

unsuccesstuJ. attempt by

Trwnan to a Kansas .city federal

court to show tha t the Korean 'War had been a result of "illegal policies
and "a': misuse of the United Nationso,,51
Peacemakers could, on the other hand,. carry on a serious political
dialogue.

'!hey stressed the repressive nature ,and 'lttlpopularity of

Rhee government, oJ?Posed
self-determination.

U.S.~.R.

and

emp~s~zed

the

j~stnes~of

national

They called nl'Jt for "the -reVOlutionarynationalism
.
.
.
- .
,

of the local elite," but
,-majority of Asians."

imperial~~m,

th~

ra~he:r

for the

"r~volutiorary-

nationalism of the

They were concerned that neither ~he U.S. nor 1,the '

,impose their "system" on the Koreans. Domestically,

th~y

worked
against .racial segregation, against UMr, and in support of C.Oos. 52
The Peacemakers were an active, intelligent organization.

They could

and did denounce with equally moral and informed authority the brutalities
and inhumanities df Korean battles,
as well as the policy mistakes that
- .
.
"

helped provoke the -w:ar.

.

Peacemakers also SIlffered from a considerable

amount of police harrassment, ranging from detentions to ,arrests to actual
pol ice assaul ts on their members, and remained undauntedo
remained unclear exactly what they wanted moSt, to be doing.

However, it
'!be religious

and political parts of their

ideo~ogy

in different strategic directio m.

agreed on opposing the war, but pointed

"This is not a tire for pacifists to

withdraw from public work and witness," they wrote, "or for the pacifist
movement locally or nationally "fjo contract .its

ac~ivitieso

vle suggest

that wherever possible pacifists in local communities, "preferably

~s

,groups,

openly'reai'firm their continued.fidelity ,to the non-violent·:~way, state
their position with respect to the present war, and do all in: their power
to secure consi<:leratio n of non ""'Violence as a true way for the nation and
for individuals."

What exactly
that
meant, especially during the difficult
- .
.

.

years of the Korean war, was hard to define. 53
.A.J.

J.fuste deserves
a section
all to himself.
..
.
.
, .

IfAmericats #1 pacifist."

Musuwas

~ctive

in the

FO~,

and did a considerable amount of l-vriting on his own.
factually detailed, morally powerful, and
for

thiB;~generation

Once identified as
the

~,

Hi~

pacifism was

uncompromi~ing.

Peacemakers,

"~J?rogram

is NO MORE WAR," he wrote, "Ollr program for the Korean

war is STOP THE WAR.II'9
Mustefs pamphlet "Korea:

Spark to Set a World Afire?" first publislled

in July, 1~O'by the FOR, was a detailed indictnent of U.S. policy:

it

gave a comprehensive historical background. to the war, criticizing .American
- policies and Syngman

~ee's repres~iveness;

began with North Korean

a~gl'ession;

denied

it derli.ed the war simply
~e

war was a "police action";

and argued that the conflict was in fact a civil war that had been caught
up .in a power struggle between the U.S. and the

U.S~S.R.

that the U.S. looked worse in Korea than did Russia.

Mlste argned

l-hlste called for

an immediate ceasefire, mediation, and for the UN never again to serve
as a war agency.

Not only did Mustefind the idea of the UN serving as

such a "police agencY" in the future objectionable, he also argued
such a concept was a sham:

"The UoS. is increasing its military budget
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by billions of dollars..

There is no pretense that these vast new forces

are even nominally UIi contingents or brought into being as a resul t of

mr

deliberation and decision."

He concluded this 32 page pamphlet

with a call to deal with the "real spiritual and economic causes of lIar
in thismodern loTOrld. u55
"Korea:

Spark to Set A World Afire?" was qne of the outstanding

anti-l'lar pieces of the Korean war.

Muste

ma~

.similar arguments in his

shorter pieces, such as... the short pamphlet "The ?-1eaning
of
Korea,"
and his
.
.
. .
.

article lTWhat Really Happened in Korea."
in the

II

Muste f s influence was obvious

Statement of American Religious and Peace leaders on the Korean

Crisis, July 19500"

Muste was the Secretary of this group, and the anti-

war eta tement produced, which used many of . Muste f s arguments, was endoresed
by 30 leading pacifists and sympathizers, including Dorothy Day of the
Catpolic

~"orker,

a number of religions leaders, and prominent members of

the FOR, vlRL ~ .A.FSC, Peacemakers, and the t-lomen t s In term tional League for
Peace and Freedom.

The statement was especially critical of UoS. defense

of Formosa, and stressed that the Korean
pOiier struggles, l-Thich deprived the

un

1~ar

had been caught up in super-

of lithe moral force which it

might exercise.,,56
11uste kept up a steaqy stream of wri tinge against the war throughout
the w·ar1s duration, and even after itlflS over.
articulate and

proli~ ii. "

He remained the most

individual critic of the war in the peace..movenent

and, arguably, in the country as a whole 0

Knowledgeable and compassionate,

some of his eri ticisms ring true for a number of other periods and
places in the.history of American foreign policy:
and soldier has to get out of Korea," he argued,

"f!ncle Sam the exploiter
II . .

ein order

t~at

Uncle

Sam the friend and the skilled worker may enter and be lielcomed." Although
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Muste's religious orientation influenced ?That tactics he chose to advocate-primarily individual witness, internal education, civil disobedience, ..:.l'tith
an occasional letter to
sharply political.

~

representative thrown in--his arguments were

The leading individual pacifist of the period, A.J.

Muste was absolutely crucial to the peace movement during the Korean war. 57

_ ._- -------------

. . _ _ ..... _ _ _·. . _ _ ..... ac~ . . _ _ _ . . _____

MC _ _ ...... _

. ._

... _ _ _ _ . . . . . . . _

. . ._

. . . . . _ _ _ ... _

... _ _ _ _ ~ _ _ - . . . . . _

, _ _ _ _. ._

Not all groups in the Peace lOOVeIll8nt opposed the Korean war..

,

vationsfor;:support: df ' ~the war in various "peace" grouJ>.f3 ranged

. . _~ . . . . _

..

Moti-

frome~treme

anti-communism, to unTtTavering belief in the UN to general conservatism..
These. , gro~psdid share, however, a notable lack of knowledge of and/or

int.erest in the backgrollt'"ld of the Korean war in Korea.
~cluded

This category

the United World Federalists, the American Peace Society, and

the World Organization of Mothers of All Nations eo
One might very '-Tell be able to guess what the perspective of the
United vlorld Federalists would be on the war just on the basis of knowing
that the UN had endorsed it.

And sure enough, on the cover of a 1952

UWF publication, there was the following Abraham Linco~n quote:

"With

firl1'll'l.ess in the right as God gives us to see the right,.<let ,us strive
on to finish the 'tvork

't-Ie

are in ••• n

The UtalF was in fact very weak during

the Korean war period, and their demands were equally palid.
the tolar, but as a

~ture solu~ion

called for ,,-vorld

They supported

disa~nt,

UN police force that would prevent nations from rearming.

and a

The police force

would arrest individuals in the government of any offending nation and
a vTorld Court, would be set. up to try the offenders.

The UN was to be

given the pm-Ters to create and enforce the above condi. tions.
equally astute on superpower relations:

"There's going to

The T,;'WF 'Was

C0100

a time
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when we will have to settle some things with Stalin--serious political
things,1t they argued, without going into any greater detail.
of course, hard to diSPute.

This was,

58

Al though the trvJF was not openly enthusiastic

~bout

the Korean war J

and called for negotiations with the Soviet Union-""whenever possible
without appeasement"--the UN endorsement of the Korean war ensured a matching
endorsement from the miF. 59
Another group one .IlJ.ight have

suspec~d

of supporting the war-since

it rarely opposed any war--was the American Peace Societyo.
in fact support thE:'

\ltl"f in

'Ihe APS did

Korea; they also opposedrecogl'lition of China,

claimed the war had "ren tatlized the .UN," and were generally obsessed
by anti-communism.
The APS pUblication

~lorld

Affairs reported the outbreak of the war
th
as t1when the solemn agreerr.ent to maintain the 38
Parallel in Korea was
broken and heavy tanks and hordes of foot soldiers poured down the open
roads of South Korea upon a weaker but more enlig.'1tened people, just as
Hitler had invaded Poland in 1939."
they

lVTOte

On the bright side , "The Korean crisis,,"

later, "dramaticaUy and opportunely. transformed the United

Nations into an active and ci,y-namic organization_,,60
The APS at one point admitted that rtAJ. though our interventions
in the East have been generally well rreant, they have, ?n the 'Whole, neither benefitted the people nor established our

security.~f

But this is as

far as they evel"' lrent, blinded as they were by anti-communismo

"Theories

expounded
by .Karl Marx have been converted by . Russian revolutionary
con.
.
spirators into a gospel and instrument for seizure, exercises and extensien of power.

Their gospel calls for world domination," wrote the APS.

'!hey added that "allover the world, in every culture, every way of life,"
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communism was "mald.ng war" on God and human freedom.

With this perspec-

tive in mind, the APS divided the nations of the world into three categories:

"free

people~,"

such as citizens of the UoS. and western lhrope; ~

lIenslaved peoples," i.e. those)iving in the communist countries; and thosesuch as the 3:>uth ,Koreans-"asp;iring to freedom" but "in grave danger of
becoming enslaved. ,,61
The APS , supported the war to the very end, utterly devoted to cold
war ideology. , In the S'Ul7Ill1er of

'53,

as the war was ,ending, they wro~,

Itpeace is one thing and securitZquite another. , Peace ,m ight be 'restored'
in Korea by first an agreement to suspend fighting there and next an agree-

ment in terms of a settlement.

But such agreements if brought about by

concessions to the aggressor would give neither real people nor any security.n

This may sound like an odd argument for a "Peace Society" to

make, but coming from the peace Society't-lhich hardly ever opposed a war,

"

62

it "is, not that , surprisi:n~. '

en
the war

the "other Jmrid, a group that ·one might well have expected to oppose
~hat

did not was the Socialist Partyo

The SPwill be discussed

la ter when the poverty of thought on the left during this time is examined,
but is mentioned here to stress the fact that ,up until the Korean war, the
SP had had such a strong pacifist tradition that it
lay

c~

co~~legitim~ly

to being part ,of the traditional pacifist '

was nQ1led before, this tra:dition was sufficiently strong that neither '
the SP or SP leader Norman Thoms could bring themselves to support the
Allies in World \-1ar IIo

However, the SP during the cold war (and after)

were rapidly and harmfully anti-cornmunist"

A clue

waS

given

i.z:t

a

sp~ech

Norman Thoms gave before the outbreak of the war, in February, 1950"
Ti tIed by the socialist paper the Q!ll an "eloquent plea for peace," the
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speech ..Tas essentially traditional socialist pacifism.
a brief yet ominous hint of 1-That ..Tas to come:

But it contained

1I}la.rshall Stalin,tt Thomas

warned, "we do not promise any appeasement to you, we do not promise arry
abatement of our struggle against :injustice, but we tell you for your
sake and your people that the world cannot stand the decision of its
quarrels by the blind destruction tmro.rds

~hich

'i'e race. 1f

Four months

, Thoms would endo rse t he Korean war. 63
later,
A

ma~or

communism~

reason

f~.p

,

Thomas's surprising shift was simply extreme anti-

At a League for Industrial Democracy torumduring the war

(LID was basically an SP organization), Sidney Hook spoke of "the nature
of the total dedication of the Sbviet regime to the destruction. of free
,

institutions every'f'lhere. 1f

,

'Ihus the SP, potentially and traditiornlly

an articulate and active ally of the' peace
cause.

movement~

was lost to the

64

Some of the strongest and rrnst active opposition to the Korean ..Tar
came f;rom large, radical
groups ..rere necessarily

wo~nt.s

ra~cal. ..

pacifist groups.

But not all women's

The "'arId Organization of Mothers of

All Nations (l-rOMA...iI1), in addition to having a. redundant narne'loTere one
of thellDre conservative groups of tm period.
from the Korean war was that the UN needed
abolishing the veto, and creating a

st~ong

The lesson that 1-101-00Ldrew

"strengthenin~'--which

world,police

meant

force~

An outstanding feature of ,1eMAN was their anti-communism.

They argued

that Itvlorld domination!! was Hitler!s "concept of how to get permanent
peace--and the stalinist ideal, as far as peace is

~oncerned,

sarr.e."

anti-co~:i,.st

'Ihey argued for a UN world police force on

is the
'lines,

claiming that "such a force offers the best, if not the only feasible
solution to the problem of defeating the communist campaign for ,the control
of all the lmman racso"

Not only was

~vOMAN

anti-communism as it referred
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to existing systems, they even went so far as to deny that "a more just
distribution of the world's resources" would help prevent l-Tar.
,

"Rich
. ~

states as well as poor have waged aggressive war,u they pointed out.
WOPiAN

call~d

for "an enlargement of

~he

.
a~inst

Security C01l..'1cilj a law

aggression and preparation for aggression; an internation Supreme Court ••• :
an international police force to move i f th.e

~urt' so:r:ders

were not accepted;

and the waiving of the veto in case of aggression or preparation for
aggression."

This pr?posa~l-Ta~written up a~ ~ Congressional Resolution

(S.

Con. Res.

#104,

and

19 House

~. C?n.Res.

spo~sors,

#253-271,

Aug~

25, 1950), and had 21 Senate

covering a political spectrum from Hubert Humphrey

to .-] lichard Nixon ..
WOWlU never

o~~s~d.-

the Korean't-rar, but rather draw "lessonsll from it.

'Ihe lessons they drew and the actions they took were conservative and
drenched in the anti-communism of the

day~

But, as is about to be shown,

this was quite different from what other women's peace groups were doing
at the time.
One of the largest, most radical, most active, and

mo~t

wide-ranging

organizations opposing the Korean TtTar was American Women 'for Peace.

AiVP

was a natiooal umbrella network of women's groups, formed during the Peace
Delegation to Washington, August

5, 1950.

Its membership included a

number of Progressive Party and American Labor Party members, so the A1VP
was quite radical, not only on the war, but on
issue s as well.

domest~c

economic and race

Still, AWP identified itself strongly as

peace group in the traditional sense:

"Let the war forces

a' "women's"
knO"N"

that Peace

will be guaranteed by garnering the strength, enthusiasm, fearlessness
and genuine love for humility which women in an independent movement
for peace can bring to the overall peace movement in our country,'" they
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proclaimed, "Homen are the strength of the Peace mov.enel'lt in America •••
in addi. tion to

thi~

women have throughout the history of this country

played a militant and leading role wherever great social progress had
taken place.,,67
In the first issue of their joumal, Peacemaker, in October 1950,
AWP began by asking for mediation of the Korean confiict, and for the
seating o~ Chil!a in the U.N.

But as the war dragged .o.n , the AWP became

is~he 01'D.:~

more impatient.

"Peace

Victory41 became their slogan in

December, 1950.

"Chanuhkahoe ~Christmas 1950,11 they editorialized, tiThe

fighting continues in Korea ••• the fear of war--of greater war--darkens the
lights of CHanukah, clouds the star of Christmas eo ."

!heir demands were

" ••• cease fighting in 'Korea, seat the legal government of
China, ban the
,
.

Atom bombo"
hood,

th~y

Still maintaining a rather ideological view of their 'WomanaI-so wrote "We reject the idea that Americans must kill Koreanso

We hold that a mother's tears are just as real and bitter whether _she
be an .American or Korean, and so we feel that we are fighting not only
for our children, but for the world's childreno"
mas, AWP wrote angrily of "the

hypo -cr~s.y

A year later at Christ-

of a campaign for clothing

-

for Korea; for clothing for those
whom,we -:have bombed and tor.tured
.
and driven out of their homeso

.

"

,

This is what we haveooeinstead

ot homst

and speedy negotiations in Korea, instead of a Five-Powerpactoo. 1I68
Disillusionment had set in e arlyo

Referring
to proposals
from Hoover
.
-

and Taft tor withdrawal trom Korea, bIlt "no slackening in American rearmament," AWP responded "We do not want an armed truce, we

want~aceooIs

this the best that our statesmen can offer to the people of the world:
lull in the fighting while our country

~urns

a

all its magnificent potentia-

lists into preparation for a bigger and bet-lier war?"

By February of 1951

- 86 AWP was indulging 1."1 some of its most radical phrasemaking:

"Last month

the U.S. clearly revealed its war policy when it forced through the

u.~ro

a resolution branding the People's Republic of China as an aggressor .. o
do our military men forget that while killing their. enemy and devastating

the land, our men are also dying:

Or don't they care, so long as profits--

fantastic profits--.f'or corporations keep piling up?"

On the same page

"A Message Addressed by the Korean ,-romen to the '-{omen of the World"
showed~ . ~n

the words of AiolP, "The indomi. table courage of the (Korean)

peopleoeowho, no matter what the cost, will .drive the imperialist aggressors out of their countryo,,69
Their criticism continued
ltlcArthur's firing prompted a

~ll:~~stently,

ba~age

of

and occasionally shrilly.

simpl~stic

rhetoric.

According

to AWP, reasons why "the President decided to get rid of the Napoleem
from Toky,?" included:
It

(1) 0

Both men are attempting to plunge the U.S. into another

i-lorld War, but their~iming is differento

MacArthur wants to declare war

now, Truman wants to .wait until the U.S. has more atomic bombs (and)
an even larger anny
If

(2).

0 ••

Dumping MacArthur gives Truman an opportunity to pose as

a friend of peace.

By deluding the people in this way J he hopes to

sell wavering liberals on his war program.
It

(3).

MacArthur is in fawr of

t dumping'

EuropeoooTruman believes

it would be folly to fight without England and Franceo
It

(h) 0

MacArthur believes the U.S. can win a 'cheap' victory , mainly

through air and sea power.

Truman is surfecing from no such delusion.

Therefore he wants to build America's ground forces.

" (5).

Finally, there is good reason to believe that Truman needs

a scapegoat to account for kl~ica's failure to win a quick victory
i.11 Koreao

By dumping MacArthur, he hoped to take some heat off the
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administration.

Both men favor a war policy.

They merely disagree on

the best way to do the job. n70
This tone continued.

In July

t

51,

the Peacemaker reached its radical

height, taking another crude leftist stab at the U.S. again in five points"
"v.1hy is the U.S. so intent in keeping troops in Korea?"
11

'!Wo weeks before Truman sent GIs to Korea.

(1).

South Koreans

voted to oust Syngman Rhee. Unification with the North was the next logical step.
ff

(2).

Millions of Americans dollars are invested in Korea"

Unifica-

tion would endanger them" ••
A 'national emergency' is needed at home to maintain our inflated

(3)..
economy.

II

71

Yet not all they wrote was grim or propagandistic :
hope for America and mankind," they insisted,

1I~'1ere

"There is better

is hope fOr" peace,

I
Ii

n

and the fruits of peace o

There is the possibility of agreement between

all nations ....we must demand of our government that it use our resources
for the benefit of our people; for schools, medical care; for soil conservation, and the construction of projects similar to the Tennessee Valley
Authority; ,'for 'housing, for adequate nutrition; for culture.
a beautiful country, rich in people, rich in resources.

Ours is

Those people

must have peace; those resources must be used for peace!" A later editorial
concluded, "" .. I know that our fight

l~ill

be won ••• No matter what obstacles

are placed in our paths, our figh t will go on." "our fight will be wono" { 2
The radicalism of the AWP was not solely confined to the fight±qg
in Korea .

Economic and racial issues were stressed heavily and often.

Economics brought out the traditional "women-oriented" side of AWP,
in contrast to some of' t.'1e polemics above.
June to December, 19S0 wages had increased

/on article noting that from

5t

while prices had gone up
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31% made the following plea: IlBillions for I-rar leaves little left for lamb
chops.

Let's tell our President and Congressmen to make peace in the

world--tell them that lamb chops are more American than bombs o "
examples, even when quantifiable, tended to be "homey."

Their

Don't let anyone

tell you that farming to the teeth' is a cheap price to pay for peace.
vIe women know the true oost ••• we know from first-hand experience, coming

,

home from shopping with a market basket lighter
than it should be, and
.
wi th a purse much emP-tier than ever before. It

Tflis table was gi w .n to

illustrate price rises:
1940

Apples ••• ~~~ •••••
Banarias~~~ ••• ~~~~~
Lemonso~~.~;~~~~ ••
Oranges ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~. ~ ~ • ; ~
Cabbage~ ••• ~~~~ •••
Carrots.o ••••••• ~o
Celery.o •• o • • • • • • •

b¢
24¢
25¢
30¢
3¢
5¢
9¢

1950
12'¢fb.
52¢ doz.
45¢ doz~
35¢ doz.
7¢ lb.
10¢ bunch
18¢ stalk

CarL'1e d vegetables, butter, to!natoes and

"Since August,n they continued,

If

some :treats have hit new highs.

As for coffee, you know what's happened."

After complaining about higher taxes, AWP concludes "We can see that part
of more 'preparedness' has led into 101-rered living standards 0" 73 .
Another Id.nd of economic statement was made in the October, 1951 Peacemaker.
The AWP noted that a bomber plane cost as much as. a new school, and llmilitary installations,1I as much as lI,the development of all our River Valleys to
provide cheap power and control floodso ll

"Wllich do you want?1I they askedo

Also, the ATNP continued throughout the war to link war spending with inflation.

AIso--

in a true sign of the

times--A~VP

felt it necessary a num-

ber of tines to argue that "war and war spending" were not lithe only alternative to depression:74
Racial issues, both at home and abroad were also stressed by

AWP~

Willie McGee, Dr. vl.E.B. DuBois, the condition of blacks in the army, peace
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movement links with negro wOllen, dotrestic racism; ,and the case of Leon
Gilbert were all given considerable attention.

Gilbert was a combat com-

mander of the all black 24th Infantr,r Regiment.

A decorated soldier in

VJfN' 2, was courtmartialled and sentenced to death in Korea for alleged "refu-

sal to lead his troops into combat.'!

'!his was despite the fact that Gilbert

had been without sleep for six days and nights, was in a state of' shock
and was suffering from dysenta.rY'.

His defense counsel put up no defense,

and told Gilbert that if he were to take the stand, things "would go harder
on him."

None of' Gilbert's

wi~nesses . wer~allowed ~

sentenced by an all-white jury.
would become a cause

,
celebre
\

testify, and he was

(This case, and a number of' similar cases,

of the Korean War,
especially
wi thin the black
.
'. .

communi ty, and will be discusse d in detail in chapter fi ye., )
AWP reported the above facts of Gilbert's case, with appropriate commentar,r:

"Feeling that the fight for Peace and the
fight
for Justice for
..

all Negroes in our armed forces is inseparable, and that without full equality
and justice for all the colored peoples of the world there can be no lasting Peace, American vToman for Peace have w:ri tten to

Presi~nt

Truman demand-

ing his intervention in , this
gross miscarriage of justice,
and to Mrso
' .
.
Gilbert, saluting her and stating that American Women for Peace are with
her in her heroic fighto"

Truman eventually commuted Gilbert's sentence

to seV'enteen years, and Mrs. Gilbert",was Guest of Honor at an AWP Roosevelt
Memorial dinner, January 31, 1951

75
0

Closer to home, AWP stressed the critical importance
of "unbreakable
.
.

ul'lity between Negro and White wotren ... "Hhite women must realize that they
have much to learn from Negro women, and that there is very little they can
teach

themo.o~~e

rotten corruption of national White Supremacy.o.stands

between us and a democratic, peaceful Americao"

They were also concerned
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with the " growing racist brutalities agajnst the Negro people at home."

The

Harriet Tubman Committee for Peace and Freedom had Itdistributed and sold thousands of buttons bearing this slogan, 'Bring the Boys Home to fight Jim Crow. r"
reported AWP..

Also on the home front, the AT"fP devoted considerable space to

the trial of Dr. W.E.B. DuBois.

DuBois, and others in the Peace Information

Center which DuBois headed, were being brought -to trial on the accusation that
they were ·acting as "foreign agents." "Peace is under attack,!! announced AWPo
"The indictment of the

scho~arly

Dr. DuBois is not only

an

,

attack on the forces

of peace, but an in suI t to the Negro people. uPeace is not treasono"

AT.,{P

also

reported on a vigil in Washington of 132 black women on September 29-00'00001' 1,

19510

The rally

liaS

orga~ized, in the words ,of the protesters, to allow them

"personally to address their government for absolute immediate and unconditional
redress of grievances," including Korean 'far issues .

Additionally, AWP co-spon-

.

sored an "inter-racial Peace Festival" in Harlem, November 30-December 2, ,.9510
MacArthur's firing brought charges of his racism from

76

Aw~--justifiable

charges, in light of what Thurgood Marshall and some black journalists had
found.

"MacArthur is fired, but Harlem shed no tears ••• "

the~

wrote, "to the

Negro GI, he represents the status quo of hated Army Jim Crow.

MacArthur's whole

concept of the 'oriental mind'--the Igook'--is a terrible expression of vfuite
Supremacy all too well undel"stood by the Negro people."

The bulk of black

opinion at the tine did indeed view :t-facArthur as being a racist.
York Councilman Earl Brown from the Amsterdam News, AWP

~oncluded,

Quoting New
lI}facArthur

is gene;-good riddance.,,7?
AWP could get fairly radical on this issue.
letter sent to the Pittsburgh Courier by
army?

54

They reprinted an entire

black soldierso

tVhy is this country fighting in Korea?"

ttWhy are we in this

the letter began, and it went

on to describe the discrimination and segregation blacks were exposed to, both
in the Al"I11'.1 and in America.

T'ne A\fP lIemphasized the interconnection of the drive
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toward war with the increased oppression of the Negro people in the IT.S o ,
pointing out the similarity betw'een the attempt to conquer the colored people
in Korea with (1) the 'judicial murder' ••• of 7 negroes in ¥Artinsville, Virginia on alleged charges of rape.

(2) The sentence of Willie McGee in Mississippi •••

(3) '!he Criminal action of the N.J. police and courts which, under tor.ture, ,
extracted confessions of murder from 6 Trenton Negroes ••• (4) The imprisonment
of Hrs

0

Rosa Lee Ingram and her two sons for defending herself from the assault

of a white man. 1t
MOves.'

At its most extreme, AWP once wrote, '''-Shoot Kvery'tlUng That

This is the order given to U.S. troops in
Korea.
..
--

Such an order would

not be permitted were it not for our policy of terror against the Negro people
at home. n78
Although the propagandistic style of the AWP could become irritatinglysimplistlc, when they were at their best, they could. connect the issues
of the
,
war, domestic economics, and racism in a very eloquent fashion.

An example of

this was the testimony of the AWP Chair Clementina Paolone, speaking before the
Salate Foreign Relations and Armed Services Committee.

Much of this bears

reprin tin g:
"What is five million

dollars-~vhich

is what a good Federal medical ser-

vice would cost--compared with 72 billions now' being appropriated for war?
it seems is

14

thousand tiJOOS more expensive than the continuation

tJf

Death,

life •• 0

.

"The schools that build healthy minds, the:,.:playgrounds that build strong
limbs, the houses that make for unity and security in the family, and the hospitals that heal the sick--the budget for these have been rutI:Uessly

s~ash~~ •••

"In the Far 'East, our young men are dying, it is said, for democracy •••
But are they fighting in

democracti<?<7~ly

fomed units?

Does too Negro Soldier

fight in a discriminationless army? •• To bring full democracy abroad, we must
first practice it :'here at home.

-

9~

-

"The 72 billion dollar question I submit is:

shall we meet with the otm'!'

nations of the world around a United Nations table, sanely, as responsible
beings striving honestly for

good-~ll

h~man

among nations--and all the decent things

which we, as free people, have as a cherished heritage:

llie anS'tfer, from 52%

of the American population--the women of our country--:-Ioud, clear, firm, is
Yes.Ilt 79

-

The A1tfP was not just an ideological organization, howevero

promoted a great deal of activity, especiall:r in '50 and '51 ~

They successfully
~ey' .sez:\t a aelega-

'tion to the State Department,ln August, 1950; organtzed a 1000-no:nen protest
at
.. .
' ."

the

u.n.,

"

October 24, '50; helped organized a "Peace ~rusaden to vTCl:shington of

2500 people; protested at t~e U.N., a~ain in April, '51; momted numerous posteaI'd campaigns; canvassed and polled; mounted a massive drive of "peace h8:Tlots";
participated in the Chicago Peace Congress of 1951, which boasted 5,000 delegates; wrote Trygve Lie regularly; printed leaflets; participated in pickets; and
even entered "Peace Floats" in parad.eso
to Korea.

Thi~

Also, they sent a delegation of women

level of activity was unmatched in this period,

On October 24, 1950, "1000 woman went to Lake Success and Flushing Meadows,

I
111

in orde::- to urge. the representatives of the various nations to

Qonflict, and ~causes

of international tensionso"

media~

the Korean

A,tFI~shing l1ea~ows, a

small group of leaders, including DrQ Paolone, heard Truman give what they called
his lion the one hand we must disarm--on the other we must have arms to guarantee
peace" speech.

At Lake Success, Trade Union leader Esther Letz pro,c::laimed, "The

fight for Peace is no easy. thing, but if peace is subversive, we are guilty of
of that charge."

A petition in support of Leon Gilbert with 500 signatures was

presented by a Philadelphia

hou~~w.tfe,.

and the program concluded with the reading

.o f the Lord's Prayer, and the singing of ItAmerica ..

n80

On November 30, 1950, 2500 women \-Tent back to Lake Success.

Overnowing

the lobby, PJVP Ifwas given the large room of the Economic and s:>cial COlmcil to

I'
Ii

Ii
'!
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organize ,its delegations."

"Peace is the only victo;oy," read their banners,

and, in their words, '''Peace!
young .. 0"

Peace Now I' was the thene of the women, old and

Delegations were sent

t~

Prime Minister

Gladwyn Jebb, Robert Chuaval, Andrei. Vishinsky,

'P

Warren Austin, Sir

and " Dr~ 'Vlu,

of the People's

The message to the delegates began, "We, American Woren

Republic of China.
for

Att~ee,

eace, mothers , wives, swee thearts of the men who are fighting this war--

wonen passionate for peace--wonen who dread the gold star, the barren
grave ••• "
. '.
.

.

.

~.

and ended by asking "the
representatives
ot all nations:
.
.
. .

is it JlX>re important

'

to fix the blame for aggression than to mediate peaoe?
noble to put an end to war, lest unborn

generati0l"!- ~ .

Is it not indeed more

curse the men now living

who brought about the destruotion of civilization?
... oWe. call upon all..govern.
.
'

ments to end the war. We urge you to use your great infl.uences and talents
The message
to Austin demanded "leadership -for peace
of
- .
.
.

towards that end. If

.

the American delegation •• oWe call upon our government to end. the war--coura._geously, unilaterally, i f need be.
home. for Christmas."

We ask our government to bring our boys

81

Postcard campaigns were another tavorite device of AWP.
homes,'; read a December,. '50 card they distributed.
peace. II

"Bring our boys

"Give us a Christmas at

Over 50,000 such postcards ~ere distributed~ through "labor union

and neighborhood peace organizations."

'lhese

car~s

added, "Mr .. . Pre.~ident, for

five months our homes have been disrupted, our security threatened. ~ The end
is not in sighto

We fear for our
loved oneso. We urge immediate mediation in
.-

the U.N. and an end to the fighting in Korea."

The campaign continued into

the next year, with postcards calling for "Cease Fire in Korea.,,82
In April,

'51,

AWP took part in the P~ce Crusade to Washington, which drew

2500 men and women from 36 states.

Delega~ions were sent to the State Depart-

ment and other government officeso

AWP representatives went to see Anna

Rosenberg of the Office of Defense MObilization, to Margaret Chase Smith--"the

I
e'
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only

wom~n

Hospi tal

senator" --and brought fruit to K?:rean war . casual ties at Walter Reed
A

0

.

telegram was sent to Truman approving of the dismissal of MacArthur-.

."

a "first step in the reversal of a disastrous foreign poliay which has lost
us prestige allover the lvorld, and the love and respect of the people in the
world. it

The telegram continued and urged Truman to bring

abou~

"the immediate

cessation of hostilities in Koreao.oand a negptiated settlement of all outstanding differences.,,83
The AWl' also went door to door, with petitions and

poll~.

In the early

winter of 1950, they undertook a massive "Peace Ballot" petition caUJP:B.ign;
their goal was 50,000 signa~res,and by November Los Angeles alone had produced 10,000.

Meanwhile, they took opinion !lolls on the

-y,rar.

While the ques-

tions below, asked of 200 citizens in Syracuse in March, 1952, betray a certain
slant that might have prejudiced the

answe~s,

as Mueller has shown, even ffres-

pectable lt polls such as the Gallup Poll showed a surprisi;ng lack of support for
the war.

Thus, theAWP's polls cannot be totally dismissed as meaningless.

The S,rracuse poll, taken by going door-to-door in several neighborhoods gave
the following results:
Do You Favor
Immediate Peace in Korea?
Withdrawing all foreign troops
from Korea?
.
.
Restoring prices to ~re-Korean
levels?

m

Yes

No

110

75
49

155

22

In March, 1951, AWP claimed that "6&f, of the American pe·o ple ~~~~ peace aIi.d

our withdrawal from Koreao"

84

The AWP also actively opposed Universal Military Training and the 18 year
old drafto

200 of their members went to Washington February 1, '51 to present

their cases to Truman, Vice-President BarJdey, and various Congressmen and
Sana tors.

liTo draft our sons and brotm ~s at this tender age means . robbing

the nation of its manhood," they claimed.

AvTP demanded that "Youth ••• be trained

at Peacet1metasks,:

~.equest

and concluded with a

for "peaceful negotiations,
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trade, and friendship with all nations.:

An AWP "Picket Line for Peace" in

Los Angeles a t the sane time featured the

sl~~ans,

!!I Didn't Raise My Boy

to Be a S:>ldi.erlf ; "World in Peace--Not in Pieces"; Don't Draft

nw Daddy,

I

Want Peace"; IIWives, not WidmTs"; and "Draftsmen for Peace, Not Draftees for

85
Waro"
Finally, the largest event AWP took part in was the Chicago Peace Congress,

-

June 29-July 1, 1951 • . 5,000 delegates attended, over~lf of whom w:ere wonen;
included were "housewives, farm women, trade union women,
women with sons in Korea, Negro women from the North
women, Protestant, Catholic a.nd

~ewish

women, all in

prof~ssionals,

an.dSout~, Puer~o
enthus~stic

mothers •••

Rican

uni.ty,

_ ~ter

mined to extend the peace zoovement in an even more vigorous .way than at any
.
,

time up to now."

.

Haloia Moorhead reported on "the

-

.

orga~zation

of hundreds

of local women's peace conmittees throughout the .!country9 the many and varied
programs for Peace carried out over last Mother's Day, WOll2n t s participation
in organizing U.N. delegations, the initiating of Peace petitions, postcards,
and thousands of neetings around the issue of Peace and the iInIoodiate settle112nt of the Korean Waro

ll

~cific

exaJl'¥lles given included 5,OO(K'Catholic

Women who prayed for peace on May Day,". '51; a

"P~ce

' "

which featured 2,000 people and
earlier.

400

Parade" in Los
Angeles,
.
-

.

cars; and a number of the events described

An enthusiastic conclusion of the Women's

~brkshop

of the Congress

proclaimed that soon "we will unite hundreds of thousands of women to guarantee
peace, freedom, and a full life for our Children.,,86
Organizations affiliated with AWP, such as New England

MinuteWomen:for~eacef

Philadelphia Women for Peace, etco worked on activities similar to those reported
by the AWPo

Additionally, the NEMWPspent considerable time and effort on build-

ing the American Intercontinental Peace Conference which took place January 2227, 1952.

'!he

II

call" to this conference proclained "the common will for peace

:1
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has forced the initiation of armistice negotiations in
the first victory for the spirit of

K~~~,

thereby.winning

neg~~~ations ~ver " me~odso~

AlIIong the signers of this call outside the U.S. were:

Noble literature prize
Co~t

winner Gabriela Mistral of Chile; . Three members of the SUp'rerne
the President of the National Congress. pf

force."

Gu.a.temala,~ber'.~entes;

of Panama City; and the former Vice-President of Peru.

of Ecuador;
the

ma.~r

lhdorsers from the

U.S included religious leaders, writers, AWP leaders, Paul Robeson and Dr.
• 87
DuBo ~s.
Eftilacre~ph:ta-'s

'ChaPter reported on what must have

~en

humorous moments of the Peace movement during the Korean war.
appeared on a panel with United World Federalists at a
19520

~

one of the more

PVlP members

convention on June 21,

After noting that the UWF backed the UN in Korea, and that one of the

panel rr.embers addressed the audience as "we Anglo-Saxons,n PWP
indignantly
com. ..
mented that n the speakers spent undue time criticizing the
courageous
women t s
.
.
peace delegations that have appeared before them, stating that they were jealous of lt10rld Federalists because they included so

manY Phi Beta Kappas. The
;

member of Philadelphia Women for Peace who spoke from the audience made f{>ecial
point in announcing her organization to note that she is a Phi Beta Kappa •••• n. BB
AWP, and i t.s many affiliate d organiza tionsdisplayed a high, unparalelled

level of radicalism and activity during this period.

They focussed on anum-

ber of domestic issues, and on the "traditional" concerns of women's peace
groups.

Somewhat surpriSingly, for ·such a political group, they said little about

the events in Korea that let up to the war.

This omission, was,however, by no

means unique to AWP.
Al though some of their sloganeering tended to be overly dogmatic, the AWP
could at least claim an uncompromising radicalism at a time when so many of the
social activists in the Peace movement had either given in to cold war ideology,
or had been silenced by repression.

Moreover, AWP was able to mobilize people

1

'I

II
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in the thousands at a time when the rest of the peace movement was lucky to get
dozens.

'tWe IIlUst be worthy of the pledge tM:t we have taken," they.wrote,

"the pledge to the wonen of the world to continue the fight for peace no matter
how difficult that fight may be.
things our hearts long for:
children--an end to

It is only peace which can give us those

quiet days, security, and a .good life for our

f~ar ••• an

end, too, to high prices, h;igh taxes.

An end,

above all, to killing.
"For Peace is the only victOl"Y'oll89
The other important large, racn.cal Wonen t s group was the Women's InternationalLeagu.e for Peace and Freedom.

Free of the dogmatic rhetoric which

occasionally plagued Av.IP, the WILPF remained one of the largest, l\X)st politically sophisticated, and insistent opponents of the Korean war.

'!hey connected

the war with domestic economic issues and increased
militarism; .provided
a
.
.
~

detailed historical background of the war; criticized Syngman Rhee} opposed
MacArthur~

supported Nehru's attempts at nediation; opposed UMT; called for

civil rights for blacks; opposed U.S. support of Formosa; opposed war atroci ties of both sides; and insistently called for a cease-fire and a mediated
solution 0

Strategically, they took great pains to encourage and coordinate

letter-writi rg campaigns and petitions to a'wide variety of government repre ...
sen~ tives

and ,officials.

dUring this period:

The v1ILPF even put out two separate publications

'Four Lightl!.1 which was their general jourmil, and Washington

NE'Msletter. which solely addressed political events and strategy.
The WILPF stressed increasing domestic mili tarism,

poin~~g

to headlines

in the New York 'I'L-nes--all appearing within a month of the outbreak of the
war:

"War speeds Arms Aid Bill"; "House Votes

Crisis Breaks Deadlock"; "Draft Fiktension

, ~nt

315-4

to Prolong Draft-Korean

to President--8enate Passes

Measure 76-011 ; "70 Group Air Force Favored by Senate"; "Korea Crisis Spurs Senate
Vote of 66-0 for Arms Aid for 2nd Year"; and etco

The WILPF opposed this
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increasing militarism, opposed UMl', and even sold tax protest

sticker~.

'!hey

redistributed the $70 billion defense budget into a "budget tor peace. n90
The WILPF provided a good deal of historical background, including a
reprint of David B. Chots article, an approving review of I.F. Stone's "The
Hidden History of the Korean War," and a good deal of their own analysis.

The

WILPF labelled the confiict a civil war, and wrote Truman arguing that Itif the
United States insists upon Syngrna.n Rheets government a bad situation in which
we are acquiring the reputation ot imperialist •••will become worse.

'!he WILPF

dug up an especially revealing quote lromRhee (o~iginally inU.S. New-s):
"We were beginning land reform in the South when the war began," the South
Korean leader explained,

II

This. land reform law will

~

We will do nothing about it during harvest this year.

extended to the North.
lht next year We will

take away the land given to tenants and return it to the lancUordo ll

91

The "IILPF saw the Korean war as being caught in superpower politics, and
criticized both UoS. and Russian policy evenly.

They took
great exception
.
.

when Jacob Malik claimed that the WILPF supported his stand on Koreao

'!he

statement Malik was referring to was a general call f'or settlement of the war which
tb~.. WILPF

s ertt to: representatives of all the relevant parties.

"Under no

circumstances could our correspondence be construed, as 'fan
mail ' except by
.
deliberate distortion of our motives," the WILPF wrote angrilyo
of both sides continued evenlyo

Criticism

The wn.pF blasted the Russian delegation tor

its opposition to certain peace overtures in the UN in an article titled "Russiar
Tips its hand .. "

On the other hand they also quoted with disgust U.S. General

Harrison's sta tement that "The most important thing in dealing with a Communist
is to remember--and never forget--tha t you are dealing with a cornmon criminal.

.
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You do not believe anything he says ••• "
The vJTLPF also printed an article by Justice rTilliam O. Douglas, in which
Asian revolutions to the American revolution, and complained

DOUglRS
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that the U.S. had been put "in partnership

~th

corrupt and

reaction~ry gr~ups

whose policies breed the discontent on which Soviet communism feeds and prosperso ll

9.3

T'ne 'VlILPF calle d for a casefire, wi thdra,",l of foreign troops, me dia tion,
and unification of Korea.

They urged their members .and. - others .
to,
write
to the
..

President, the SecretaI7 of State, Senators

an~ Con~ssmen"

editors of local neloTspapers to protest the war.
sages to Congress at

The WILPF also wrote mes-

thebe~ng - , cjf,eachsession.

enter into efforts for negotiation of the

st~ggle

message to the eight-second congress in 1951.

and even to the

"The
in

u:.~~

should willingly

~r~a ••• "

began their

'!he message _to the' e:;igh,ty-third

Congress called for "an immediate cessation of hostilities.,,94
The WILPF acquitted itself admirably during the Korean war.

Throughout

the war" they offered sensitive and perceptive critiques of U.S policy.

They

were especially good at providing detailed news from the U.No at all stages
of the war.

If their activities were no t as varied and colorful as those of

the Peacemakers, the WILPF's tactics were more realistic and consistentc
their rhetoric was not quite as radical

~s

If

that of AWP" it wCls more. responsible.

T'ne vlILPF remained politically practical, but were still idealistic. _ And despite their knowledge that they were in bad tines, they retained their optimism. -

In Februar.r, 1953, they quoted a postcard written by W!LPF leader
Balch:

II

A world of equal opportunity based on good-will and peace is not · just

a drea.'Il, .: it is not just a pious aspiration.
purpose.

Emily Green

It is a program, a promiseo

It is the object of a determined

It is also in the nature of things." It

was this sort of commitrent that the best groups in the peace movement shared,
that was needed to live in America from 1950 to 1953 and oppose the Korean war. 95

[

-~------~--------------------~-----------------~-----~-------------~-----~--------

t

To argue that the American Peace l-bvement during the KOrean war was small,

I
i
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splintered and isolated is ,not ' to be saying an;y"'thing
various internal and external

reasons-,~.any

stU!'~"1ing

or newo

For

of which can be seen from the above

cnapter--the movement during the Korean war was quite weak.

These problems,

and other reasons why parts of the moven:ent did not exist will be discussed
more fully in the final chapter.
B.lt for too l()ng, the efforts of the individu~is and groups.~hat opposed
the Korean war have gone unrecorded.
during the Korean
.

l,Tar

It is not the ',thesis . of this

cha~ter th~t

there .existed a massive politically. powerful peace
rnove.
.

ment--although it should be kept in mind that the American peace mo,!ement during
ti.l'res of war has rarely been either massive or politically powerful.

Rather

the ' point ;nere is to show that there
wa s a peace movement during the Korean
..
.

~

. '

l;rar; that a sizable number of groups and individuals

oppose~th~

.

war with argu-

ments and analyses that had a factual and historical sophistication not only
beyond that of many of their contemporaries, but also beyond much of l-rhat
has been the conventional wisdom about the Korean war since its end; that antiwar activities took place ranging from the fasts of several

indivi~Jals,

to

rallies and conferences involving thousands, to anti..:war petition drives involving tens of thousands, 'ton'th myriads of smaller rallies, petitions, postcard
and letter-writing campaigns" tax resistance, etc .. ; and finally, that even in
the depth of the war, the peace movement was winning victories, such as the
defeat of Universal Military Training, the reduction of Leon Gilbert's sen-.
. .

tence, and the reduction of the sentences of Robert }uchener and other

C.O.s~

Beyond the activities of the peace movement itself, although it is a debated
point, a number of historians have argued

tha~

Eisenhower's pledge to end the

war was a :maj or factor in his Victory in 1952 ..
It vTould be convenient and perhaps satisfying to conclude by arguing that
the peace IilOYBment during the Korean war "sowed the seeds" for the Vietnam antiwar movement, or something along those lineso

It would, however, not be true.

Despite the overlap of certain individuals such as Muste and Dellinger, the peace
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movement during the Korean was not the beginning of' the mOV8IOOnt of' the '60s .
The m:"rement had its "seeds" in the anti-nuclear and civil rights protests
of the late

t 50s.

Nor was the Korean war the end of' the previous era:

that

era had been destroyed by vTorld 1..Jar Two, and buried by the f'irst f'ew years
of' the cold war in the late '40s.
the Peace movement, between the
the '60s.

~10

The Korean "Tar was in fact a Dark Ages f'or
bigger and better periods of' the')Os and

Yet beyond merely surviving the period,

acted .nth ad.'1lirable honor and ihtegrityo

many

in ;.t he .,pacifist movenent

Had America taken more seriously

some of the better ideas of the peace movement at this time,

t~s

COlUltry

might well have been--and continued to be--a. much happier placeo

Ii
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Chapter

4

"Is the NEM Ret>ubliq,' s policy now 'ni;rcountr;r 'right or wrong'? ••
to let soreone speak .
againstfntervention?1I
--letter to the New Republic, Jan. 1, ~951 (1)- 4).

vlhy is there not one liberal rrAgazine willing

Liberal response to the war took a very .<l1trerent form
opposition.

~'Ihat 1ibe~~

opposition

th~re

~:vt?lved.

:was

t~

pacifist

over time;.

_~ll

major liberal organizations
and periodicals
endorsed
the war at its
.
.
- '
,-,

outset.

.-

"'

Hen-rever, disenchantment with U.S. policies

w~uld

emerge as the war

pcogre.ssed t usually beginning with l-lacArtlmr's drive Peyond the Yalu
."

and China's entry into the 1-Tar.
S1,lbtly.

Liberal

oppo~ition ~~er~y

'!here were no cries of "U.S. out of Korea:'now."

liberal opposition took the

fo~

of

and increasing insistence on peace.

1ncre~sing

expressed itself
Rather,

criticism of UoS o policies

Liberals in the 1950s were moving

tOtfard a new, more rig.'1t-'t.nng fOrm of liberalism, a li"'?Cralism defined
as being the political center rather than part of the political left.
This doctrine of the llvital center" provided the theoretical frame-

work for What has less charitably been called Itcold war liberalism."

A

salient feature of this ideology- was its extreme anti-communism in foreign affairsc

Thus the organizations and periodicals that flocked to

"vital center" liberalism--such as Americans"'for Democratic Action and
the NerN,;Leader--firlrJ.y endorsed the Korean war for

~ts

entire durationo

'Vlhat liberal opposition there was came from the comparatively "left"
liberals who clustered around the Nation, the New Republic, and the
Progressive.

And even these were quite caught up in the cold war ideo-

logy of the day.
and convoluted.

Thus their critiques of the war were often ambivalent
But this ppposi tion did exist, and was increasing

I
:1
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significantly as the war went on.
Any opposition that was to errerge, hOlV'ever, ..ras going to require
a marked shift in the perspective of the left liberals.

The

Prcgressi~fs

endorserr1en t of the ""Tar and condemnation of pacifist opposition was noted
in the last chapter.

On July 3, 1950, the

N8i>1

Republic, the most conser-

vative in this group, argued that the Soviet Union was behind the North
KOrean aggression, and concluded that the most important thing for the

,

U.S. to do was trto upho;'d the authority of the U.N.II

In the issue after

that, the. New Republ!£:. proclaimed, "The mood of. pathetic fatc:liSI!l vanished
as American came together in an almost unprecedented moral unity."

The

Natiop., which would be the rr.ost skeptical of the \V'ar in this group, admitted
that the Syngman Rhee regime was "olle of the most repressive police
states ever to enjoy our favor," but gave broad approval to the inter"It must be plain to all that u..'11ess this aggression is stopped

vention.

neither the U.S. nor the U.N. will any longer be a barrier to the Commu,

nist ' conquest of Asia," they concluded.

1

The Nation reserved a few doubts, however, warning that the
not appear imperialistic to

Ai~~

U.~.

must

Another concern was that it appeared

that Itthe South Korean soldieru 40 doe s ,not want to fight, perhaps .because
he has

re~tively

little to fight

for.f~

TIle article concluded with a

call for the U.S. and the U.. N. to give to Korea "the concrete pledge of
national freedom and economic reform."

2

'!Wo strains of thought ivould ererge in the 'h'1:'itings of the left
liberals.

The . ~

prominent strain was dominated by anti-communism, con-

siderations of U.S. security, faith in U.S. "leadershipll of the world,
and a generally conservative sense of "realism. 1f

The minority strain

stressed peace, anti-imperialism, concern with the Korean people, and
general support for economic and social urevolutions" in Asia.

The
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story of left liberal"-thought during the Hal" would be the story of the
second st.rain trying to emerge out from under the first.
One example of t.l1e pervasiveness and povsr of post-World War Two
It

realism" and anti"'Communism was the extremes often taken by the

ReEublic.

~

It is hard to imagine another period in which left liberals

could so easily be persuaded to throwaway their traditional values at
the first call of the bugles, and so bitterly oppose as IIdefeatist"
arguments that in a different time they Illight well have made them'selves:
"Defeatism has an armory of pooerful arguments," the New Republi,c wrote in
August, 1950, "~ve backed a regi,'T'e and system in K~rea whose rottenness
inv"i. ted attack; 'tv-by sh<?:uld "'Te fight to reimpose it against the desires
of the Koreans themselves.?' Were we not to blame in keeping Conmrunist
China out of the UN, and isn't, the UH action
Chinese participation?

ille~l

at heart without

Isn't there an eas.y way out, that can spare U.S.

lives and the mud huts of a prinutive people used as a pmm in a conflict between great p0v.ler?
when

1!!~_ ,?ame J?lausible argwreilts were adv~nced

the_1~;<)cists w~re. te~ti-£&

(emphasis mine)

up the lvo,rld before t1!.e

w

l~;!i

w,er ... n

,.3

Liberals during this time, however, saw themselves as the beleagured
upholders of enlightened liberalism, navigating between the shoals of
-

-

u1 tra-right isolationism and communism.

The Nation in its strong oPPO-

sition to both extrerres even tITrote, "it is sometimes difficult to distinguish

bet~een

on the right,,11

the rantings and

In two articles

rav.t~~s

on the left and the ravings

en-liitled ~IIMan

Bites Dog," the Nation

lumped together right-wing publications such as the Chicago Tribune with
left-T;ring publications such as the Conmrunist Party's Dail;y· Worker in one
amorphous mass" characterized, ironically, by nopposi tionll to the Korean
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war~

It would appear odd that the Nation co.uld or would not distinguish

between the Stalinist party line protests that South Korea had actually
attacked

~orth

Korea, and the partisan, anti-limited war approach of the

far right.

But this easy equation of two political extremes was very nmch
h
in keeping with the doctrine of the liberal "vital center." .
The event that began to tUrn the Nation--and
to a lesser extent the
.
,

New' Republic-toward increased criticism of the war was MacArthur's drive
northward" 'and the Sllbsequent involvement
a pattern strikingly similar to that of

~f

China in the war.

De~re

Following

Allell and the T;\brld Intererete£J

the Nation reported suspiciously upon hearing the first reports of MacArthur's
.

P

__

.

. '

.

,

.

~

"

",

advance.
. . Later comments would be less restrained..

.

-

.

"

It was "ludicrous"

to think that the decision to cross the parallel was made by the UN high
comIrand, the roTation wrote.

The tactic
was a MacArtlmr -plan II to increase
,
.
~

the authority and prestige of Syngman Rhee," which, they claimed" showed
American intentions to rrinstall the distasteful Rhee reg:ime as the
government of all Korea."

'!his "ras all

IId.isastrous~y

inept. ,,5

The New Republic did not follow this line of reasoningt>
that both the U.S. government and the U.N. had "taken for
General MacArthur had

co~lete

K.orea that was necessary."

They argued

gr~tedthat

authority to send his forces anywhere in

'Ihe protection of the hydro-electric plant

near the Chinese border did not seem to the New Republic as a legitimate
reason for the Chinese to suddenly intervene, since it could already be
' 6
"destroyed at any time. 1f
In fact" e:ven tt.te entry of China into the war did not sway the

ReE:blic immediately.

At first they belittled the Chinese al"1l\Y.

~

Later,

as the U,;lif. forces were pushed back, they expressed Sllrprise andrather
belatedly pointed to tl tragic blunders" in U.S. policy.

fut they remained
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completely unsympathetic to China.

"Aggression is not made legal because

i~

announced in adyat?-ce," they argued, "whatever mistakes have been
7
made, our cause is just."
it

However, in that very issue, of the
ment appeared.

~

Republic, a new line of argu-

In an article that . represented
a complete
departure
.
.
.
.

from what had previously been written in the New Republic, Harold Ickes
argued that intact the U.N. t~op~ shollld have , ~lted at the 38th pc\rallel,
as "the arIl\Y' of the U.N. had achie:ved its
clear South Korea of enemies."

.ori~al

Previous~' ;ii<?

this." the ,Nar ReP'!blic had

insisted that such a policy was inadequate.

Ickes .also criticized
MacArthur
. -

,

for maldng ties with Formosa,

note~

objective, wlll:C?h was to

China'.s warnings" and argued

~at

MacArthur "had been deliberately inching not only the U.S. but the U.N.
forward into a war which did not have to be fought
and from which
we could
. ". - . - _ .' ...
"

not hope to disentangle ourselves for an

"

~predic~ble

signified a moderation of the, New Republic.

period."

This

In the next issue they wrote

that "Nehru, who was proved right on Korea, deserves our fullest support,"
and called for negotiations.

The NevI Republic even wrote sympathetically

8

about recognizing China.-

The Nation responded to the Chinese entry into the war with an angry
_ "We-told""5'"ou-so" article, and called for an immediate " reasses sing of' the
whole situation."
betraying certain

The next issue featured an analogy- which, although
~onvictions

as to the origins of the war, was nonethe-

less basically syMpathetic to the Chinese:

liTo understand the Chinese

point of View, it is only necessary to imagine American hysteria i f a
predominantly Communist force under a Russian General .were approaching
,

the Texas border after we had encouraged a North 11exican arnv to liquidate a South Hexican leftist regimeooe'l

The Nation concluded in December

I
I'
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that

t~e

drive North

~d

been a "monumental military blunder based on

appallingly bad intelligence." . But beyond seeing the drive north as
merely a tactical error, this event prompted a new, more serious look
by both the Nation and the New' Republic into U.S. policy in Korea. 9
'lliis look generally meant a greater concern ,for Korea itself', and
a more sophisticated view of the Asian situatim.

This had already

begun at the Nation as far back as July 29,_ 1950, when Stewart Meacham

in a book review provided a good deal of historical
to what was quoted in the previous chapter.

back~ound,

similar

Vera Micheles Dean in the

August 26 issue, argued that the world was in "revolutionary forment,"
and the U.S. was giving the impression that it was "prepared to resist
all change and become defenders of the status

smO.1I

lliese revolutions,

Dean argued, we;re due to centuries of "misery, maladjustm::mts," and
colonialism, and were independent of Russian comnrunismo

The U.S. had

to redefine its opposition to "socialist" poli ticies such as land reform
in Asia., Dean even brought up the

"wh~ te

for better treatment of blacks at homeo

supremacyG. issue, and argued

10

These ideas gained increasing force.

In mid-December the Nation

wrote, "we are either struggling to lay the foundations for a real peace
in Asia ••• or we are merely trying to thwart the Russians at this point
or that point.

There is a big

Freda Kirclrffey gave

~re

difference.~

,In a separate article

pre-war history, and then stressed the nature

of the conflict in terms of the U.S.-U.S.S.U. world power strUggle.
"Both North and South knew that reunion was Korea fS Bingle hope, but

in termS of the Cold
the other."

~Tar,

reunion could only mean conquest of one by

Kirchwey denOlD'lCed Rhee and MacArthur, then continued with

the broad critique that "in the present stage of Alrerican political
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development

l-le

seem almost incapable of doing ,,,hat needs to be done in

countries ripe for revolution •••we must accept revolution as the dominant
inescapable facet of our

t:i1ne.l~

Concluding, she argued that "we must

become the ne,., sponsor of revolution, helping the peoples of the world to
win all that conmnmism provides--p"+us liberty.!1

Significantly, implicit

in the arguments of both articles is the assumption that it l-Tas the
duty of the U.S. to do somethin,g to Asia.
cit:

A third article was more ex:pli-

rr The world r shope . of peace re sts, a t t~s mo~nt, upon thei rapi d

emergence of a new, affirmative, American leadership.f1

This concept of

benevolent American interventionism had been a staple of twentiethcentury American liberalism since Wilson.

By late

1950" horsver, left

,
11
liberals were beginning to . question
our
methods
of
intervention
•
.
.
"

The NetoJ' Reeublic too softened its line somewhat.
Douglas's calls for reform

~~d

their January 15, 1951 issue"

'Ihey quoted Justice

even support of revolution in Asia in
In that same issue they wrote of the U.S.,

"In hardening ourselves to the bitterness of the Korean campaign, we
have turned aHay from a search to the alternatives to war. ll

At their

most radical, they printed an article by Victor Purcell entitled "U.S.
mocks Peace. If

The New Rem;bli<? put a sli,ght disclaimer before the

article, stating that ;; they were "not wholly in
felt it was "largely right."
tion was justified, that

a~ement"

with it, but

The article argued that China's interven-

N'acAr~hurt s

policies had robbed the U.N. of any

moral justification it mi&ht have had, that to Asia the U.S. appeared
as the aggressor in the war, and that it was "hard to believe" MacArthur
12
'TrTaS not seeking world war.
The first half of 1951 brought up another mjor issue:

the firing of

General }facArthur ..
;

I

--.J-
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The Nation. in a series of articles begirm:ing in mid-February, 1951,
warned against trying again to dr:i.ve through North Korea.

They stressed

not only the strategic aspects of such a plan, but also the potential
cost to the Koreans.

They also noted the reluctance of other UN allies

to pursue such a strategy, and the potential for the war to degenerate

into a permanent, bloody stalemate.
Ridgway's remarks that "It l-Tould be a

They approvingly quoted General
tr~ndous

victory for the U.N.

if the war ended with our forces in control ~:p to the 38
and "we'didn'tset out to

con~er

th

para,l lel,"
Co~ism."

China,we set out to stop

1-lacArthur "Tas depicted unfavorably as
. want:ing further conquest.

13

,

RapicIly, the Nation became

very '

critical of what they per-

ceived as being MacArthur's more warlike positions.

The Nation scoffed

at MacArtlmr's "peace proposal" for explicitly ruling out discussion of
,

.

.

Formosa and China's seat in the U.N., and for containing overt threats
against China.

They also noted I'Tith alarm the way in which . MacArthur

seemed to be usurping the government's power to make policy. t1The President's patience with General MacArthur's meddling policy and the virtual
:insubordination has ceased long ago to be a v:i.rtue,u they wrote in midApril 0

Hhen Truman fired MacArthur, the Nation was jubilant.

"The recall

-of General MacArthur accomplished several
things .
that
.urgently needed
doing,'! they wrote, Among ,these things was the assurance to "a doubting
world, that American policy still favored settlemen t of the Korean war
by negotiation." . Other articles in the same issue echoed the sentiment

'14

that the firing represented a step toward peace.

TIle New Republic l-TaS also critical of HacArthuro

Harold Ickes

contributed a piece sarcastically titled "MacArthur is Always Righto"

The

New Republic also scoffed at "MacArthur's peace offer, i f i.t can be called
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tha t& ... 11 , . and they criticized HacArthur for poli tical interference, and
for taking stands ccntrary to U.. S .. and U.N. policies.

en

April 9, they

accused HacArthur of "deliberate insubordination.,"

The Net.; Republic

heartily endorsed the recall of HacArt.hur:

the head of an open

liRe

l"TaS

conspiracy against the policy of the government he lias mioro to serve."
They concluded that "nO"l-T that he is out

o~

the Hay, efforts to end the

war on an honorable basis can be pursued •• Dthe desire of peoples allover
the world for peace has seldom been so great."

15

'

This changing perspective on the war was not limited to the N'a tim
and the Ner.v

Re..E.~blic_o

The

Prom::essi~

was following a ' very similar
theProg£essi~.

path .. For this reason it would be redundant to quote from
at length, but it is worth showing that by January, 1951,

another

journal which had endorsed the Har was seriously questioning U.S. policy.
The p£og£essi:,,~e

note.d that calling the North Koreans

nag~essor,n

but

not a.ppl;ying this label to the French in Indo-Ghina was contradictorry..
"~"e

say we' fight only to trepel agg-cessiotl,jl t but He claim the right to

define 'aggression f to refer only to COT:1."'TlUIlist ,activities," they argued.
They also claimed that U.S.

policies were promoting not a

genuL~e

peace ,

but a peace "imposed lYJ force," and backed by a certain bloc or nations.
Noreover, lido

'VJe r~~lly

nists?1I they asked...

want peace?

The

Or do i>fe just want to fight COIll.;"TlU-

P.rogressj.v~

also docTh11ented the destruction of

Korea, and concluded, "Americans may feel--and have a right to fee1-tha t we would prefer to die and to have our cOllntr"J totally destroyed
rather than have a communist government heree

But have

right to ,inake __this terrible c1ecision for other peoples?"

'VTe

really the
In February

the !:r,?llressiy,£ published an article by pacifist Homer An Jack describing
an eleven-hour "prayer vigil for peaceI' that had attracted 1,000 people
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in Chicago on December 6, 1 950~

TheLrog,r~~sive

l.;ould continue to

chart a course similar to that of the Nati.QQ. and the
the remainder of the

war~

llirw

Republi,£ for

16

The JVJa.cArthur firing had prompted further reflection on the Har.
Not coincidentally, irrnnediately follo'\oiing the firing,

t..~e Ng~f

Republic

began a series of articles aired. atflrevealing hOif special interests
-

.

'

are profiteering on our national defense program."

An article in }tay

t-Ta'Scri tical of the bru tali tie s of the South Korean goverrl1"llen t,
noted that South Korean sol·diers were defecting to the Northo
the

~ReE.'ublic

slipped back

a~~t,

as they did i.D.th

t~eir

and

even

E'-ven '{-Then

cover story .,

on June 25,1952, tit.l~~,nKorea..,.A Year of Achievemen~,n they stil~ called
for a negotiated settlement of the war, and for the reconstruction of
Korea. 17
The calls for peace grew stronger in the Nation after the firing.
"Peace by negotiation u.TOuld be something to offer the American public,
something better

tp~n

indefinite stalemate in Korea--and better, too,

than tpeace I by expanded war," they wro te in ¥Jc3.y

0

declared that " if the 'limited war' in Korea is to

In June Fre cIa Kircrrwey
end'td~hout

into an unlimited war, the JOOment to try to end it is now .. "
peace were combined with an increasing impatience with
,

burgeoning

Calls for

~gman
,

Rhee:
.

"Rhee's declation at Pusan on June 12 that the world should beware of
a tphony peace' in Korea clearly registers the fears of a dictator 'who
senses that ' time is rtmning short .. "
'18
come later.

This

l'TaS

a hint of what was to

Both the New Republip. and the Nation also took time to criticize
Senator Taft.

Again, 'lihe point l-vas to shO"N that Taft was hardly an

anti-'t.;ar spokesman..

'!.he Nation noted that although Taft had questioned
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the consti t utionality of sending the troops to Korea, he had also said
at the tiJne, lIsinca I approve of :the charlges nOli made in our foreign
policy, I , approve of the general policies outlined in the President's
statelT1."mt.,1I

In their next issue, ;the Na"tion quoted Taft's initial res-

ponse to the sending of ground troops to Korea:
got to go all out .. "

tI~.fuen

you're in, you'v-e

Tne New Republic. also made this point about Taf'{j,

quoting him to the effect that Tr1L'1J2.n and

~cheson

because the latter "i-J'anted to vTinTl the I'mr.

had recalled l'1acArthur

Later, the Ns-J' RePu1J.lic
Truman f s position ,i n

wrote.t " Taft has ahmys ' supported the Korean war.

-

.

entering the 'V-Tar, Taft has said, I-ms 'unassailable 11119
Q

Both magazines continued to call for negotiations throughout the
su~2r,

although both shared a

h~althy

tions.

This isperr.aps best shmm in a series of cartoons in the Nation ,

skepticism towards Russia'sinten-

depicting a character labelled "peace ll being misled or tricked by a character representing the Soviet Union.

Their antipathy for cO!lmnmism com-

bining wi,th their generally more liberal outlook led them to some rather
torture.d analyses:

"80m3 straight thinklng about China is necessary,If

they 1-/TOte, "As long as Chinese arnri.es are killing Americans and other
U.. N. troops in Korea,9 we can hardly recognize Hao Tse-Tu.."1g's regime or
consent to its admission into the U.N. But any A.'1lerican diplomat who two
years ago 'V-TaS no t
incompetent..

f

considering' recognition should have Deen. fired as

He should still be ' considering' recognition as something

that may seem more advisable when the Korean fighting is over.,"
Re~J.bllc alt..~ough
~

..-

'ilie

~

no less mistrustful of the Comnnmists,
took on a mJre
.-

concilliatory tone,

t~Titing

in

~uly,

good reason to believe she does .. "

"Does Russia want peace?

There is

In October the NertT ReEll;b)..;hc noted

that "both sides have negotiated in good faith," a.'1d pointed out concessions
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made by the communists.

This continued to the end of the year, and by

December 31 , they Here forced to ac1'7lit that IlIf there can be a criticism
of the U .. N" attitude so far, it is

tlt~t He hav'B

acted as if we 'Here negotiat-

ing a military victory, not a Inilitary stalemate •• "the truth is that alrrost
every concession in the negotiations so far has been made by the Communists. H20
As the ~var ground i.lmcreasi..ngly to a long s talema. te in 1952, both
magazines wrote considerably less about it.

"Peace in Korea stands

first on our agenda of hopes in 1952," wrote the New Repp.blic in January

_-

of that year, but both the Nev.r
Reuublic
and the Nation
"'
....
. '
. began to confine
themselves to occasional short appeals to settle the war, at or around
the 38

th

parallel.

The NatioJ1, hOi-rever, . c?ntinued moving toward a ;more

sound, factually based criticism of the war.

Tney printed an article

by IeF. stone titled "1k'W Facts in Korea,1I in lv-hich Stone raised many
of the questions about the origins of the
liThe Hidden History of the Korean 1'lar .. "
and detailed article titled "Korea:

Hal'

that he later raised in

Arthur Gray wrote an Ll1formed

Steps to Unification," which argued

for a negotiated settlement, peaceful unification, and neutrality for
Korea"

A nE;vf agency to oversee this process was needed, as liThe UN has

become too closely identified with the United States in. Korea and is
unable to play an independent role. It
tant a.cL"7lissiono

This in itself was a fairly impor-

Gray concluded ldth a description of the destruction

of Korea--an especially

c~mpelling

statistic is that with the vTar only

half over, Korea had already suffered five millien casualties out of a
pre-war population of thirty million---and a call for "imaginative cooperation to save Korea from chaos. n
La tel' articles in the

21

&~i:Qa

vTOuld continue this theme"

II

No country

has ever been more completely laid ..ras-tie by war than Korea. ,11 began an
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article by 1fal tel" 8u11i van in February 1951.,

t'li th a year and a half of

fighting still ahead, .o ne out of nine Koreans had alreactr been killed,

5,00,00 displaced, and 100,000 ~ children made

orphans~

The Nation con-

sistently called for peace, reunification (unoer neither Rhee nor Kim
II-Sung of the North), and reconstruction..

II

A Korea left divided as well

as ruined 1'1ill have gone through untold agony to no avail, and the United
Nations't'1ill have fought for nothing," they concluded.

In view of subse-

,

quent events, ' this is an interesting analysis. 22
Re:e~lic

The New

remained remarkably silent on the war during most

of 1952 (although a significant amount of its slack was picked up by the
Progre~sive,

which followed a line similar to the Nation t s with perhaps

a little more emphasis on the question of American imperialism).,
~~"public

The

did oppose fO,rced repatriation, but expressed-increasing weari-

ness of the war

They vrere especially cn tical of ':Ei.senhmrer t s handling

$

of the war issue in the

'52

campaign.

The Korean War issue elected

Eisenho,,,eI'", theY'V1rote, but the issue had never been adequately debated
in the campaign.

The

~ . ReEubl.~.£

referred to Eisenhower's promise to

go to Korea as nerely a glib gimmick, and as such was potentially counterprodu.ctive"

After Eisenhowerts election, their cynicism remained unabated,

and articles appeared with titles li!.<e "Did Ike Delay Peace in Korea?1I
The ~ongrew increasingly anti-..rar.
a platform for the

Democrat~c

Party.

23

In July", '52 they outlined

Their section on the Far East con-

sisted of two paragraphs, one a quote from the AFSC's "A Quaker View of
Foreign Policy," and the other a call by the Nation
seating
of
- for the
.
.
...
China in the U.N. after the establishment of a Korean truce.
first time the

N~tion

had been so explicit on the issue.

This was the

The section in

the proposed platform on Colonialism consisted of one paragraph, a quote
from

the }lILPF.

The

"
·
po I"lCY V1.ews
f orelgn

0

~

for the first time was openly endorsing the

f an t'J..-war

"f·l5 t
paCl

" t ·lons. 24
organlza

- 115 -

This trend intensifiedo

lilt is time to end the Korean fighting, 1t

the ~ wrote in October, 1952..

In December, Robert Lynd wrote,

III for one do not Imow why peace has not yet been achieve do II

The Nation

also shared the New Republic f s cynicism about the new President.

lli..senhower

had "suddenly promised to 'make a personal trip to Korea' in an effort
to bring the war to an early and honorable end--but with no hint as to

.

'25

how he would go ,about it,ll the Nation complained in

No~mber.

The Nation
bega". to criticize a lvide variety of. aspects to. U,S. policy.
In December Robert Lynd accused theU .So of following a pattern similar

to nineteenth century British imperialism. The Korean war was not "d8ll1O ...
cratically responsible," Lynd concluded.

On a different track, the

!La tioll vehemently· opposed the idea of sending Chiang Kai-Shek's troops
to fight in Korea--an idea that had great currency in certain rightwing circles at the time..

The -tIatiop objected to this proposed prolong-

ment and extension of the war, which "could easily become a universal
bloodbath-ell

The Natiol.l also eJ...'"Pressed concern that policies be made by

the U.Ne, and not by the U.S. unilaterally, revealing some fears of the
potential manipulatio n of the U.. N. by the U.S.

liThe U.N. was not estab-

lished to suppress any particular i<i:lology, or to promote the strategic
interests of anyone nation," they argued"
N~ti0!2.

Finally, early in 1953 the

published a series of "Proposals for Peace" by various authors.

3)me of these plans were fairly vague, but they usually began with a
demand for a ceasefire in Korea.

T'ne better ones

sug~sted'a

broad

range of measures to ease the cold war, including specific plans for a
Korean peace settlement, and also proposals dealing with Indo-China, Germa.."'lY,
economic cooperation, and a general easing of world tensions.
The

~ati~

26

however, was a little slower in accepting the idea that
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connnunists -were negotiating in good faith than -was the Net-l' Republi£.

They

tended to vacillate in their perspective, and as late as December, 1952
they could writ.e, "It may well be true tha t they (the communists) •.ran t
to end this war, but there has been no sign yet that they will consent

to end it on anything but their own strictly interpreted tems. n

This

view occasionally degenerated into pure pessimism, in articles such as
J. Alvarez Del Vayo' s

~~.Kore.a:

No 1-vay Out"; another article remarked

,

sadly, "-what worries us . is the idea of the war in Korea becoming a 'way
of' life'•• ",,27
But by the sprL~g of '~3, both the Nation and the New Re~blic were
.

,

C

4

.

. .

putting the onus of the failure of negotiations on the U.N.

The death

of Stalin (who was replaced by Georgi Malenkov) may have made this shift
in perspective easier.

"It is too soon to say positively, but apparently

.Hoscow policies have changed," the
~

the New

Reoubli~

tically one-sided:

N..~_Republtc

wrote .in April 19530

In

denounced Eisenhowerfs peace plans as being unrealis"The Soviet government thanks President Eisenhower;

it is always Hilling to talk and has no intention of slitting its own
throat," The

~~f

Rep!!bl!c began.

The article went on to argue that the

U"S. had to provide more realistic peace terms.

The Nation went even further.

"~SCOw

28

I.

is ready to go to almost fan-

tastic lengths to settle outstanding feuds," they wrote in April '53 ..
This same article quoted a UoN. diplomat who remarked, "It looks as i f
Dwight Eisenhower f s campaign pledge to try to end the Korean war is now
going to be fulfilled--by If.a.o Tse-Tung and Ma.lenkovo 00"

The Nation

-

accused the U.S. of unnecessarily "hunting booby traps" in peace orfers,
29
and listed the long series of concessions made by the communist sideo
i
I.

,~ .

i!

,' ,
"

~
,,;"
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In fac 't there had been no sudden, dramatic change in the communist
negotiating technj.queso

But increasing war weariness, and the grm-Ting

list of comrm.mi st, concessions helped focus the anger of the left liberals
on the U.S.

side~

At this point, near the end of the war, the Nation and the New Republic,
began to direct all their anger and frustration at
the June

~;ngroan

Rhee.

After

6 truce agreement, which still left much to be negotiated, the

Nation cautioned that
as great as his

rt

SyngmanRhee f s capacity for dangerO'J.s mischief is

inOl~ity
,

to
drive the Chinese out of Korea single-handed.
.

He can do a lot to sabotage the truce and obstruct progress towards peaceo"
After Rhee engineered a mass escape of North Korean prisoners of war-at a time when the issue of forced repatriation was still in the major
stumbling block in the ne gotiations--both magazines were furious.
New

Rep!!~.in

Tne

a series of articles referred to Rhee as a "ward heeler

cast as a 'statesman!! whose "action proves that he still cannot be trusted .. "
lIS;yngnt..an Rhee's position is clear; if the U.N. does not place the whole
~he

of Korea under his rule, he will violate the truce,"
wrote.

"Rhee would make a Il'..ockery of'f!..N. pri..'1ciples.

New Re,E!!blic

Rhea is the

poli tica.l deadwood that must be cleared away i f we are to help create
30
• A·
..
J.n
sJ.a ••• f ree progressJ:.ve
na t·J.ons •.•• rr

The release of the prisoners also infuriated the

Nationo~

In the

space of two paragraphs, they referred to Rhee' s " infamy," called him
ttthe evil old
and concluded that "to proceed with
. man of South Korea,"
. Syngrnan Rhee as a treaty partner is to put into this

unbalance~,,_ sinister

man t s hands a commi ttment that could be abused not merely to rekindle
the Korean conflict, but, to drag the United States into another '''orld vlaro"
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This criticism continued as the negotiations dragged on through July and
August.

"The most popular spectator sport over the past few days has

been the grim one of guessing ,.rhether Syngman Rhee would accept any truce
formula that anyone else could accept,"the Nation wrote in July.31
The final structure for any kind of support for the war were giving
way..

The left Liberals had first endo17sed the war, then argued for its

limitations; later, growing weary of the

fight~ng,

ingly critical of the U .. S. and its policies, and
with increasing insistancyo

. they became increas-

1Jega~

,

calling for .peace

Their criticisms ranged--fro?1cm increased

awareness of the devastation of Korea, to the grudging realization that
the

U~N.

side had been less willing

negotiations than had the

~

communists~

make concessions during the long
Finally, Rhee's record of brutality

and oppression, and hi~ uncompro~sing and obstructive ~ehavior during

the negotiations hadyrompted an outburst of rage and frustration from the
left

liberals~

"lor three ""Teeksthe United Nations has bea'l pa.ralyzed
treache~

and the Korean truce blocked by the

Rhae ,It wrot..e the New R~blic in July, 1953..

and intransigence of Syngman

Then, after cataloguing

Rhee's long record of political oppression and corruption, they concluded:
"Rhee theanti-communist has pursued every communist -, technique of police
ru1e. 1132
Implicitly, this brought much of the moral
war into
in the

question~

.

justific~tion fo~

the

Freda Kirchwey articulated this in a different way

E!.~: It§yg~n

Rhea has dramati,zed the

Sl.1l:~stion

whether the UoN.

will not have to reconsider the whole problem of hmf to deal with acts
.

.

.

I

.

2!_~ssion_and other threats to l!,orld peace." (~hasis mine.) T?is

cannot compete in radicalism with the pacifist opposition in the previous
-

chapter"

.

.

But it does represent the end of a long road of increasing cri-

ticism of the war, and increasing disillusionment with U.S. policies..

And,
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al though it had taken the N..f!..J" RE:J2ublic and the Nati.9E, the length of the
lolar to get to this point, the above quotes represent a serious q'uestioning of the f1L.'"ldamental rationales for which the '"Tar had, in their viel-T,
been fought)3
The evolution of left liberal thought during the war followed a long,
slOt-l, tortured and frequently convoluted path of inc,r easing criticism.
Even these less "centrist" liberals still adhered to a fairly rigid cold
In the spring of ,1951, even a~ter it hadQ,fre~d

vTar nevT of the world.

a number of criticisms of the war, the Ne'.-l ReEublic could still

~~a:p" ,

"the New Republic believes that the w:orld is divided by 'a basic struggle
between dictatorship of the Soviet Uhion and Democracy.'!

In the sense

that these assumptions were alt'TaYs undex-lying liberal thought, liberals
could never be more than, to use a term of Robert Fowler' s} II believing
skepticsc,!34
Tnis phrase

cap~~res

left liberals of the day:

nicely the contradictioh_ in the ideology of the
the contradicti.on

along with cold war assumptions..
as ,,-laS argued before, in

'fRIO

of having liberal values

This contradiction manifested itself,

conflicting strains of thought which were

simul taneously embraced by left liberals.

The mre prominent strain

stressed anti-commullism, U.. S. lV'orld interests, and Ifrealismc"; the other
strain stressed peace,

anti-impe~ialism,

and social "revolutions" in Asiao

and s.ympathy with the economic

Although often distorted by the former,

increasingly the lat:ter perspective cc;une out, in the writings of the New,
Republi~,

the Nation,

_a~d

in similar periodicals such as the ProgreSSive.

One ' could well argue that had the cold war ideology been slightly less
dominant in this period, had the origins of the war not been so univerally
assumed to be nothing other than sheer naked aggression, had there been
a more vocal

anti~'lar

movement, or even if the war 1].a,fi just gone on longer,

-

12 0 -

-Chis increasingly sharp criticism of the war could have tlL"1"l1ed into
intelligent and vocal outright and unequivocal opposition c

The experiences

of many left liberals during the next war America would fight in Asia
seem to suggest thisQ

,
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Chapter

5

"This \-Tar wi thifurea is no t the Ne gro f s ,far e!l
--William Patterson
Black opposition to the Vietnam Hal" Has (jiuite famouso
but still strong was black opposition to World 'IvaI"

Less famous,

TwooThe~efore,

it is

not surprising to fin~ .that there was indeed black opposition to the
Korean Hal".

Because of their unequal status at hOll'e,

likely to view any war America

bec~e

dom,democracy and equality abroad.
especially suspect for blacks;

black~

l-1ere less

engaged in as a war to promote free-

America' s involvement in Korea was

the war could be seen as a "whitell country

fighting non""'i-Thite forces; and-moreover;.blacks were very

suspici~s

to vThat they perceived as the overtones of colonialism in the "'Taro

Some

of the best examples of black opposition formulated on these gro11.'1ds
be f011.11d in the pages of the Pittsburgh Courie:r: and the Cleveland
~d

Pop.!!.

as

C~'1

~

In the mar..ner of the previous chapter, only these two will be

quoted, but s1-milar attitudes can be found in other black newspapers of
the times, such as the Baltimore Afro-A1'!!erica!1: and the New York
~~

A.."l1ster~

1

lrfuen the war broke out

·~he

Calland Post expressed some ambivalanceo

"America needs waste no sleep over the loyalty of its 15,000,000 Negro
5'tlb-citiizens,1I they lon'ote on July

15, .1.9500

The black Il'an 'Would serve

loyally, although IIbetter than most Americans he will be able to understand the basic reason behind his nation's fumbling diplomacy in the
realm of the darker races, and for all its strange and inexcusable protestations of full democracy for 'foreigners' while c111\9;1\,9 desperately
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at home to the principles of white supremacy. "

They concluded t.,ith t-"he

observation that until the ' U.S. granted full equality to blacks, it
2

could nev-er have credibility in Asian and African nations.
This

,"laS

hardly a ringing endorsement of the war, but the Pitts-

burg."h Courier, the most anti-'V'far of all the !l'ajor black newspaper, went
even further.
war."

On July 8, 1950, they referred to the conflict as a "civil

On July 15, columnist Horace Cayton argued that the U.S. had

,

ignored the cries of colonial na tiORS for freedom., and for several

ye<l:~s

A

had used the "false thr'eatll of
ing the issue.

By delaying

co~islll

act~on,

as a s,capegoat and a way of.avoid-

the U.S. had caused the

co~st

threat .to become real, Cayton argued, and the U.S. was "still unable to
formulat.e a positive hope for the peoples of the world.'!

JoA. Rogers on

the ' next page argued that America was inheriting "centuries of evil wrought
by white '!l'.ash;rraces, '" and concluded that "Asia, communist, or not, intends
to be rr'ee of white dominance .. "

In his next colurrm, Rogers gave some

backgr01md, of the war" declared that the di-vision of Korea waS "a bad bargain for all Koreans,1t denounced both the American and Russian role in
managing the liberation, referred to SyngIT'.an Rhee as a U.S. I!puppet ...
senile, incompetent, autocratic," noted Rhee's assasination or his political rival Kim Koo, charged that South Korea was a "police state," and
claimed that several South Korean Generals and "large nUIIlbers" of the South
Korean .Army had defected to the North.
carried as if it 'Here another Pearl

"Though nevTS of the invasion was

Har~or,

both sides have been fighting

on the border for years,1I Rogers pointed out.

Finally, Uthe Communists,

who had gained great strength in South Korea, thanks to Rhee's rotten rule,
seem to have taken his defeat at the polls as a green light to come in and
be welcomed," he concluded.

3

Not all that 't-Tas to follow from the Courier and the Call and Post
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would be cn tic ism"
co~~nismo

macks to some extent shared contemporary anti-

And, as the

abov~

Call and

Pos~

editorial indicates, many

were willing, at least initially, to give grudging support to the war.
Notable among prominent blacks who supported the war on general partiotic
'

"

grounds was A Phillip Randolph ..
$

But what was perhaps the most positive aspect blacks savT in the Korean
war

i<1aS

the promised integration of the Army.

No longer liould blacks be

relegated to servi,c e units; they would now bea:llov-red ,t o
front lines, ultimately in integrated units.

fight ~'.on ::~he

This desegregation

was

seen

as: a constructive : element of the war by even the most critical black comrnentators.
greeted

'tn th

The fact that blacks were to be used as combat troops was
enthusiasm.

"Negro Combat Soldiers Prove HettIe in Korea--

Get chance to use Guns for Heapons, not Picks, Shovels," was the title
of an August 26, 1950 Call. and p~~ feature story.

Blacks were

If

getting

a better chance to prove their fighting ability than they got in eitherv-Torld Ivar' One, lihen colored soldiers loTere assigned mostly to labor battalions, or in vlorld 'VJar Two, when they had their morale

shattere~

by being

trained as combat soldiers and then converted, with few exceptions, into
service troopse ll

Black newspapers
would follow the exploits of black com. . . . . ..
'

bat troops zealously throughout the loTar, giving special attention to the
all-black (excepting"officers) Twenty-fourth Infar:tryRegiment, whi ch
had borne the brunt of much of the early fightingo
It does not need

docume~ing

here that by

the charm of being sent to the front lines had

t~e

4
Vietnam. war, much of

I~orn

off. ~or blacks.

What

is worth.;noting is that blacks were beginning to get a sense of this by
the middle of the Korean ,"'ar.

A March 31, 1951 cartoon in .t he Courier

shows two black soldiers alone in a foxhole at the front:

in reference

to a white character not shown in the scene, one of the black soldiers
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is saying to the other, "Say Cuz, why do you reckon Mister Charlie ain ' t
been up here like he always do, to tell us to get back in the rear f cause
hets the only' one allowed in front?

You sfpose hers gittin' more demo-

cratic?" 5
The sentencing of Leon Gilbert to death, and the subsequent spate
of court martials against blacks began to dim l-Thatever enthusiasm blacks
had been able to generate about

t~e

roid-october to mid-No~!f1ber, 1950..

war.

These events took place from

Although Gilbert's case was t&.e IOOst

extreme, it was by no lOOans an isolated incident.

It~ve

are being court-

martialed and sentenced to imprisor..ment for life--not one or two of
us, but in groups of fours and fives," one soldier complained
Call and Post.

~

the

The soldiers requested aid from the NAACP, who after over-

coming in:i.ti,H resistance from MacArthur, sent Thurgood Marshall to Korea
to do an investigation"

.

The results he returned ldth shocked many blacks.

In the ..first place, many of the trials had been conducted extremely
quickly.

Three bla,?k GIs were given life sentences in trials that lasted

under fifty minutes.

Twenty-seven others were given severe sent,ences

in trials of equal length, and none of the cases lasted more than '.fa
fetor hours."

Blacks had also been convicted considerably more often

than whites, and givan considerably stiffer sentences, as the follm-dng
chart of court martial trial for October-NoVember 1950 (printed in the
pall and Post) shOl-Ts: 7
Disposill£>n.

Number by: Race
Black

Accused
Charges withdrawn
Charges reduced to AWOL
Acquitted
Sentenced
Death
Lile

60

23
1

White

-"8"
2

o

4
ll.

~

15

o

1

4

o

6

-

1-t::)

-

..

'

50 yrs.
25 yrs.

1
2

20 yrs.
15 yrs.

3

10 yrS.

7

0

0
0
0
0
1
1

1

5 yrs.

2
0

3 yrs.

These "figures lead us to two possible conclusions,1f the Call and Post
remarked dryly, "either Negro soldiers who in every previous war have
dis-I;inguished themselves as excellent fighters have disintegrated during
~ut

the last generation, or else they have been singled
for the poor showing

.of. the

U.N. troops."

as scapegoats

,

In its conclusion, the Call and
~lack

Post added that "we are certain that fe . .1, if any American . s?ldiers,

or l-Thite, have any real knol-fledge of why they are fighting ••• in Koreao,,8
~rshallts

report also concluded that MacArthur was in large part

responsible for the continuing segregation in the Army.

It was with

this in.mind that most blacks vieHed MacArthur's firing.

Blacks had

also not been pleased with certain remarks MacArthur had made, such as
his prediction that an A..ryr:y with "clean uniforms and white faces" would
scare the Koreans into retreato
focus of black anger.

Hor.'1ever, HacArt!rJ.!' was not the only

hl.f7

lfuen he was fired, the Courier approved,

not-

ing that MacArthur could not have been solely responsible for the continuing segregation in the A:rro:y., asked, "How about 'ousting some others?,,9
The above typifies an important aspect of black opposition.

Blacks

had their own concerns in the war, and these remained fairly constant o
The ups and downs, and even the important crises of the war held less
interest for black commentators than for others e Blacks were more intersted
in the underlying themes : they perceived in the l-1ar, such as colonialism
and racism; also blacks could not consider the war without considering
the sta tus of their race in the Army, and in the U. S as a whole
II

0
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Han~r

blacks were unhappy with the thought that after fighting in

a war to make Korea t1free,n they Hould hav'"e to come home to a n jimcrow"
America"

"He was good enough to fight, but his color isn't right,"

was the refrain ,of a song sent in to the Courier in August, 1950, that
made this pOint.

Along similar lines, in December, 1951, Courier 'columnist

P.C. Prattis wrote an "open letter" to a

part:

Gr

in Korea, which read in

"Even w:~'filif'medals, Joe, and your uniform, you could never be sure

where you .could buy a ~al or obtain a room in a hotel.

They'd still

have the nerve to tell you, Joe, that 'l-1e den r t serve coloreds.' II

A

letter from a black soldier to the Call and Post argued, "if our boys are
..

.

.

.

to die for this country, they are to share equally in its opportunities,
not just its wars"n

10

The fact that blacks were still the .victims of racial arrogance
in the U.S., helped sensitize them to the racial implica t ions ofU"S.
soldiers referring to Koreans as "gookso"

The word Ilgook" was as bad

as the word "nigger," Horace Cayton insisted" and the NAACP's 9,risis
argued that " • ..,we will never l·dn the political war in Asia as long as
Koreans and Asians are

f

gooks t in the eyes of our fighting meno" 11

Not infrequently, black commentators actually expressed a certain
ill-repressed glee at the victories of the non-"toJ'hite Koreans.

J .. A. Rogers

wrote in late 1950. " if the disaster in Korea can rid us of some of our
racial and national conceit, and let us see things as they really are,
i t will not have entirely been in vain."

1952 sUIrJTled up this sentiment"

A letter to the Courier in

The lvrited admitted he had "a sneaking

admiration for the mapner in which the Koreans were fighting the whole
'--Torld, especially the white troops • .., 'Gooks, t defying the might of America . ...
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which for the first time •• • has been robbed of a victory, and by a nonwhite people ...... the battlefield of Korea is disproving a lot of nonsense
12
about the human race~1f
Blacks also tended to identify with the Koreans by drawing parallels
betNreen the status of Asia and the status of Africa.
the war the Courier began an editorial,

1I~1e

At the outbreak of

knm-T how. ~~e peoples of Asia
1/

and Africa are restive under the imperialistic system..

More directly,

Horace Cayton wrote in 1951 that "What is happening in Asia now will happen in Africa ten years from now."
anti-colonialist beliefs:

This identification led to strong

"We have teamed up with the world's maJor

colonizers and exploiters to maintain in the world the old status quo
13
of imperialism," charged the Call. and Post in IvTA.Y, 1951 .
The

combin~d

issues of white supremacy, the spectre of imperialism,

and the poor treatment of blacks at home and in the army led many blacks
to a rather unsympathetic view of tha waro
the Q211 and

Pos~editorialized

As early as August, 1950,

that nfrom a study of the

backgro l~~d

of

erents since the liberation of Korea, it becomes increasingly apparent
that a combination of administra.tbra ineptness, coupled with fwhite supre-

.

14

macy' arrogance has led us into a war which would have been avoided."
The Courier was more extreme..

It had at least seven regular colum-

nists reporting on the war in the editorial section, and at least five
of these--J.A. Rogers, P"G. Prattis, Benjamin Hays, Horace Cayton, and
Marjorie;; HcKenzie-·owere antiwar.
The most vocal at the beginning of the war was Rogers, whose intiial
reactions to the war were noted earlier.
gi ven North Korea the

!I

After writing that the U.S. had

green lightll to invade, Rogers continued wi t,.~ a

stream of antiwar editorials.

In July, Rogers quoted Lt. Col.

Tho~as

McClure (who had spent four years in Korea) on the attitude of South

- 128 -

Koreans :

"They hate us," HcClure claimed, " South Koreans aren 't interested

in fighting and quite a few of them are

commuJ.'1ists~1I

In April, 1 9)1,

Rogers denounced the U.S. for backing rulers such as Chiang and Rhea , "who
their own people didn t t want. 1I

Rogers ey'e n went so far as to claim

that North Korea had enjoyed better rule than had the Ebuth.

In Hay,

Rogers argued that "America has permitted Russia to eme:rga as the champain of Darker HumanitY •• o~tr.
is being fought over in Korea.

."

Trum~n

says the future of world freedom

lvell, darker humanity agrees, but' not

' 15

by the side Mr. Truman mea.."1s."
F:L"lally, in late June, P..o gers explicitly came out for American wi thdrawalo

"Look at Asia, II he wrote,

II

more than two-thirds of it is owned

by Russia, and most of the rest of it is under her influence.

Therefo:r,-e,

let America pullout of it, and make Asia Russia's sphere of influence .
America could t':1en devote herself to her own sphere of influence, the
West~tf

On September 1 J Rogers elaborated t his argument, noting that

Russ1.a 'tiDuld "have her hands full with the Chinese, Japanese, Koreans,
Thst L"ldians and others over their own national integr'ityoll

America could

no t defend all of Asia and all of Eu.ropein any case, Rogers concluded.
He "muld continue .vriting from this perspective for the remainder of the

war.

16
Rogers was not the only antiwar

spokes~an,

howevero

Horace Cayton

early in the war had suggested that the U.So press had played up the
early victories of black troops because the U.N. side embarrassingly
had no non.-.vhite nations fighting ",ith it.

Cayton would continue to

hold this cynical view of the war, giving special emphasis to its racial
themes.
world.

By early 1951, he would write, "I donft think we canp..1.Jlice-

The Korean business was a terrible mistake."

Cayton opposed "
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broadening the war into China; he also stressed that he was not an isolationist o Rather, he argued, America should use its
t,

nialism.

. '

p~ners

to end colo-

•

Military maneuvers alone would not stop communism, Cayton con-

cluded, the UoS must be able to give the peoples of the world" -especially
the darker peoples--a stake in democracy."

17

Courier colunmist P.C. Prattisalso opposed the war.

In early 1951,

Prattis argued that the .w ar was in no way a 'police ,action, 'critic,ized
both the U.S. and the SOviet union for having divided Korea against the
will of its people, claimed that

thew~

action without the participation

o~ Russi~

could n.o t '!!ruly be a legal U.N.

that the conflict was in fact a civil war.
wrote "this so-called police acticn is

~he

ever foistered upon the American people."
tion to the war through to the war' ~

in the decision, and concluded

In ~~h, 1951, Prattis
screWiest and most costly war
Prattis continued his opposi'18

conc~usio ~

Other writers made similar points, and added some of their own,
BenJamin 11ays in 1951 applauded Truman for trying to settle at the 38
parall~

th

but noted that Truman could and should have tried settling there

earlier in the war, instead of driving north.

At the end of the war, Mays

made the sane argument I noting too ~ . ~he war was ending "only a few thousand yards from where it had be gun eo owith Britain and India standing for
a ne gotia te d peace, we have been forced to do what in 1951 and late 1950
we might have done 'fith more grace o"
Rhee, and U.S. policies in general.

This article went on to criticize
"It isn't ,popular to write like

this," May-scone luded, "we are too close to it. o. but future historians
will write in this

~Nay•••Le t

us hail the truce! ,,1 9

Al though · the Courier 'fas the most, radical of the black newspapers in
this period, many of the above sentiments were expressed throughout the
black press.

The Call and Post's desire for peace "lias eloquently expressed
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in the following editorial from late 1951 :
"In the tumultuous Far Thst there is great suffering and destruction.
Millions in Korea among both our friends and our enemies are suffering the
dire privation and despair that only a bitter war can bring.

In our zeal

to 'liberate' these so-called backward peoples from the threat of communist
yoke, we have thus far only succeeded in disru.pting their normal way of li f e,
d8stroyin~ :

their

homes and churches, and bringing them to the brink

of destru.ction ... can anyone seek a more glorious present for the world
,
20
this
time of year than a just and loving peace?"
,
The 9.!.ll' and Post also continuously reported on racfsm and racial tension in the army.

They frequently stressed the destru.ction of KOrea, and

the bankruptcy of the Rhee regime.
imperialist

them~s

They noted the white supremacy and

of the war, and consistently called ror'mediation.

One of the best examples of their view of the wa~ (and ~lso the repatriation issue) was their a~gry reaction to the Arm,y's detention of a few
bl ack soldiers at the end of the war on the suspicion that they had been
"brainwashed" by the communists:

"there is a

grea~

deal of fertile ground

to be exploited in the minds of troops who have been thrust into the battIe ill-equipped, badly-trained, and . for a

~rpose

that still has our

- State D3pa.rtment fumbling to explain," fumed the Ca;,ll and Post; moreover,
tithe smaring of these battered and suffering heroes
is even more inexcus.
,

able ,in the light of our
of

comrr~~ist

o~rn

revelations that we have indoctrinated thousands

prisoners with so much love for our own ideology that their

refusal to go back to their homes is one of the principle stalemates
in the settlement of the Korean war.

How did we do it--with mirrors?u21

The war also brought out more radical opposition.
and Dr.

"'.E.B.

Both Paul Robeson

,·~Bois presented very leftist views of the war.

"Unless
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American intervention in Kor ea and the rest of the world is stopped,"
Robeson argued in July-, 1950, "Africa ifill be next in line.
of the Pre 51 den t

f S

order tha t the live s of

0111'

The meaning

sailors and airmen must

be sacrificed for the government's despicable puppet in Korea shall not
be lost to the millions in the East, whose day of freedom is not far off. "
In a somewhat different vein, DuBois in 1952 charged that "In Korea, the
UoS. has coInI1'!itted every atrocity that man ever did to mano

We have ....

..

poured millions of gallons of flaming gasoline on shrieking men, l:10men
and children, and tlL'r'Iled a helpless nation into a stinking desert." During the course of the war, a s was noted earlier, DuBois was tried as for-

-

eign agent.
tieso

Robeson had his passport revoked for his political activi-

Radical criticism also

CawB

from the Civil PJ.ghts Congress:

"This

war 1vith Korea is not the Negro's war," argued CRC Exeeutive Secretar.r
H1lliam Patterson in 1951,

If

the U. S.. should bring 1 ts troops home to

fight for democracy in this countr.r."

22

Although this radical criticism is important, it is perhaps equally
important to note that many of the ideas and principles that concerned
the antiwar blacks also concerned the more moderate blacks vrho officially
supported the war.

For example, pro-war black leader Ralph Bunche in

early 1951 warned the West to Itawaken to the fires of revolutionary natiorn."
" A Sl.a.
" ,,23
1l.5m
l.n

Hany blacks remained highly skeptical towards the l-lar.

Although

they welcomed the integration of troops, they remained sensitive to the
continuing racism in the Army, and in America.

Black commentators also

saw themes of l-Thi te supremacy and colonialism in the war.
in

rr~y

Their s;}-"l7lpa thies

cases were more with the Koreans than with the Americans.

,\n

editorial from the Courier near the end of 1950 sums up much of black

II
'I

,I

-

1]2 -

sentiment:
"v1hat are we doing in
Asia "Tant us?

~sia?

ifuy must '\-I"e be there?

Ib the people of

Ib they Ivant" .... our "ray of life .. .1 !)o they think we are their

friends?o.Do they enjoy the spectacla of our defending them by waging
war in their coun-t.ries?

Are they \clilling to be the victi..'Tls of such a

derense?
"We don't believe the Asians want us"
our way of life.

lve don't think they like

We don't believe they,want •• •
USo

They look at our record

of arrogance and exploitation in the past, and they have a feeling of
hatred for

uS o

This is as true in Korea as in Chhl8..,,24

With this analysis, it -:.-ras only logical to oppose the Korean war.
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Conclusion
" Is there any point to which you would draw my
attention?"
"To the curious incident of the dog in the nighttime."
"The dog did nothing in the night-time. "
"That was the curious incid.e nt," remarked Sherlock
Holmes.
--"Silver Blaze", The Memoirs of Sherlock
Holmes , Sir Arthur Conan-ooyle .

,
Significant sections of the American antiwar movement fai l ed
to materialize during the Korean war.

'.

.

Many of the traditional

consituents of opposition movements during wartime were either
unable or unwilling to prot e st U. S. involvement. - This " absence"
cannot totally be ascribed to the nobility of the

U~S.-Ga~se.in

Korea .

without making value judgements, it seems odd that World War Two
generated more opposition from a wider variety of perspectives
than did the Kor ean conflict ~ the enemy in Korea was less obviously
"evi l"; the battlefield more obscure ; and the direct threat to
America less obvious .
For a variety of reasons independent of !he

~ar,

t he creation

of an antiwar movement in America from 1950 to 1953 was particularly difficult.

For their own individual reasons, as well as for

reasons related to the general political climate, different groups
did not join the antiwar movement.

Although a thorough analysis of why

some potential parts of the movement never came into existence
i s beyond the scope of this paper , some discussion of this topic
is needed .
Two of the most important influences on American thought
in th e early 1950s were World War Two and the Cold war.

As was
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noted before, World War Two convinced many Americans that war
could be the more moral option in a given situation.
convinced them of the effectiveness of war;

It also

this perception

was probably enhanced by the fact that America emerged from the
war relatively undamaged, and with a revitalized economy.

Another

crucial lesson many drew from the war was that "appeasement"
caused the war, and therefore "ap:reasement" had to be, avoided
at all costs in the future.

"Appeasement" rapidly became synono-

mous with any form of compromise, and the term " appeaser" became
a vicious and effective smear word.
The Cold war also had a tremendously debilitating effect
on the peace movement.

Belligerency from both the U.S. and the

Soviet Union after the war increased world tension to a tremendously high degree.

Suddenly, the entire world had been divided

into a giant game board with two competing players.

The Soviet

domination of Eastern Europe, the well-founded accounts of repression in the Soviet bloc, and finally the "fall" of China
made many Americans very nervous about, and hostile towards,
their former allies.
It is not surprising, therefore, that with the spectre of
Hitler in their memories, many Americans simply equated communism with fascism, and drew conclusions from this perspective.
Doctrines of "Red Fascism" and "vital center" liberalism which
were prevalent at the time described ideologies which made no
distinction between the totalitarianism of Stalin, and the totalitariansim of Hitler.

Much has been written on the strengths
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and weaknesses of this analogy ; it is only necessary to note
here that viewing the North Korean attack as equivalent to Germany ' s invasion of Poland, as many commentators at the time did ,
seems something of an overstatement in retrospect.
The effects of World War Two and the Cold war on l iberals
were tremendous.

In a study of liberals during this period ,

Mary MacAuliffe concludes that this era saw the development
of
,
a "new liberalism"' , different from earlier forms of liberalism
in the U. S.

This "new liberalism" rabidly opposed " extremes"

in politicspusually endorsed the foreign policy of the Truman
administration, and generally redefined liberalism to fit the
new conservative national mood and the Cold war.

MacAuliffe

argues that liberals in this period "abandoned many traditional
liberal tenets--the belief in progress, in man ' s goodness, in
popular democracy, and in wor~peace--replacing them with a chastened , and in their view ' realistic ' philosophy which stressed
man's sinfullness, the seeming inevitability of conflict among
nations, and the dangers of democratic rule."

Also unlike' pre-

vious liberals in America, the liberals of the early 1950s "'stressed
the benificence of American pOlitical and economic institutions."l
To a great extent not only "left" liberals but even socialists
subscribed to the above ideology.

The world had been divided into

t wo armed camps ; any gain for one side would be a loss for the other.
The socialists chose to support the side they felt had greater
democratic rights.
--- ~-.

" Life would seem to me a much better place

if I saw any social action that might h ave been taken June 25 in
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Korea that would not in' its implications and consequences have
been worse .than that which was taken, n Norman Thomas wrote a friend
in 1950, "but neither in my own mind nor in the many statements
which have come to me have I found any.alternative to what was
done."

And Thomas became a strong supporter of efforts to "beat

back that aggre~sion. ,,2
Another leading figure on the left who supported the war was
Henry Wallace.

Wallace broke with what was left of the Progressive

Party on this issue, announcing that "When my country is at war
and the United Nations sanctions that war, I am on the side of
my country and the U.N."

Angrily dissociating himself from his

former supporters, Wallace oncewvote A.J ~ ·Muste that .. if our
left-wing friends were interested in peace, they would write Stalin to end the Korean conflict."J
Earl Browder wrote concerning the Communist Party in 1956,
' ''I am not interested in microbiology."

It is with this view that

one must approach the CP during ·the Korean war.
cant that Joseph Starobin's book

It is signifi-

American Communism in Crisis,

which covers the CP from 194J to 1957 contains in its JOO-odd pages
one passing reference to the Korean war.

The communists in the

late 1940s and early '50s simply had too many other worries.
The party was devastated in the Wallace campaign of 1948; saw
the destruction of their union base in the C.I.O.--eleven left-led
unions were expelled in 1949 alone; had eleven of its leaders
convicted in the Smith Act trials of 1949, with more to follow; and
found throughout the early '50s a growing ideology in America
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called

McCarth y~m

which fostered bo th the increasing legal repres-

sion of party members, and also the idea in the minds of many

.

Americans that " communism" was the cause of most of America ' s
4
troubles.
The CP lost half of its claimed membership in the year 19501951 .

Starobin's chapter on the party from 1948-51 is titled

"Incoherence and Agony", wh i ch is as good a way as any to describe
the CP during the Korean war.

Starobin argues that i.n this period

the CP "turned inward", and even began internal "witchhunts" (for
doctrinal purity ) of their own.

Despite occasional rhetoric about

"Korean people's liberation" and "the cOlonial . enslavement of all
East Asia", the CP remained inarticulate and inactive on the war.
To the extent that their "peace offensive" had any impact , it was
in garnering 1 , 350 , 000 American signatures for the Stockholm Peace
Pledge--a call to ban nuclear weapons that did not mention the
Korean war. 5
Opposition from the ri ght is a slightly more subtle subject .
Taft--whose positions are representative of " right-wing opposition " -- did critize the war.

But Taft' s perspective came not only

from the traditional " isolationist" school , but also from the
" Asia-first" school which stressed the importance of Asia to America .

Taft ' s opinions were at many points inconsistent, but overall

i t can be concluded that his objections were in the first place
highly partisan, and in the second place not anti-war, but rather
anti-limited war .
When the war began , Taft blamed the Soviet Union for North
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Korea ' s " outrageous act of aggression against a friendly, inde pendent nation."

Throughout the war Taft, in his own words, had

"no difficulty whatever in lining ... up with the general principles
announced by General MacArthur. '"

Taft denounced the administration

for not bombing China, and for not using Nationalist Chinese forces
in Korea.

Again in his own words, Taft backed" an aggressive

war" in Korea.

This position cannot accurately be called antiwar. 6

A more general conclusion about Taft and others in the Republican Party is made by Ronald Caridi in
RQlitics:

the Republican Rarty

~

~he

Korean War and American

a Case Study.

The Republican re-

sponse to the Korean war "was neither consistent nor sincere."
The G.O.P. supported the war, then grew critical of it, "then
passionately associated themselves with the 'no substitute for
victory' philosophy of General MacArthur."

Apparently, the Repub-

licans felt it to be advantageous to criticize the administration
on both s ides of the issue at the same time; the G.O.P. simultaneously
referred to the .war as "useless" and called for its expansion.
Caridi concludes that the Republican dissent was

'~otivated

more

by political expediency than by a desire to provide a consistent
and viable alternative to Administration pOlicies •• • n . ?
Even black opinion was not as strongly antiwar as it might
have been.

In 1948, A. Phillip Randolph, who would later support

the war, headed an organization called the League for Non-Violent
Civil Disobedience Against Military Segregation.

Randolph testi-

fied in front of the Senate Armed Services Committee that "this
time Negro es will not take a jimcrow draft lying down ••• I personally
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upon all veterans to j oin this civil disobedience movement • • • if
we must die, let us die as free men, and not as jimcrow slaves."
Truman's order to integrate the armed serv:lces mollified this potentially explosive opposition completely, and .Randolph supported
the war, despite the Army's slow, inconsistent, and often only token attempts at integration. 8
Finally, even pacifists were not immune to the peculiarities
of the Korean war and its period

As was noted earlier, the fact

that the war was a U.N. action allowed.world.federalist pacifists
to endorse the war wholeheartedly.

UWF president Allan Cranston

proclaimed that the joint U.S.-U.N. action "may well go down in
history as the experience that opened man's eyes to salvation.,,9
Beyond the U.N. issue though, pacifists were affected by the
ideology of the times.

In the external sense, this was reflected

during the war by a number of pacifists being beaten up when distributing leaflets, and by a number losing their jObs. lO
But the prevailing ideology als·o ·influenced the waj':·paCi!ist~\
themselves thought.

.

Charles ·DeBenedetti has sUmnlE~d this ·Uf> well, and

his analysis serves as a good conclusion for this section.

DeBene-

detti argues that after World War Two, with the intensification
of the Cold war:
" internationalists, progressives , and to a lesser extent ,
pacifists, shifted the focus of their anti-imperialist criticism
from the United States and the western colonial powers to the Soviet Union and anti-western revolutionary nationalists in Asia .
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With surprising speed , after 1947, they adopted a kind of Cold war
anti-imperialism that identified the main enemy of Asian peace and
freedom no longer as systematic great power interventionism, but
as an ideolbgy that masked the imperial interests of an ambitious
totalitarian state ." l l

And yet there was a peace movement during the Korean war.
What was perhaps the most interesting feature of this'particular
antiwar movement was that the most directly political opposition to
the war came from groups which for certain reasons saw t hemselves
as primarily unpolitical or , more accurately , saw themselves as
being somehow "outside" the political struggles of the Cold war .
The FOR automatically opposed the war , and, having no vested interests
in solutions that were primarily political , freely and unselfconscioL.:-sly published highly political criticisms of the war.

The WRL,

who traditionally had a more "political" outlook, suffered splits
over t he political questions of the war.
Blacks " to varying degrees, also saw themselves as " outside "
the global power struggle.

They tended to look at other issues

b9yond the U.S.-U.S.S.R. polarization.

And they often identified

themselves with c'o lonial peoples in Asia and Africa as much as with
the U.S.

Whether or not Asia goes communist, wrote one black critic ,

she intends to be free of white imperialism.
Finally, both of the large women's peace groups examined in
this paper, despite all their political work and radical phrasemaking , were always quick to stress their specific nature as women' s
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peace groups .

Again, these groups placed themselves outside the

parameters of contemporary political debate.

Women were simply

inherently inclined towards peace, they argued.

lft'easons for this

ranged from concern wi th war-related inflation , to concern with the
loss of life of husbands , sons and brothers.

Both AWP and the WILPF

stressed the importance of women and women's values to t he peace
movement.
Additionally, the periodicals of these organizations suggest
that women ' s peace groups served social functions, and perhaps even
functioned as support groups.

AWP, for example·, frequently had

picnics, teas, and similar events for its members ; comradery and
mutual support was stressed by both groups.
Finally, these organizations provided an outlet for political
action for women in a time when few such outlets existed in "mainstream" politics .
One could sugges t then , that although
a number of members who were politically

AWP (lind the WILPF had

l eft·'wing--in the Progres-

sive Party or American Labor Party sense--a good deal of their ability to form large organizations and motivate comparatively large
numbers of people came from an appeal that was outside the political framework:
social network.

"women's" desire for peace, and an accompanying
These organizations then provided a political out-

let for acti vlst · ,; . . women who did not see themselves as being confined to the field of contemporary debate .

Such. groups produced

a goo d deal of radical opposition to the war .
Some of thi s is of necessity conjecture .

But the basic theme

that those who opposed the war were th ose who for some reason saw
themselves as outside th e prevai l ing political debate is s ound.
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Liberals accepted most of th e premises of this debate , and were
therefore limited from the beginning.

Blacks , many pacifists , and

women's peace groups did not use these premises as a starting point ,
and therefore ended up with very different conclusions about the
war than much of America.

Ironically, therefore, it was these groups ,

and not the more traditionally "political" individuals and

organi~

zations of the left and right, that provided the most consistent ,
factual , and

polit~cal

opposition to the Korean war .

CheerS greet d

of. the fir

sf

e the annou
peace talk 5 _ neement

Dear Congressm.an
We appeal to you to help meet our deep need for peace
and security. We ask that you ' do everything possible to
stop further bloodshed and to speed up the negotiations
for immediate peace in Korea. ·
Peace in Korea means the return of our loved ones.
Every day peace is delayed ~creases the danger of war
spreading throughout ·the world.
Our families are hard hit by the heavy burdens of war,
not only in the draft of our sons, husbands and brothers,
but in our shrinking fcmlUy budgets as taxes and living
cOsts keep soaring.

The atmosphere of hate let loose by the war has led to
mounting violence against the Negro people, bombings· of
chu..-ches end synagogues, and threatens the liberties of
cll Americans.
'-

to

\Ve feel the best way
protect our families' lives and
well·being is to have peace in Korea and peace in the world.
We urge you to use your influence in Congress for a
meeting ·of the heads of the major powers of the world .the United States,. the Soviet Union, Great Britain, France
and the People's Republic of China - to work out disarmOment and a peace agreement to remove world tensions.

'.

', .

~

..,~

, r: !.: ; ~ ". ; '; :. • ",

;~ i
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